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Background 
 
A consensus is developing concerning the need for a supranational automatic stabiliser in EMU, as 
acknowledged in the Commission Blueprint1 and the Four Presidents' Report.2 Such stabilisers 
smooth cyclical fluctuations, restraining booms and busts and stabilise the economic and social 
situation in the Member States most affected by crises. 
The Communication on the Social Dimension of EMU3 reaffirmed that, in the long term, "it should 
become possible to establish an autonomous euro area budget providing the euro area with a fiscal 
capacity to support Member States absorb shocks". However, it also drew attention to the fact that 
supranational EU automatic stabilisers need to be seen as a long-term project, notably in view of 
institutional issues concerning possible Treaty changes. As a result, discussions on concrete proposals 
for the implementation of a fiscal capacity have not yet started.  
Discussions have started in academic circles, where proposals typically take the form of a transfer 
system across Member States and a centralisation at euro-area (or EU) level of some counter-cyclical 
public expenditure (such as an unemployment benefits scheme – or UBS). However, more analysis is 
needed in order to assess in-depth the different options for a fiscal capacity.  
One aspect of this analysis focuses on the interaction between the national and the supranational 
UBS. Specifically, there may be a risk of moral hazard when the supranational level pays (part of) a 
benefit but is not necessarily able to check crucial characteristics of the beneficiary (job search effort, 
eligibility, etc.). This involves a moral hazard risk at the individual as well as the Member State level. 
The experience of existing federal or heavily regionalised systems in the EU could bring useful lessons 
for a possible supranational UBS, such as regarding a set of common minimal activation conditions. 
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1. Introduction 
There are some who consider supranational unemployment-based automatic stabilizers to be 
advantageous for the Euro area and the European Union at large (Deinzer 2004; Dullien 2007, 2012, 
2014; French Ministry of Finance and Public Accounts 2014; see Figure 1). An E(MU)-wide 
unemployment benefit scheme could function as an automatic stabilizer but it could also create 
awareness amongst European citizens for the efforts and the advantages of the Union and it could 
reinforce convergence of social models. This paper focusses on stabilisation purposes and 
investigates issues of moral hazard. Even though the political climate in Europe is very hostile to 
further integration – in some countries more so than others – it would be wise to consider the merits 
of such proposals as it is the duty for public officials, politicians and researchers to look beyond the 
problems of today and to contemplate the solutions of tomorrow. If an E(M)U-wide unemployment 
benefit scheme, or some scheme that reinforces and supports national systems, could actually 
achieve at least some of the goals stated above, it warrants further investigation.i  
In order to fully appreciate the possibilities and the limitations of a supranational scheme in 
combination with national schemes, it is paramount to learn from the experiences with actual real 
world practices of multi-tiered unemployment systems. Nearly everywhere in the European Union, 
but also in other Western countries, unemployment schemes are already multi-tiered in some form 
or another. Moreover, there is a strong European tendency to decentralise unemployment 
administration, social assistance and activation of the unemployed (Van Berkel & Borghi 2008, 
Wieshaupt 2010, Mosley 2011). It is crucial that, before we even think about adding another layer on 
top of existing unemployment schemes, we understand the realities and experiences of the 
(interaction between) existing layers.  
This paper will focus on the decentralisation efforts and the experiences with multi-tiered systems of 
unemployment benefits, social assistance and activation that exist today in order to explore the issue 
of moral hazard. The current European trend of decentralisation is very much linked to activation and 
moral hazard. The issue of moral hazard is especially relevant for the solidarity among contributors of 
any unemployment related scheme. This is one of the reasons for enacting activation systems. 
Passive labour market policies, administrating and disbursing cash benefits, are policies that are 
often executed at the central level. But the transition from passive to activating unemployment 
systems requires governments to have more intimate knowledge of unemployed individuals (Van 
Berkel & Borghi 2008). Activation, in this line of reasoning, requires tailor-made policies and the 
capacity to administer and monitor those policies. This logic mandates a decentralisation of labour 
market policies to local governments (OECD 2003: 12-17, Knuth & Larsen 2010). But besides the 
effort to bring activation closer to the unemployed, there are also other reasons for a multi-tiered 
system.ii Because there is a variety of motivations behind multi-tiered systems it does not come as a 
surprise that there are different forms of decentralisation. Bredgaard and Larsen try to bring order in 
the multitude of questions considering multi-tiered schemes and reforms. They identify two main 
dimensions: formal policy and operational policy (Table 1). Formal policy reforms concern the actual 
content of policies, whereas operational policy reforms deal with the relationship and the 
responsibilities of actors: who implements policy, who is responsible and to whom? Such questions 
are exactly the type of questions that are relevant for understanding the possibilities and limitations 
of multi-tiered systems. Therefore, the main focus of this paper will be on operational policy reforms. 
In practice, the difference between those two dimensions might not be so clear-cut.iii  
This paper will investigate different forms of multi-tiered labour market governance systems to draw 
lessons for possible E(M)U-wide employment based automatic stabilizers – and especially it will 
review experiences with issues of moral hazard. Different forms of multi-tiered governance relate to 
possible European schemes in different ways. First of all, the federal form of labour market 
governance decentralisation of the United States forms the inspiration for the works by Dullien. 
Arguably, the way in which the American states and the federal level relate to each other is more 
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akin to the relationship between the member states and the supra-national level of the EU than how 
municipalities and centralized governments relate to each other. The relation between the American 
states and the federal government (the leeway they enjoy in labour market governance) but also the 
size and demographic characteristics resemble the EU member states more closely than the 
characteristics of municipalities do. In order to assess whether we can draw any lessons from the U.S. 
experience we need to understand the institutional dimension of the U.S. experience. Secondly, the 
way in which municipalised or regionalised EU member states deal with issues of moral hazard might 
provide valuable insights for any policymaker contemplating supranational schemes. The European 
experiences are, thus, very relevant as well. Thirdly, any European scheme needs to take account of 
the variety of labour market governance in the European Union itself. In other words, the design of 
an E(M)U-wide scheme should accommodate or at least recognise the variety of its member states. 
This paper itself does not represent the full diversity of EU member states, it only deals with a subset 
of the possible range of constellations.  
This paper will proceed in the following manner. Firstly, a theoretical framework will be constructed 
in order to understand the basic concepts inherent to multi-tiered labour market governance 
systems. Secondly, this theoretical framework will be used to select cases which represent the 
different forms of multi-tiered governance models. Thirdly, the institutional framework of the cases 
will be analysed. The insights gained from the cases will be combined with the theoretical framework 
in the ‘results’ chapter. Finally, the conclusions and pointers for further investigation will be outlined 
in the last chapter. 
2. Multi-tiered Labour Market Governance 
2.1 Types of multi-tiered labour market governance models 
Before we take a look at the cases we must get an understanding of what exactly a multi-tiered 
labour market governance system entails. We should have some basic conceptualisation of the 
different forms, practical implementations and issues of moral hazard involved. This is to say, we 
want to fully appreciate the diversity within our cases on selected issues to draw lessons on full range 
of the possibilities which are open to policy makers. Furthermore, in order to select relevant cases 
one must come to grips with the existing diversity among different countries. As said, there are 
different forms of employment policy reforms and decentralisation, but there are also multiple 
classifications or typologies of such reforms. This paper takes the separation of formal and 
operational policy by Bredgaard and Larsen as a starting point (2008). From this starting point we will 
close in on the empirical level by building on Hugh Mosley who identifies a couple of practical forms 
of decentralisation and multi-tiered labour market governance (2011). 
Hugh Mosley, in preparation of the PES to PES dialogue instigated by the European Commission, 
authored a most useful analytical paper in which he not only clarifies identifies some of the practical 
forms decentralisation can take, but also considers the link between policy goals and those different 
forms of decentralisation. Mosley, thus, focusses mostly on operational policy reform but does not 
neglect formal changes either. He differentiates between, what he calls, ‘managerial’ and ‘political’ 
decentralisation (2011).iv This classification takes off where the difference between formal and 
operational reform ends (Figure 2). Managerial decentralisation is mostly driven by the desire for 
more efficiency and effectiveness. (Mosley 2011: 7). This form of decentralisation is very much 
influenced by New Public Management (NPM) and specifically by Management By Objectives (MBO). 
Reforms include measures such as the setting of targets and ways to measure progress for central 
agencies (or local offices thereof) to achieve. Sometimes local offices of central agencies are free to 
choose how to achieve the goals themselves, but often there is some sort of ‘policy menu’ from 
which local managers can pick the types of policies they see most fit for their local office. The goals 
and measurements, however, are centrally set and because of that, this type of decentralisation is 
actually a refinement of central authority (Mosley 2011: 6). In this sense it could be seen as a way to 
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combat moral hazard issues between levels of hierarchy (see section 2.2). Mosley states that this 
type of decentralisation is almost universal amongst EU member states and that the European 
Employment Strategy (EES) has been instrumental in the process of spread and diffusion of these 
policies (2011: 7). This form of labour market policy decentralisation pertains in the first place to 
local offices of a central or federal authority. Public Employment Services (PES) are, thus, perhaps 
decentralised but this does not necessarily entail any real transfusion of authority between layers of 
government. In other words, these MBO practices can also be applied between different levels of 
government. In essence, managerial decentralisation is not a true form of a multi-tiered system as a 
central or federal authority can remain in charge of both the design and implementation of policies. 
Multi-tiered systems often encompass elements of both types of decentralisation so it is paramount 
not to neglect one of the two forms of decentralisation.  
Political decentralisation, on the other hand, is much more a true form of decentralisation and the 
essence of a multi-tiered system. Political decentralisation implies the devolution of labour market 
policy authority to lower levels of government. Local PES offices become formal political and legal 
entities under the responsibility of lower levels of government, which could have a very substantial 
freedom when it comes to formal policy change, policy innovation and the type of implementation. 
This form will be of the utmost importance for this paper, as it is the closest to a truly multi-tiered 
system. It is also the most complex form of decentralisation. Political decentralisation, according to 
Mosley, is not always the result of changes in formal labour market policy but can also be driven by 
pragmatic or political motivations such as ethnic or linguistic regional differences, the historical 
development of institutions – for example social assistance is often already decentralised - or the 
political desire for more autonomy (2011: 12-13). Political processes and formal policy changes are 
not mutually exclusive when it comes to motivation behind political decentralisation. Nor are 
political and managerial decentralisation mutually exclusive. It is very likely to see MBO or NPM 
influenced practices reflected in political decentralisation.  
Political decentralisation can take different forms and those different forms are instigated by 
different motivations and goals. Mosley identifies three types: federal, regional and municipal.v 
Essentially, these three types do not just represent decentralisation but are representative of the 
different forms of multi-tiered labour market governance models. These types are mutually 
exclusive. Federalism is characterised by the greatest autonomy for local government of those three 
types. Local government here is understood as states or cantons, which are responsible for a range of 
domestic policy areas including employment policies. Regionalised decentralisation is a form of a 
multi-tiered system in which regions have some responsibilities in certain policy fields, including 
employment policy. The term local government in this sense is understood as regions or provinces. 
Municipalisation, according to Mosley, is a form of decentralisation where municipalities have 
limited responsibilities in some areas of policy. In this case the responsibilities of municipalities often 
only explicitly include the activation of some or all unemployed – it is not uncommon for 
municipalities to be responsible only for social assistance (2011: 8). Table 2 shows a categorisation of 
European and North-American countries along these lines. Although we consider Belgium as much as 
a federal state as Canada or the US, we follow Mosley in classifying Belgium as an example of 
‘regional political decentralisation’. 
To understand the practical implications of decentralisation and multi-tiered systems we need to ask 
ourselves: in what dimensions of labour market governance can local actors obtain flexibility? Every 
dimension of labour market governance flexibility has its own practical forms. These are often 
presented as distinct and separate forms but are in practice, of course, not so distinct and certainly 
not always mutually exclusive. Furthermore, some forms of flexibility might look the same on paper 
but can be very different in practice.vi Such issues require qualitative analysis. The ‘practical 
flexibility’ of local and regional levels of government in labour market governance is very clearly 
discussed in three prominent sources: Mosley (2011),vii Froy et al. (2011) and the OECD LEED report 
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on flexibility in labour market governance edited by Giguère and Froy (2009, see also  
Table 3). 
 
Table 4 identifies the most common practical forms of flexibility in managerial and political 
decentralisation. The purpose of the table is to provide an overview of possible practical forms of 
decentralisation and how they are divided among the two types of decentralisation. It is by no means 
exhaustive or conclusive. Another precaution is that most of the forms described are subject to a 
certain degree of flexibility themselves. Take for example ‘performance measures’: even though a 
very strict system might be in place in a specific country, it does not entail that every aspect of the 
policy implementation is covered by those targets. Some activities might be purposefully left out, 
they could be hard to capture in indicators or they might be left out of the analysis by happenstance. 
When performance management does not cover all relevant policy areas it creates what is referred 
to as “accountability gaps”. Such gaps could hinder the interaction between levels of government, 
but it is not uncommon that performance management systems deliberately do not cover some 
activities of local actors because this increases the flexibility of those local actors (Froy et al. 2011: 
43). 
2.2 Moral hazard 
Moral hazard is a central concept in this paper. It can incur on two levels: the individual level (the 
benefit claimant) and the institutional level (the institution tasked with administration and activation 
of unemployment related benefits). But let us first to the concept itself: “At its strongest, the 
condition that there should be no moral hazard requires that both the probability, p, and the insured 
loss, L, should be exogenous to the individual. Less stringently, moral hazard is not a problem as long 
as individuals can influence p and L only at a cost to themselves greater than the expected gain from 
doing so” (Barr 1993: 92). Relating this to unemployment insurance, moral hazard means that the 
risk of becoming and staying unemployed becomes, to some extent, subject to deliberate choices of 
the individual. By insuring the risk of unemployment, the cost of moral hazard is born by the state (or 
the collective insurance fund). In social market economies, public authorities may be prepared to 
bear some moral hazard-related costs, given the benefits of the automatic stabilization function and 
their wish to protect individuals who are truly involuntary unemployed.viii At the individual level, 
unemployment insurance alters the incentive structure to find employment at the first possible 
opportunity (Nicholson & Needels 2006: 6, 9). Especially with unemployment related benefits that 
have a long duration, the state or insurance fund is confronted with this altered incentive structure. 
2.2.1 Activation: combatting moral hazard at the individual level and the consequences for 
moral hazard on the institutional level 
Through altering the incentive structure of the individual, it is possible for the state to limit its risk of 
prolonged unemployment and therefore to reduce the risk of undesired high welfare expenditures. 
Activation and labour market services have partially been developed to deal with issues of moral 
hazard for individual benefit claimants (Calmfors 1995, Boone & Van Ours 2004: 4, Grubb 2004: 365). 
By engaging in job search-contracts with benefit claimants, through monitoring of requirements and 
by offering services, governments try to counteract the danger that unemployed benefit recipients 
would postpone their job search. Such activating services and monitoring responsibilities are most 
conveniently implemented at the local level, either through local subsidiaries of central actors or by 
local governments or operators (OECD 2003: 12-17, Knuth & Larsen 2010). Because such 
responsibilities are thought to be better situated at the local level, the authority over the funding 
benefits and the authority over the implementation of activation policies could get separated. In the 
case where the local level is required to perform and fund activating labour market services but does 
not bear the fiscal responsibility over the benefits, the incentive structure is skewed towards 
providing only limited services or even creating ‘shell’ programmes that are only activating in name. 
This specific form of moral hazard is termed ‘parking’ as the unemployed are parked in programmes 
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that do not actually entail any activation (Grubb 394-395; Nunn et al. 2009: 15-16). The following 
definition of moral hazard by Mosley, therefore, applies equally to the principal-agent relationship 
between the state and the individual as to the relationship between levels of government: “Moral 
hazard refers to the (ex post) condition that the principal is not able to monitor or assess (fully) the 
activities of the agent which enables the latter to various forms of non-compliance with the 
contractual terms, e.g. so-called shirking” (Mosley et al. 2001: 10). Moral hazard also occurs in 
situations in which one level of government bears the fiscal responsibilities for the benefits and 
another administers and disburses the benefit. In that relationship the costs of individuals prolonging 
their unemployment spell is not felt by the level that disburses and administers the benefit. The 
purpose of this paragraph has been to demonstrate that linking activation and benefit can create 
another level of moral hazard: the institutional or governmental level.  
Another, related, possibility for the occurrence of moral hazard on the institutional level is when 
several benefits exist alongside each other, funded by different levels of government. A common 
example is when local governments fund social assistance and the central level funds sickness 
benefits. Determining whether or not a benefit claimant is eligible for either sickness or social 
assistance becomes an issue of moral hazard. This specific form is often referred to as ‘dumping’: 
intentional wrongful assessment of eligibility to transfer caseloads from one benefit scheme to 
another. These ideal-typical forms of moral hazard are represented in Table 6.ix  
2.2.2 Designing performance measurements to prevent institutional moral hazard 
In any unemployment insurance system, the challenge for public authorities is to create incentives 
towards limiting the duration of unemployment. Such incentives can stem from low generosity or 
short duration of benefits but activation is part and parcel of the incentive system with which the 
unemployed are confronted. In a multi-tiered system that delegates activation to a lower level of 
government whilst maintaining the budgetary responsibility for benefits at the central level, the 
central level must secure the compliance of the lower level of government with the central objective 
of activation. To ensure compliance, the behaviour of agencies responsible for activation could be 
determined by higher levels of government, which is often attempted through performance 
measures, legal requirements, mandatory reporting, transparency and monitoring of the agencies 
involved.x This is what Mosley described as ‘management by objectives (MBO)’ (2011: 6).xi This can 
be done in two ways: ex-ante setting of operational objectives and performance targets or constant 
measuring and reporting the performance of operating units against these objectives. (Mosley 2001: 
14). There are different kind of objectives or performance measures (Table 5). Three types of 
measures are differentiated: input measures (budgets, the amount of staff), process measures (also 
referred to in the literature as ‘output’, which are focussed on the actions of the service provider) 
and outcome measures, which can be subdivided into intermediate and final outcome measures 
(Grubb 2004: 358, Nunn et al. 2009: 2-3). The use of these indicators is inspired by agency-theory, 
which assumes that there will be less likelihood of moral hazard under conditions where principals 
and agents agree on goals, but only when performance can be accurately measured and tied to effort 
(Moynihan 2010: 31). It must be noted however that: “agency problems, especially moral hazard, are 
endemic to the performance management approach with its strong emphasis on achieving 
quantitative targets” (Mosley 2001: iii). Additionally, those conditions which are assumed by agency-
theory are rare in public services (Moynihan 2010: 31). Moynihan even states that designing any 
performance management or contract-based system – a market model – not only creates 
opportunities for moral hazard to arise but also undermine the Public Service Motivation (PSM) of 
civil servants (2010; Heinrich 2007: 283-284). The irony is that it is exactly this type of intrinsic 
motivation that could be the best remedy against shirking performance management (Moynihan 
2010: 25). This does not necessarily entail that performance management systems are inherently 
counterproductive. But there is a consensus in the literature that suggests that performance 
indicators must accurately, comprehensively and timely reflect actor behaviour, that this data must 
be robust and that there should be limited number of targets and finally that both levels must be 
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committed to those goals (Nunn et al. 2009: 16, 45; Heinrich 2007: 284; Mosley 2001: iii). 
Furthermore, performance management has costs, these costs are often opaque (Grubb 2004: 363; 
Mosley 2001: 91). In order to be effective, any performance management model must increase 
compliance and efficiency in such a way that it offsets the costs of the system itself. Performance 
monitoring could also be combined with incentive payments – bonuses. Studies have shown that 
these payments do not necessarily have to be high in order to affect behaviour (Mosley 2001: 97). 
But when performance measures are used to allocate bonuses and when these measures are easily 
manipulated it creates incentives for moral hazard (Heinrich 2007: 285). Additionally they may 
generate supply of services above the level of demand, leading to higher costs while not producing 
any added value (Grubb 2004: 363). The purpose of this paragraph is to explain that performance 
management can be used to enhance the compliance of lower levels of government, but that there 
are dangers and costs involved. 
Concerning the practical uses of indicators: ‘input’ measures refer to what local governments or one-
stop-shop operators work with (budgets or staff) and are not particularly common. When they are 
used, they do not actually incentivise behaviour per se. For example, when local levels of 
government are granted a specific budget the principal level runs the risk that the local level might 
not actually implement the budgets in an effective way. When local levels are required to provide a 
certain budget themselves, the principal level runs the risk that local governments dump their 
caseloads. Most common measures are ‘process’ performance measures. In essence, such indicators 
measure the efforts of the local subsidiaries and governments by keeping track of the amount of 
vacancies they administrate and the types and amounts of intervention policies implemented. 
Process measures, especially ‘intervention’ measures, are susceptible to parking (see Table 6). 
‘Intermediate outcome’ indicators measures, focussed on the direct outcomes of the actions of PES, 
are different from ‘final outcome’ indicators, which are aimed at the social conditions which labour 
market governance systems should improve in general – e.g. employment rates of the population 
(Grubb 2004: 358, Nunn et al. 2009: 27-32). Intermediate outcome measures include general and 
specific out-flows of beneficiaries, the results of the vacancy registration and the average duration of 
benefits. These measures carry with them the danger of incentivising the creaming off of easy-to-
place workers (Mosley 2001: 10-11; Nunn et al. 2009: 15-16). Final outcomes measures prevent the 
focus on the short term, as they include indicators as general employment rates and employment 
rates of specific groups. Specific forms of performance measures, namely penetration and quality 
measures, can be utilised to counteract some of the perverse incentives. The greatest challenge for 
the principal level is not so much combatting the individual moral hazard of beneficiaries, but rather 
creating a multi-tiered system that combats moral hazard on both the individual and the institutional 
level. It is hard to overstate the problematic nature of this challenge. To provide some guidance on 
the use of indicators and how to implement what type of performance management, the next 
section will look at the relevant institutional context-factors. 
2.2.3 The institutional context of performance measurement systems 
There is a strong consensus in the literature that powerful incentives are only optimal when 
performance can be readily measured in a straightforward way. […] In fact, agency theory 
suggests that this finding is even more relevant for a high performance bonus system with 
aggregate (for example, state-level) measures of performance, where there are fewer 
competing agents by which to assess effort levels and more distinctive organizational or 
environmental contexts that influence performance outcomes. (Heinrich 2007: 284). 
What we should take away from this quote is that it is crucial for any system which relies on 
incentivises and monitoring of behaviour in order to enhance compliance, to focus on behaviour 
which can viably be transformed into parsimonious performance indicators that reflect the actual 
actions and effects of those actions. It must be avoided – certainly on an aggregate level – that actors 
and their environments can distort the measurement or the outcomes of indicators. In section 2.2.2 
it was noted that there was a consensus in the literature on the conditions for performance 
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indicators, there is also strong evidence that the performance measurement system must be 
compatible with the managerial strategy and the structure of the organisations (Heinrich 2007: 284; 
Grubb 2004; Mosley 2001: 95, Nunn et al. 2009: 4). Mosley identifies two ideal-types which 
correspond with political and managerial decentralisation: the more centralized and hierarchical 
agency model and the more decentralized self-administration model (Mosley 2001: 95). Grubb 
identifies more practical models in increasing order of flexibility: (1) traditional hierarchical 
management using centralised command and control with in-house service delivery; (2) continuous 
re-contracting with competing providers, including potentially arms-length public service delivery 
and where payments are set over the lifetime of a contract; (3) payment for results where payments 
are determined by levels of performance (volume and quality) over the course of the contract; (4) 
purchase of services directly by clients who exercise market choice (2004). Research suggests that 
the nature and incidence of cream skimming, parking, and other gaming activities are strongly 
influenced by institutional settings (Koning & Heinrich 2013: 463). The flexibility of local providers 
and the use of (private) third parties and contracts, thus, affect the probability and type of moral 
hazard issues. Grubb argues against the use of process indicators altogether because they would 
inherently incentivise parking and creaming (2004). Others point towards the costs of programmes, 
the ability of local providers to select clients and the likelihood of placing clients in jobs as major 
causes of creaming and parking. When programme costs are high creaming is more likely than 
parking (Koning & Heinrich 2013: 477). High risk clients, combined with high rewards is a recipe for 
the occurrence of creaming and parking – depending on whether these rewards are contingent on 
outcomes or process indicators. This effect is even stronger when local providers are able to select 
their clients. “In contexts where the risks to service providers of failing to meet contract expectations 
are greater, due to factors such as client characteristics that portend barriers to successful outcomes, 
high powered, performance-based contracts are more likely to induce unintended effects such as 
parking” (Koning & Heinrich 2013: 480). 
It becomes clear that such considerations should also affect the choice of indicators. In a broad 
review of performance management literature relating to activation and unemployment, Nunn et al. 
summarise that: “in organisations and systems where there is strong centralised process control, it is 
appropriate that performance measures focus on and set targets for inputs, processes and outputs. 
In organisations and systems where there is more local or operational autonomy over processes it is 
more appropriate to focus performance measures on outcomes. In the latter case it may still be 
appropriate to monitor inputs, processes and outputs, in order to learn from successful practice, but 
targets should be focused only on outcomes” (2009: 4). This leads them to conclude that devolved 
managerial autonomy over inputs and processes is compatible with outcome-focused management 
while strong centralised control is seen as compatible with strong process controls (Nunn et al. 2009: 
47). Monitoring could be done via internal or external mechanisms. External mechanisms include the 
use of independent (private) organisations such as audit bureaus or firms, they tend to be more 
costly and can also undermine the inherent motivation of civil servants. Internal mechanisms require 
more trust and cooperation. Theories critical of agency-theory suggest that internal mechanisms are 
more likely to be effective and cost-reducing in public organisations (Heinrich 2007: 285). 
2.2.4 Lessons on designing multi-tiered labour market governance systems and moral hazard 
So we have learned that moral hazard occurs on two levels, and that one (institutional) is partly the 
result of a system that combats the other (individual). Activation is thought to be best suited at the 
local level, but this creates moral hazard between levels of government. MBO and performance 
management are often implemented to combat this type of moral hazard. This can be done in two 
ways: ex-ante setting of objectives or constant ‘real-time’ monitoring – possibly supplemented with 
incentive payments. But these systems create their own incentives for gaming and shirking. 
Additionally, they may undermine the very characteristic of public service that serves as a bulwark 
against moral hazard: the intrinsic motivation of public officials. MBO can make use of different kinds 
of indicators, which are appropriate in different types of institutional contexts. Input and process 
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indicators are more in line with centralised hierarchical systems and outcome process indicators are 
seen to be more compatible with devolved systems. This does not mean that the monitoring of input 
or process indicators cannot be utilised in devolved systems for (mutual) learning or best practice 
purposes. Even so, they are only useful if: 1) there are a limited number of indicators, 2) when 
employees actively participate in performance management, 3) reduce density and complexity of 
administrative rules, 4) provide comprehensive, reliable and timely information, 5) are 
complementary to management approaches and 6) when assessing and rewarding performance is 
fair and transparent (Mosley 2001). The ability of providers to select clients, the risk of placing clients 
and the costs of programmes are all factors that influence morally hazardous incentives, especially 
combined with high powered rewards.  
Both moral hazard issues at the individual and institutional level are relevant to any possible 
European-wide scheme. Put even more strongly, moral hazard is a greater danger to the European 
Union than to its member states as it undermines solidarity which is arguably already much weaker 
at the supranational level than at the domestic level. National solidarity is much more consolidated 
through centuries of nation and state forming and is vested in national (centralised) institutions, 
social policies and industrial relations. European solidarity is much younger and is not so much vested 
in centralized political capacity. Furthermore it is under pressure of competition both within and 
outside the Union (Streeck 2000). In their report on a European Social Union Vandenbroucke and 
Vanhercke contemplate the differences between a pan-European and national solidarity: “The pan-
European notion of solidarity refers, not only to economic convergence and cohesion on a European 
scale, but to individual rights such as free movement. Solidarity within national Member States, on 
the other hand, refers particularly to social insurance, income redistribution and the balance of social 
rights and obligations” (Vandenbroucke & Vanhercke 2014: 15). Therefore, the authors argue that 
solidarity is a multi-dimensional concept in a European context and can take either of two forms: 
mutual insurance or redistribution – in practice it is often a mix of the two but both require 
reciprocity. If a E(M)U-wide scheme would require redistribution the warning by Vandenbroucke and 
Vanhercke seems appropriate: “When solidarity entails redistribution, it implies a propensity to 
cooperate and share with others. In all cases, reciprocity requires a sense of common goals and 
values among those concerned. There is no way back: reciprocity in the EU requires both shared 
values and a sense of common purpose” (Vandenbroucke & Vanhercke 2014: 16). When 
performance measurement is flawed and it is revealed that one or more member states ‘fix’ their 
performance or when moral hazard at the individual level is reduced in one country but not in the 
other, it could cause unrepairable damage to any notion of reciprocity – thereby undermining 
budding European solidarity. Given the fact that European solidarity is different from, but also 
weaker and younger than, national solidarity, moral hazard poses a greater danger to European 
social unity than to a national sense of shared obligations and trust. Any EU or Eurozone benefit 
scheme which suffers from severe moral hazard issues would surely be counterproductive in 
fostering any pan-European solidarity. 
2.3 Studying experiences with multi-tiered labour market governance systems and 
moral hazard: case selection 
In order to represent the broad diversity and to increase the likelihood of drawing meaningful policy 
conclusions from real world experiences with multi-tiered systems this paper will analyse four cases 
which represent the four forms of multi-tiered labour market governance models – (partial) 
municipalisation, regionalisation and federalisation. The object of this study is to investigate the 
possible pitfalls and challenges to a E(M)U-wide unemployment based automatic stabilizer. It is an 
exploratory study and will not yield definite conclusions on either feasibility or desirability.  
A federal multi-tiered system would come closest to such a European-wide scheme as it resembles 
the relation between the supra-national level and the European member states. As one of the main 
inspirations for the proposal by Dullien is the United States, that country has a leg up on the other 
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possible cases (2007, 2012, 2013). In the U.S. even the benefit administration itself is a federal-state 
cooperation (Mosley 2011: 33). The size of the United States and its relation with its states comes, 
geographically and demographically, closest to the EU as a whole. These reasons make the United 
States a relevant example for how a possible multi-tiered European wide benefit scheme might look 
like, or at least some elements of it. 
The European cases will represent partial municipalisation, full municipalisation and regionalisation. 
Germany will represent the partial municipalised mode. In Germany the responsibilities for 
employment services are devolved to joint PES-municipal one-stop-shops (Mosley 2011: 8). Such 
collaborations are most interesting as it intermingles both managerial and political decentralisation 
in one case. Additionally, in the German system there is also an experiment ongoing with 105 
municipalities which have opted-out of this system and have assumed full responsibility.xii 
Furthermore, the German experience is one of a complete shock as the new system, based on the 
Hartz reforms, was introduced almost instantaneous after a scandal involving the German PES 
(Eichhorst et al. 2006: 11, Konle-Seidl 2008: 12). The joint one-stop-shops, the experiment with opt-
out municipalities and the clean break with the past make Germany an ideal candidate to represent 
the hybrid form. For the municipal case it would be relevant to select a case that represents the most 
extreme case of municipalisation as we already have a case of hybrid municipalisation. It would 
reveal how full municipalisation looks like and provide contrast to the partially municipalised case. 
Denmark looks as the best case for the municipal form of decentralisation as research by two leading 
OECD scholars (Giguère and Froy) shows that the total local flexibility of all possible municipal cases 
is highest in Denmark (2009: 14, 26). This is even before the final stages of municipalisation effort in 
Denmark. It has another quite relevant advantage and that is the fact that all of the municipal efforts 
are made completely public by way of using transparency as an accountability tool (Mosley 2011: 
19), which is a very interesting way to increase transparency and potentially to decrease inter-
governmental moral hazard. Significant parts of the Danish municipalisation took place between 
2008 and 2009 (taking effect a little later) and was a follow up to a previous period of 
experimentation with fully autonomous municipalities (Froy & Giguère 2009: 51). The third case 
should represent the regional form of political decentralisation. Table 2 presents us with three 
options: Belgium, Italy and Spain. As with full municipalisation, it would be most interesting to find a 
‘pure’ case for this form. Mosley estimates the regional flexibilities for all three the cases as high 
(2011: 34). Froy and Giguère determine that Italy has the most flexibility available to agencies and 
departments operating below the national level (of all the countries they examined, not just the 
regionalised ones), followed by Belgium and then by Spain (2009: 39, see tables 2.1 and 2.2). But the 
Italian flexibility originates at the sub-regional level rather than the Belgian and Spanish systems. So 
out of the three, Belgium is the case which combines high total flexibility with low sub-regional 
flexibility.xiii  
3. The United States  
3.1 Introduction 
The United States represents the federal form of a multi-tiered labour market governance system. 
This form is often the result of ‘path-dependence’ (Mosley 2011: 3). The federalist element within 
the political and institutional history has a notable impact on the style and motivation behind the 
multi-tiered system. Essentially, the difference between municipalisation and regionalisation versus 
federalisation boils down to a top-down imposed desire for decentralisation versus the result of an 
ongoing bottom-up process attempting to retain as much responsibilities at the lower levels of 
government as possible (Straits 2003; Eberts 2009). Besides that the U.S. differs from the other cases 
in the fact that it is a federation of states rather than a (somewhat) centralised state, it has some 
other obvious differences: it is not European, it is geographically and demographically much larger 
than the individual EU member states, but the institutional difference is what this case truly sets it 
apart from the others.xiv Most prominent institutional difference is the clearly demarked legislation 
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and flow of funds that is separated for unemployment insurance and activation. Activation 
(requirements) have little bearing on the federal-state cooperation concerning unemployment 
insurance. Activation can be considered separate because not only because it is dealt with in 
separate legislation, but also that federal funding for part of unemployment insurance is not 
contingent on activation of the unemployed.  
Rather than a definite point in time where the central government decided that the responsibility 
over labour market policy would best be devolved to lower levels of government, the federalist 
tradition has been present throughout the U.S. history. The federal-state cooperation in labour 
market governance has first been legislated and codified since the era of Great Depression (Eberts 
2003: 304; O’leary & Eberts 2008: 1; Quade et al. 2008: 348). Much of the unemployment insurance 
is still governed by the (amended versions of the) Social Security Act (SSA) of 1935, the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) of 1939 and the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, of which the latter 
already established a nation-wide network of public employment services decades before many 
European countries created such a system. The SSA established an explicit federal-state relationship 
for unemployment insurance and the FUTA regulated fiscal responsibilities and incentives for state 
compliance with federal goals. This institutional history reflects the comments on path-dependence 
and remarks on bottom-up versus top-down decentralisation (Mosley 2011; Eberts 2009; Straits 
2003). Although the American unemployment related benefits could be headed under 
‘unemployment insurance’ and ‘social assistance’, they are somewhat different from their European 
counterparts. First of all, regular unemployment compensation is relatively short and meagre. 
Secondly, social assistance is divided in very distinct and separate programmes, chief amongst them: 
the Food Stamp programme (officially the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Programme or SNAP) 
and the Temporary Assistance of Needy Families (TANF) programme. Thirdly, there are several 
contingent federal or federal-state benefits in place. Finally, activation has a less prominent place in 
the United States than it does in the EU.  
3.2 Unemployment insurance 
As said, the unemployment insurance is a federal-state cooperation, see Table 8 and Table 9 for the 
current division of labour (see also Nichols & Needels 2006). The three elements – the basic system, 
the supplementary benefits and the emergency benefits – are financed in different ways. The basic 
unemployment compensation and the extend benefits are financed both by the states and the 
federal government. The state finances the benefits itself through state payroll taxes. The federal 
government finances both the state and the federal administration of UC, which amounted to almost 
10 percent of the total costs last year, through a federal payroll tax (USDOL 2013: 2). States do not 
receive these federal funds without conditions though: to be eligible for these fiscal transfers from 
federal accounts they must submit a claim which has to be approved by the Secretary of Labour (see 
Figure 4).xv The states’ claim must comply with federally set ex-ante set requirements (Table 10).xvi 
These provisions are predominantly administrative requirements. Only a small subset of the 
requirements have some relation to actual labour market policies and such as the profiling and 
referral of workers and keeping track of employers’ lay-off records (experience rating). Under U.S.C. 
42 § 503 (a) (10) the federal government does pose the condition for workers to participate in 
employment services. However, the states are given the authority to determine whether (past) 
participation of beneficiaries is satisfactory and states are free to make exemptions for this condition. 
There are no federally imposed indicators measuring the behaviour of states concerning this 
condition. In other words, the federal government, through the SSA legislation, does not seem very 
concerned for activation of UI-beneficiaries.  
Additionally, the federal government ensures conformity and state compliance through the levying of 
the FUTA itself, which is a federal 6% payroll tax levied on every employer on wages (up to $7000). If 
the state meets the minimum FUTA conditions (see Table 11) the federal government provides a tax 
credit for all employers in that state for 5,4 percentage points, or 90% of the FUTA tax liabilities for 
employers.xvii These FUTA conditions also have ties to labour market policy. However, the FUTA 
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conditions mainly concern some minimalistic ground rules for eligibility and other administration 
procedures, it does not pose any activation or other performance measures. A final interesting 
feature is that all the state and federal funds go into trust funds, which has the fiscal capacity to lend 
to states.xviii States can borrow from the Federal Unemployment Account for a maximum of two 
years, but in the second year the loan must be repaid in full or the FUTA credit will be discontinued 
(US DOL 2013: 7-8). The federal government can also claw back funds that have not been used in a 
proper manner of have exceeded the maximum amount for administration purposes. 
The federal government, thus, effectively ensures compliance with their minimum requirements for 
state legislation through fiscal transfers and fiscal pressure on the local tax-base.xix Besides the 
minimalistic FUTA requirements, there are almost no federal rules and regulations on eligibility of 
claimants and states set their own benefit levels and duration (USDOL 2013: 2, 11).xx The FUTA and 
state claim requirements are hard to place in a categorisation of indicators. It could best be 
characterised as management by directives rather than MBO. Most requirements concern state 
legislative adoption of clauses to share information with other federal and state institutions. The 
FUTA and the state claim requirements do not refer to actual behavioural indicators.xxi All state laws 
share some common characteristics: the rules on eligibility, the duration and the level of benefits for 
individual beneficiaries are always determined by individual experience in covered employment in a 
past period of time called the ‘base period’ (USDOL 2013: 11). Workers must show a labour force 
attachment, but must also continue to show their willingness to work.xxii The states have 
considerable flexibility (see Table 12). The FUTA conditions and the requirements for state claims are 
attempts to influence the target group and eligibility dimension. Furthermore, some of the funds 
provided are ring-fenced for administration purposes, but as most of the funding comes out of the 
state’s own revenue it enjoys significant budget flexibility. Additionally, even though the funds for 
administration entail a limit on what states can spend on staff, their personnel policies and hiring and 
firing are unrestricted. So this system seems unconcerned with issues of moral hazard. There is the 
requirement for states to impose conditionality of participation in employment services for UI-
beneficiaries, however the states are free to exempt or deem the participation of beneficiaries as 
satisfactory as they see fit, there is no performance management-contingent pay or public service 
requirements build into the regular federal-state cooperation of UI. This could well be because of the 
traditionally meagre generosity and coverage of UI, unlike their European counterparts. Additionally, 
only a very modest part of the state UI programme is financed by the federal level. Even during times 
of crisis, the costs of the administration is unlikely to rise as significantly as the costs of disbursing the 
benefits will. For these reasons, it is not so strange that the federal level seems unconcerned with 
individual or institutional moral hazard in regular UI – most states do have job search requirements 
in their state laws, though (Klerman 2013: 2).  
The most prominent permanent supplementary benefit scheme is the Extended Unemployment 
Compensation (EB) scheme. This is a benefit which is explicitly meant to operate counter-cyclically 
and functions as a federal automatic stabilizer. When a mandatory trigger is set off, or when states 
choose to make use of some optional triggers (see Table 13), the duration of the unemployment 
benefits are increased by half to a combined maximum of 39 weeks – most states enforce a 
maximum duration of 26 weeks. This extension is in equal parts financed out of federal accounts and 
out of state accounts (Figure 4).xxiii Other supplementary benefits include the Trade Adjustment Act 
(TAA). The Temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) programme was an 
example of an emergency benefit which has to be put before congress and explicitly renewed at the 
end of a given period.xxiv The purpose of the EUC08 programme is similar to the EB but functions in 
times of extraordinary hardship. It extents benefit durations for a certain period, fully paid for out of 
special federal accounts. “Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation programmes are 
solely governed by federal legislation, but the federal government (specifically the US Department of 
Labour) entered into abstract administration agreements with the states. The Disaster 
Unemployment Assistance (DUA) is structured similarly: federal laws govern the programme, but the 
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States administer it on a contractual basis (as agreements between the states and the USDOL) and 
are required to provide non reimbursable re-employment assistance services” (Quade et al. 2008: 
361).xxv These schemes provide very limited programme flexibility compared to the regular benefits, 
but states are not obliged to accept the help of the federal government in the first place. But as said, 
the emergency (but also to some extent the extended) benefits do limit the states’ flexibility on 
determining their own target groups and eligibility. A crucial difference between the extended and 
emergency benefits is that the extended benefits operate automatically, while the emergency 
benefits require legislative action and approval. This entail that the emergency benefits kick in at a 
later moment in the downturn of the economic cycle (Nichols & Needels 2006: 16). 
The EUC08 was part of the U.S. response to the financial crisis: the 800 billion dollar American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, which included the option for federal-state 
agreements which increased the levels of unemployment insurance, extended benefits and 
emergency benefits with 25 dollars per week; it extended the Emergency Employment 
Compensation; it also included a major (7 billion dollar) incentive package for states to alter 
(broaden) their UI eligibility and cover the costs for a significant period – which is yet another 
example of using federal funds to influence state laws on eligibility. These ARRA extensions, 
programmes and raises of benefits were part of an agreement state could enter into with the federal 
government, the latter of which would cover most of the costs.xxvi In terms of moral hazard, the ARRA 
has not changed the labour market governance very much. As with state claims for regular UI funding 
and the FUTA, the preconditions for ARRA funds are mostly ex-ante legislative changes aimed at 
convergence of eligibility and administration procedures. Furthermore, the ARRA erected an 
emergency fund for the TANF programme, for which states in need could apply.  
Until halfway during the 1980s it was possible for states to opt-out or exit the extended benefit 
programme early under certain circumstances, thereby falling back on the federally financed 
emergency benefits. In effect this could be considered a form of dumping. This form of institutional 
moral hazard was negated by reversing the order of emergency and extended benefits and scrapping 
the possibility to opt-out (Nichols & Needels 2006: 16). Both benefits have also gained stricter federal 
job search requirements for claimants, introduced by the Middle Class Tax Relief & Job Creation Act 
of 2012 (Klerman 2013: 2).xxvii These requirements are aimed at the individual unemployed. States 
just have to collect their information and perform random audits. So even with the extension of the 
duration of regular UI, the federal government has not attempted to implement any meaningful 
performance measurement systems. The moral hazard of extended benefits is fully understood as 
individual moral hazard and it is the individual that has to undertake action. However, the individual 
work requirements do show increased concern for moral hazard from the federal level. The Middle 
Class Tax Relief & Job Creation Act has been a step towards coupling activation with unemployment 
and social assistance in a more consistent manner. In other words, regular unemployment insurance 
is since 2012 linked to activation – albeit in a very limited way. Furthermore, the MCTRJCA has 
limited the state’s ability to determine their own eligibility and target group policies. 
The dominant mode of federal governance is through the power of fiscal transfers. When the federal 
government foots the bill, as with the EUC08, it poses federal requirements. When it wants to 
influence state policy, it does so through agreements which include the availability of funds under 
certain legislative requirements. The ex-ante legislative change requirements do not deal with the 
setting of targets. There is no comprehensive performance measurement relating to UI, moral hazard 
is predominantly understood as occurring on the individual level. States are supposed to deal with 
this themselves, as is unsurprising given the fact that most funds flow from the states themselves. 
Through management by directives, the federal level tries to ensure a minimum level of activation 
increasingly so when it gets more involved in financing – through EB or emergency benefits. Although 
the extended and emergency benefits extend the duration of UI severely, it would be difficult to 
imagine that states would be required to have an activation system on stand-by especially for such 
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circumstances. It is also possible that the automatic stabilization effect of the extended and 
emergency benefits supersede any institutional moral hazard concerns.  
3.3 Social assistance 
The U.S. social assistance consists of several programmes: TANF, the Food Stamp programme, public 
housing, energy assistance and social services. This section will focus on the main unemployment 
related component of the U.S. social assistance: TANF. However, this paper does not ignore the Food 
Stamp programme.xxviii The Food Stamp programme is a mostly federally financed programme, which 
is to U.S. standards not very flexible and provides only limited leeway for state influence. The federal 
government sets uniform eligibility criteria and provides a calculation for the rates of the benefits, 
but states are allowed to enlarge their programme.xxix States can set their own eligibility rules only 
within strict federal parameters. Although it is sometimes remarked that the system is fully federally 
financed, the states and the federal level equally share fiscal burden for the administrative costs.xxx 
Furthermore, state are required to enter into an incentive payment scheme related to this benefit. 
The incentive payments are aimed at local and state entities.xxxi The payments are available to 
entities that achieve certain targets set by the federal level (the Secretary) and adhere to the 
eligibility requirements.xxxii The federal funds of these incentive grants cannot exceed 50 percent of 
the activity. The Food Programme entails very limited state programme-, budget- and organisation of 
delivery flexibility. The dominant mode of governance is the ex-ante setting of federal guidelines, the 
Food Stamp programme also includes very limited activating service requirements but incorporates 
little performance measurement. Even the incentive payments are not based on any significant 
performance measurement.xxxiii 
In comparison to the Food Stamp programme, the TANF programme brings with it a broader range of 
federal governance compliance methods, but also more leeway. States can apply for block grant 
funds (a so-called ‘State Family Assistance Grant’) if they comply with a great number of 
requirements and develop a state plan.xxxiv The second part of the funding is provided by the states 
themselves. The states are required to maintain a certain level of spending (Maintenance Of Effort or 
MOE), which is federally codified (see Table 14).xxxv In 2013 the funding amounted to $16,5 billion of 
federal grants and $10,4 billion of state funds (Falk: 1-2). The block grants and MOE created 
limitations on the flexibility of the use of funds. The MOE is relatively freely spendable but block 
grants are subject to federal legislation (see Table 15, Table 16 and Table 18). The TANF programme 
once also included incentive payments which are utilised by the federal level to create an additional 
incentive for state compliance, but these were discontinued in 2007 (Heinrich 2007: 282).  
In order to start the application for a State Family Assistance Grant (SFAG) a state has to draw up a 
plan and submit that at the federal Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). States are 
required to comply with process indicators such as: work activity rates by providing work activities, 
re-employment services and related services; ground rules for applying sanctions for specific 
behaviour. Most of the work-requirements for states and individuals were introduced with the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996 which transformed social 
assistance into the current TANF form. States are required to implement a minimum of services 
which are federally determined, further limiting the programme flexibility.xxxvi Their actions must be 
approved through the state plan and must comply with 42 USC § 604 (see Table 18). So, In contrast 
to the UI and the Food Stamp programme, TANF does include some form of a performance 
measurement system. It operates through ex-ante setting of targets (the agreements). In comparison 
to the other cases, the states have significant programme and organisation of delivery flexibility, the 
development of own state plans provides them with the opportunity to develop their own forms, but 
the content of those programmes must comply with federal regulations. So this system operates 
within a much decentralised context. The requirements for state TANF programmes can be 
subdivided into two categories: requirements for the state plans and mandatory work requirements 
which have to be achieved (see Table 18).xxxvii The work requirements for states are: achieving a 50% 
participation rate and a 90% participation rate for 2-parent families. Work activities, as defined by 42 
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USC § 604, officially includes unsubsidized employment but goes on to identify eleven other activities 
such as training, participating in community service programmes or providing child care services to 
others in community service programmes, also as ‘work activities’ for the purposes of achieving 
participation rates. This is an example of the use of process indicators with no flexibility on the 
setting of the performance measures. The literature suggests that the use of process indicators in a 
much decentralised institutional context increases the risk of institutional moral hazard (Nunn et al. 
2009: 47).  
Social assistance is, in contrast with UC, much more regulated at the federal level and the system 
displays more concern for moral hazard. On the one hand, this is not surprising as the federal 
government is heavily involved in financing the Food Stamp Programme and provides more than half 
of the TANF funds. On the other hand, it is in contrast with a lot of European countries where social 
assistance is the unemployment related benefit which is more traditionally the role of local 
governments. The federal level determines the governance of social assistance through (in U.S. 
terms) strict legislation and process requirements. The actions of states are also to be reported and 
subsequently approved. They do however have considerable leeway in the practical implementation 
and the setting of TANF benefits, especially compared to the European local governments in the 
cases reviewed for this paper. The performance management is done through ex-ante setting of 
targets (input and process), and the states themselves have to report to the Secretary. The 
decentralised nature of the U.S. TANF programme, the fact that states themselves report their 
actions, that those actions are measured in terms of process indicators and the absence of quality 
measures all raise doubts over whether institutional moral hazard is actually reduced, or that it 
incentivises the parking of TANF beneficiaries.  
3.4 Activation & workforce development 
Activation is mainly enforced through three channels: the SNAP and TANF work requirements, 
through use of the Public Employment Service and through the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 
1998. Activation has not been as an integral part of U.S. labour market governance as it has been in 
the EU. The PES, which has been a part of the unemployment insurance system, provided only very 
minimal services.xxxviii Furthermore the federal-state cooperation in unemployment insurance is not 
so much reliant on activation requirements. The PRWORA did impose work requirements for TANF 
recipients in the 1990s, but the Middle Class Tax Relief & Job Creation Act was the first act to actually 
couple unemployment insurance with actual working requirements. Even now, the linkage between 
the federal-state cooperation concerning unemployment insurance and activation is still almost 
completely separated between the (non-activation dependent) FUTA and Wagner-Peyser funds and 
the WIA funds. This (late) coupling is probably due to the extension of benefits of the EB and EUC08, 
before 2008 the unemployment insurance benefits were very short indeed; at first 13 to 16 weeks. 
Later most states posed a maximum duration of 26 to 30 weeks. With the extensions of 2008 there 
were three years where 99 weeks was the maximum combined duration (in 2012 this was cut back to 
73, Klerman 2013: 2). Another reason why the federal government might not be so committed to 
getting involved in activation, compared to Europe, is the performance of the American states 
concerning unemployment. As Table 17 shows, there is much more homogeneity in the 
unemployment rates of U.S. states than there is in the European member states.xxxix When the 
performance of (member) states is rather equal, the need for the federal government to step in is 
lower than when some (member) states clearly diverge from the pack. 
Before we turn to the WIA, it must be noted that the WIA and the institutions it enacted (mainly the 
one-stop-shops) is not the same as the American PES. The U.S. PES was created almost a century ago 
by the Wagner-Peyser act.xl Both the unemployed and the employed can register with the PES in 
order to find (other) work and receive low intensive services (résumé preparation, use of printers 
etc.). The PES is the mandated agency to execute Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services 
(WPRS). Nowadays, the unemployment insurance employees are mostly moved to call centres and 
the PES has moved into the one-stop-shops as created by the WIA (Barnow & King 2005: 28). The 
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WIA was constructed along seven guiding principles: streamlined services, individual empowerment, 
universal access, increased accountability, a strong role for the local Workforce Investment Boards 
(WIBs) and the private sector, enhanced state and local flexibility and improved youth programmes 
(USDOL 1998). 
“WIA’s law and regulations attempt to separate policy development, administration, and 
service delivery. Thus, the legislation’s default model has local policy set by the local WIB, 
One-Stop Career Centers operated by independent organizations (which can be for-profit, 
nonprofit, or a consortium of organizations), and services delivered by Wagner-Peyser Act 
funded state employees [PES] and vendors selected by the board or the One-Stop Career 
Center operator — in the case of core and intensive services, and by the customer in the case 
of training (through ITAs). The statute grants the states sufficient leeway to separate various 
functions, so administration and delivery can be placed in the hands of the local government” 
(Barnow & King 2005: 35). 
Since the introduction of the WIA the workforce development of the U.S. is operated through 
workforce investment areas which are governed by Workforce Investment Boards.xli There are statexlii 
and localxliii investment boards, the latter number in the 600 although not every state has multiple 
WIBs. These WIBs are the linchpin of the U.S. workforce development policy, in principle they 
oversee the one-stop-shops and advice state and local policy makers. How these one-stop-shops are 
operated, though, is left almost entirely up to the states and localities – the governor and the local 
WIB select the operator, providing almost full outsourcing, collaboration and organisation of delivery 
flexibility.xliv These shops are an attempt to combine these responsibilities, but they are not 
singlehandedly run by the operator; there are a multitude of optional and mandatory partners who 
can share or have complete authority over specific programmes and funding (which is the only true 
limit on collaboration and outsourcing flexibility).xlv The most common setup is where policy 
development is done by the WIB, the programme administration is done by agencies at the local 
level and the service delivery is carried out by vendors, but this division is not mandatory: 
“specifically, the state board may be an independent organization that reports directly to the 
governor, or it can be placed in the same organization responsible for administering WIA programs. 
At the local level, the workforce board may or may not have any staff; in the latter case, the board 
may have little independence from the agency operating the program” (Barnow & King 2005: 16; 
Figure 5).xlvi Thus, the institutional context is very much decentralised and devolved, with significant 
local autonomy. 
The PES is for 97% funded out of the ESAA, which is fully financed by the FUTA, but it fulfils only a 
very modest role in the activation and workforce development in the U.S. The WIA is for the largest 
part funded out of federal grants.xlvii If any states wish to broaden the authority of the WIBs they 
must finance those responsibility themselves. Increased local and state flexibility is monitored 
through the formulation of standards and measures, essentially a NPM type of relationship. Under 
the WIA, both the states and the localities have their own standards.xlviii These measures are centrally 
determined, the targets which must be achieved are adopted in a planning procedure and contain a 
mix of process and outcome indicators (see Table 19). The adoption of additional process for hard-to-
place clients and quality measures was a reaction to evidence of creaming under the Job Training 
Partnership Act which preceded the WIA (Heinrich & Marscke 2009: 20). The targets which the states 
and localities must achieve arise out of negotiations between the state and the federal level, the 
state then determines the standards for the local offices, and they are allowed to add more 
performance measures than federal legislation calls for (Barnow & King 2005: 44, 46).xlix Thus, their 
flexibility on performance measures extents to the negotiation and proposing of performance 
measures and additional setting of measures for subcontractors. On the one hand, such negotiations 
over target levels can create a shared feeling of purpose. On the other hand, three different studies 
have shown that abandoning a standard adjustment model in favour of adjusting target levels 
through negotiations led to target levels that “are viewed as arbitrary, increased risk for program 
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managers, greater incentives for creaming among potential participants, and other undesirable post-
hoc activities to improve measured performance” (Heinrich & Marschke 2009: 34; see also Heinrich, 
2004; Social Policy Research Associates, 2004; Barnow and King, 2005). 
This performance management is based on ex-ante setting of goals and reporting. States are 
required to develop multi-annual strategic plans. Additionally, they are invited, but not required, to 
develop a unified plan in which they engage in strategic planning with a multitude of federal 
agencies.l States, as grantees, are required to monitor and report the use of funds by sub-recipients, 
state reports are then reviewed by the Secretary of Labour.li Additionally, the WIA includes incentive 
grants which are an additional way of enhancing state compliance with federal goals. The use of 
incentive grants reinforces the need for a performance measurements, thereby supplementing the 
ex-ante system with more monitoring capacities. The efforts of the state which are measured only 
include intensive and training services, which means that the core services – often provided by the 
PES through the one-stop-shops – are not counted towards the WIA performance indicators 
(Heinrich 2007: 286). The Secretary has the authority to monitor all state conduct and perform 
financial and performance audits. The level of performance bonuses is modest, however.lii The 
spending of the bonuses is regulated by federal guidelines.liii “There are three major tasks involved in 
the implementation of the WIA performance bonus system: 1) the determination of performance 
standards (expected levels of performance) for each of 17 required performance measures [the 
number 17 is based on the 2007 situation, see Table 19 for current measures]; 2) the calculation of 
states’ performance for a given program year using administrative and survey data, and 3) the 
verification of states’ eligibility for incentive grants (performance bonuses) and bonus allocations” 
(Heinrich 2007: 288).liv The performance measurement system linked to the incentive payments, 
thus, measures the total activities of states concerning intensive and training services. The lack of a 
standardized process and mounting doubts over the accuracy of the data leads some scholars to call 
for a discontinuation of this system (Heinrich 2007), as evidence has been found of ‘strategic 
enrolment’ or in other words: creaming and parking (Trutko et al. 2005; Heinrich 2007). The federal 
actions taken to combat creaming under the former JTPA regime have not resulted the desired 
reduction of institutional moral hazard. The lack of a standardised process is due to the fact that 
there is no single adjustment model that accounts for externalities, rather the goals are negotiated 
between the states and the federal level. Therefore, it is hard to precisely and consistently measure 
the activities of the states as the indicators are perhaps more based on politics than adjusted for 
economic externalities (Heinrich 2007: 288).lv The WIA has definitely represented a shift towards a 
more encompassing system, but the planning, reporting and monitoring requirements have also 
created an overly complicated administration system (Barnow & King 2005: 16). The quality of that 
complex reporting system could be questioned as it provides incentives for creaming and parking of 
the unemployed and as doubts arise over the quality of the data in general. 
3.5 The U.S. experience 
The American state authorities enjoy a lot of flexibility, which decreases with the amount of funds 
provided by the federal level. The more the federal level funds, the more they engage in federal 
codification of state conduct to enhance compliance and limit flexibility. There are three main modes 
of federal control: (mostly) input conditions which, when met, reduce tax pressure; application for 
block grants which require ex-ante certification of state plans based on input and process conditions; 
and ex-post formal restrictions for the use of funds is solely governed by process indicators. The 
difference between the second and the third mode is that the second mode requires creative 
strategic input from the states or localities. The third mode can be seen as a restriction or constraint 
on behaviour.lvi Simplified: regular unemployment compensation uses the first mode; TANF, the Food 
Programme and activation is predominantly governed by the latter two; and the extended and 
emergency benefits by the last mode. When states are required to meet conditions for tax relief, 
they enjoy a maximum amount of leeway. State plans still provide flexibility to design policies and 
the delivery of services, as is especially the case for the workforce development where states can 
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even design, within federal parameters, parts of the institutional landscape as they see fit. Federal 
requirements for the use of funds constitute moderate constraints on the degrees of freedom of the 
states. It must be noted that the FUTA funds and federal funding of state UI programmes have little 
relation to activation requirements. Table 9 provides an overview of the responsibilities and funding 
of the different unemployment related benefits and acts. 
The US experience contains two important lessons for any supra-national benefit scheme. On the 
one hand, the monitoring WIA requirements and workforce investment plans have resulted in a 
complex bureaucratic system. Even though the WIA added some extra indicators to neutralise 
perverse incentives in the old JTPA system, significant evidence remains that the WIA performance 
management system is still lacking. It shows how difficult it is to efficiently enforce and monitor 
compliance with activation policies from a federal level in a much decentralised context without 
creating moral hazard issues on the institutional level. On the other hand, the unemployment 
insurance benefit does seem to work without significant considerations for moral hazard issues. 
Reviewing the states UI claim for federal funds requires only a limited bureaucratic effort as the 
conditions of the claims are specifically aimed at changing state legislation. They are mainly targeted 
at eligibility, administrative procedures and transferring client information from one system to 
another. The advantage of this system is a fairly simple method ensuring compliance without 
extensive monitoring, the negative side is that is not usable for fighting institutional moral hazard 
concerning activation.  
The emergency and extended benefits build on this unemployment insurance system. The use of the 
extended and emergency benefits has been uneven, the extended benefit experience has been more 
marked by changes while the emergency benefit experience has been stable (Nichols & Needels 
2006: 17). The emergency benefits are almost always implemented sometime after a cyclical 
downturn occurred. Of course, labour markets always lags behind the business cycle but the 
emergency benefits must then be enacted and approved, while the extended benefits operate 
automatically (Nichols & Needels 2006: 16). Time-lag affects the automatic stabilization effects of 
programmes negatively. Both schemes could entail more individual and institutional moral hazard 
issues than the regular unemployment insurance. On the individual level, when individuals know 
their benefits will be extended it might negatively affect their job search efforts. However, there is 
evidence that the extension of duration by the previous emergency benefits reduced the total 
exhaustion rate of unemployment benefits to pre-emergency levels (Nichols & Needels 2006: 18). 
This is not to say that beneficiaries do not postpone their job search efforts but it does limit concerns 
for individual moral hazard. On the institutional level, if states know that additional benefits provided 
by the federal government will kick in, they might not be as incentivised to activate their workforce. 
This counts especially for emergency benefits which are fully funded by the federal government. 
These dangers are recognised by the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act, which poses more 
federal requirements for activation reigning in some of the more extreme forms of flexibility. 
Additionally, the extra activation or workforce development requirements inherent in the emergency 
benefits also indicate presence of that pitfall. It would be most likely, though, that the institutional 
moral hazard of not complying with activation of long term unemployed will relate to the additional 
requirements only, because it would seem unlikely that states would actively reduce their own 
activation system in times of crisis. In contrast, states might not be as enthusiastic when it comes to 
workforce requirements that are added onto their own activation systems. There is one obvious 
disadvantage of the emergency and extended benefit systems when it comes to the applicability for 
to the EU: the national unemployment insurance schemes are far more divergent than in the U.S. 
However, the proposal by Dullien includes an elegant solution: rather than extending the national UI 
schemes, the E(M)U-wide funded part of the scheme could be extended – both through emergency 
or extended benefits (Dullien 2014: 84-86, see also Figure 1). In the U.S. extended and emergency 
benefits extended an UI scheme that is under normal circumstances 26 weeks. The base period for 
the ‘regular’ E(M)U scheme is twice that, which entails that extending such a scheme would fund 
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(part of) UI for the officially long-term unemployed.lvii Such an additional option for a E(M)U-wide 
scheme would only increase the relevance of the U.S. lessons on mounting concern for activation 
during periods of extension of benefits. 
4. Germany 
4.1 Introduction 
Germany is a case where a process of municipalisation has taken place but only limited to 
unemployment related social assistance (Arbeitslosengeld II or ALG II). Of all the countries where 
political decentralisation occurs, Germany fits the category where it occurs in the most limited form. 
The institutional context could, therefore, be characterised as centralised hierarchical compared to 
the other cases (see for the division of labour Table 20 and for the flexibility of German municipal 
governments Table 26). The German decentralisation was part of a much larger effort of socio-
economic overhaul: the Hartz-reforms, but has since undergone multiple changes. 
The PES and decentralisation efforts in Germany is almost wholly characterised by the Hartz reforms 
in 2002 and the aftermath thereof (Table 21). Ironically, it was a scandal in the German Federal 
Employment Office, the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA), which instigated this major overhaul of 
German social and labour market policies. In 2002 a federal audit of the BA revealed that a significant 
part of the statistical reporting about job placements done by the BA, was fraudulent. The public 
outrage about this scandal provided politicians with a “window of opportunity” to break the 
politically deadlocked labour market governance (Eichhorst et al. 2006: 11; Konle-Seidl 2008: 12), 
with the famous Hartz reforms as a result. As this process was kick-started by events in the 
Employment Office, a significant part of the Hartz reforms included a transformation of PES practices 
and governance. As we shall see it entailed both managerial and various forms of political 
decentralisation but also the creation of (joint) one-stop-shops for the unemployed. In this sense 
operational and formal reforms were conjoined in the Hartz initiatives. Some would even go so far as 
to say that Germany was “selling the benefit reform as a precondition for an operational reform that 
ostensibly would lead to joined-up employment services” (Knuth & Larsen 2010: 8). 
Germany had three labour market related benefit systems before the Hartz reforms: unemployment 
insurance (Arbeitslosengeld) and unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) for those who did not 
have or had exhausted their claim to Arbeitslosengeld. Both schemes were federally funded through 
either social contributions or taxation, and both were administered by the BA. The third benefit was 
social assistance (Sozialhilfe) intended for those who had no connection to the labour market, this 
scheme was the responsibility of the municipalities (Table 22). Although some municipalities had, 
comparatively speaking, a solid record of activation there was significant variation in the level of 
activation between the municipalities (Eichhorst et al. 2006: 6-7). The burden of social assistance was 
very unevenly divided, making it harder for municipalities with relatively large quantities of people 
who were dependent on social assistance (Knuth & Larsen 2010: 9). In this sense, the local flexibility 
and diversity among the municipalities created divergence of performance. These factors created a 
situation in which some municipalities found it hard to keep up with their performance and thereby 
gave municipalities the incentives to “dump” their workload. Confirming the suggestion in the 
literature on moral hazard that goals and objectives must be achievable, or would otherwise create 
perverse incentives (Mosley 2001: 22-23; Nunn et al. 2009: 68). Concretely, some of those 
municipalities created work programmes that provided workers with entitlements to unemployment 
assistance. The effect was that municipalities could remove social assistance claimants from their 
budget by transferring them to programmes that would turn them over to the federally funded and 
unlimited unemployment assistance system. Thus, the interaction between old systems of social 
assistance and unemployment assistance entailed some perverse incentives.lviii  
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4.2 Unemployment insurance 
The current unemployment insurance, ALG I, is a federally funded unemployment benefit, financed 
by social contributions paid for by employers and employees.lix When it comes to ALG I, the position 
of the BA remains largely unchanged after the Hartz reforms. It is a self-governing independent 
organisation run by a management board (Vorstand) which is overseen and monitored by a tripartite 
supervisory committee (Verwaltungsrat). According to the Drittes Sozialgezetsbuch (SGB III), which is 
the legal base for this benefit, the BA remains in charge of the administration and implementation of 
the unemployment benefit scheme.lx The BA remains responsible for the activation of out of work 
people, even those who fall under the ALG II regime – which will be elaborated on below (Eichhorst 
et al. 2006: 39). The level, duration and eligibility are all legislated by the federal government.lxi The 
governance of this unemployment benefit is, thus, not very multi-tiered in terms of levels of 
government and it entails no flexibility for the municipalities. The activation is performed at the local 
level by the local offices of the BA. The BA must adhere to non-quantified goals in §1 of SGB III, but 
also negotiates additional frame (outcome) targets (Rahmenziele) with the federal government, and 
tracks and monitors the performance of its local offices through process measures (see section 
4.4).lxii  
4.3 Social assistance 
Perhaps the most important reform implemented as a result of the Hartz Commission, is the creation 
of the ALG II system by combining Arbeitslosenhilfe and Sozialhilfe into a single scheme 
(Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende or ALG II) regulated by a single legal framework: the Zweites 
Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB II).lxiii This raised questions as to the responsibility for the scheme because 
both the old schemes were administered and run by two different actors. The Red-Green Schröder 
government wanted to transfer all responsibilities regarding unemployment related benefits to the 
BA, including the ALG II administration and activation. A compromise with the opposition resulted in 
the following division between municipalities and the BA: the federal government (partially through 
the BA) funds the benefits and activation while municipalities fund another part of the bill.lxiv The 
municipalities now finance most of the housing and heating costs and they finance all of the 
miscellaneous social services.lxv The rates are predetermined by the central and Länder level and are 
out of the hands of the municipalities themselves.lxvi Before the Hartz reforms the federal 
government funded Arbeitslosenhilfe in full. The old Sozialhilfe benefit was paid for by the 
municipalities (75%) and the Länder (25%).lxvii In other words, the federal level assumed most of the 
financial responsibilities for unemployment related benefits. As with ALG I, the height and duration 
of ALG II are centrally set, leaving little flexibility in that regard. The SGB II determines the height and 
the division of costs of the benefit.lxviii In principle the benefit is indefinite, but in practice the benefit 
can be cut short. ALG II is contingent on a six month individual integration agreement, which has to 
be renewed.lxix The monitoring local BA or municipality office can, by not renewing the agreement, 
influence the duration of the benefit. The transfer of fiscal responsibility of Sozialhilfe to the ALG II 
regime, and therefore to the federal level, led to the (morally hazardous) situation where 
municipalities were in charge of assessing the working capacity of the former Sozialhilfe claimants. 
This form moral hazard of classifying workers who are in fact unable to work as ‘capable of working’, 
and thereby transferring them to the federal budget, remained for some time (Eichhorst et al. 2008: 
47). Deeming someone capable of working would in effect transfer that individual from the municipal 
budget to the federal budget, consequently 90% of the claimants were assessed to be capable of 
working (Eichhorst et al. 2006: 23). 
The administration of the benefits is done by a federal-local cooperation or ‘consortia’ (one-stop-
shops called Gemeinsame Einrichtungen or EA, see Figure 6 for accountability arrangements).lxx In 
these consortia the BA and the municipalities work together. Although, towards the unemployed the 
EA behaves as a unitary actor, the division of labour between the municipality and the BA in those 
consortia is quite clear.lxxi The municipalities provide the miscellaneous services while the BA handles 
the activation. The flexibility of municipalities is fairly limited: budgets are predetermined, personnel 
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flexibility is limited; and there are mandatory work practices such as profiling and integration 
agreements with beneficiaries. Almost all activating services are performed by the BA. However, the 
role of the BA in ALG II is different than in the ALG I regime. For the regular unemployment 
insurance, the BA is a self-governing independent institution. For the delivery of services and 
administration of the ALG II the BA is contracted as a delivery agent, this has consequences for the 
governance of the ALG II scheme (Jantz & Jann 2013: 235). It entails that the BA is confronted with 
different objectives and that, contrary to the ALG I regime, the federal government can in fact 
instruct the BA on activation. Another striking governance feature is the adoption of an ‘opt-out’ 
clause for municipalities, which are referred to as Optionskommunen. In 2007 a number 
municipalities were allowed to opt-out of the delivery of services through an integrated one-stop-
shop (see section 4.4).lxxii These opting municipalities also take over the responsibility of the 
administration of the ALG II benefits, but they do not pay for these benefits themselves.lxxiii In other 
words, they takes over the role of the BA in the ALG II regime in all aspects but financing. To be clear, 
these responsibilities only extent to the activities of the otherwise joint consortia. Both the regular 
joint one-stop-shops and the opting municipalities presented steering and control problems right 
from the start as the Federal Ministry as well as the Federal Employment Agency had only limited 
competences to intervene in the day-to-day operations at the municipal level (Jantz & Jann 2013: 
235). The next section will describe the changes the federal government has undertaken to address 
these issues. 
4.4 Activation 
The BA is still the main actor involved in activation of the unemployed.lxxiv But attempts to create a 
unified structure for labour market services have not brought about a truly coherent system (Konle-
Seidl 2008: 17). ALG I activation is the responsibility of the BA as a self-governing institution. It is 
administered by 156 local BA offices (with about 660 branches) overseen by 10 regional directorates. 
But the service provision for ALG II is coordinated through the consortia which act as a one-stop-shop 
for the claimants, in which the BA is a contracted partner (Jantz & Jann 2013: 235). As stated above, 
these joint one-stop-shops experienced governance problems. In the then-called 
Arbeitsgemeinschaften (ARGEn) tensions arose between local methods of implementation and 
central goals and coordination. Municipalities felt hampered by central coordination and a 
compromise was struck: the ARGEn would, after 2005, determine the operational targets themselves 
(through their governing council) (Konle-Seild 2008: 16). These changes did not solve the underlying 
problem, which was “a clash of cultures” between the BA and the municipal employees (Eichhorst et 
al. 2006: 39; Konlei-Seidl 2008: 17). Finally, a constitutional ruling determined that the ARGEn were 
unconstitutional because the federal government cannot create ‘mixed administration’ where 
responsibilities of the state and the local government are intermingled, because it was opposed to 
the municipalities’ constitutional right to self-rule (Knuth & Larsen 2010: 11-12).lxxv This resulted in 
the transformation of the Arbeitsgemeinschaften to the current Gemeinsame Einrichtungen. Instead 
of the ‘mixed administration’ directly inside the local agencies due to federal controlling and 
monitoring, the Länder were now placed in between the local agencies and the federal level: “The 
new legislation gives the national government the powers to supervise the Länder authorities, which, 
in turn, are supervising the proceedings of the municipalities.lxxvi Target agreements binding the 
licensed municipalities will be achieved in a similar two-tier process” (Knuth & Larsen 2010: 17). 
Additionally, the Optionskommunen are responsible for activation of the ALG II claimants without 
intervention of the PES. These Optionskommunen were, until 2011, not accountable to any higher 
level of government, but the changes described above also entailed that these opt-out municipalities 
were also partially made accountable to the Länder level.lxxvii  
By contrast, the ALG I activation structure is fairly simple. The types of services to be provided are 
determined by the federal government.lxxviii The main (non-quantified) goals for the BA and labour 
market governance in general, are stated in the first paragraph of the Drittes SozialGezetsbuch.lxxix 
But the BA is a rather independent organisation which sets its own operational targets for its local 
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offices independently from the federal government (Konle-Seidl 2008: 20). It does negotiate 
additional framework targets (Rahmenziele) based on the four non-quantifiable goals with the 
ministry,lxxx but is not obligated to do so.lxxxi The BA is overseen by the federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs but only to the extent that the BA conforms to its own statutes and the SGB III.lxxxii 
However, the BA does report to the government at least annually on input, output and outcome 
indicators and on discretionary spending of targeted integration funds.lxxxiii Their differentiated role in 
the ALG I and ALG II regimes and the targets they had to achieve according to the Rahmenziele rose 
doubts about the incentive structure of the BA. Concerns about creaming, whereby boosting the ALG 
I performance, was to be reduced by a penalty tax of €10.000 for every person who would transfer 
from ALG I to ALG II. But this practice was found to be unconstitutional and abolished in 2008 
(Eichhorst et al. 2008: 46; Konle-Seidl 2008: 21).lxxxiv So regardless of the absence of performance 
contingent pay, the federal level was concerned enough of institutional moral hazard on the side of 
the BA to initiate drastic measures. 
The ALG II activation regime is rather more complicated (Eichhorst et al. 2008: 33). Federal legislation 
determines that those institutions administrating ALG II (the consortia and the opting municipalities) 
are responsible for activation of their beneficiaries.lxxxv The consortia are accountable to both the BA 
and to the municipal council, they are in fact the “servant of two masters” (Jantz & Jann 2013: 242). 
The day to day management is headed by a managing director, who is appointed by the ‘Assembly of 
Providers’ (Trägerversammlung).lxxxvi This Trägerversammlung, which is made up from BA and 
municipal employees, and is also responsible for the administrative process, regulating the service 
delivery, establishing annual plans and guidelines. The competent Länder authorities (the labour 
ministry equivalent) oversee and may instruct the joint one-stop-shops on ALMPs.lxxxvii The federal 
government, in turn, oversees and cooperates with the Länder in a newly erected ‘Cooperation 
Committee’ (Kooperationsausschuss).lxxxviii In this Kooperationsausschuss the implementation of ALG 
II regime is coordinated and annual outcome measures are agreed upon. Additionally, another 
federal-state committee is erected to observe implementation, identify issues, compares 
performances of the joint one-stop-shops and can invite representatives of those local one-stop-
shops, all in order to provide advice on the implementation of the ALG II scheme and the activation 
thereof. The Optionskommunen are subjected to the same oversight by the Länder as the regular 
one-stop-shops. For the determination of objectives, which in the consortia is done by the 
Trägerversammlung, the opting municipalities have to negotiate with the Länder ministries. The 
primacy in the German labour market governance model lies with the Ministry and the BA, which 
enter into agreements with the Länder, which in turn monitor the municipalities. When 
municipalities cannot come to a satisfying agreement with the Ministry and the Länder, the 
Kooperationausschuss will deliver a proposal which will be considered by the Ministry – essentially 
casting a shadow of hierarchy.lxxxix Additionally, both the Länder and the Ministry have the right to 
instruct the jobcentres on service delivery and administration, this reinforces compliance through the 
shadow of hierarchy.xc The German case, therefore, comes the closest to a centralised hierarchical 
institutional context. From the four types of institutional context Grubb described, Germany 
resembles the “traditional hierarchical management using centralised command and control with in-
house service delivery” the most (2004). It is therefore, no surprise that most of the monitoring of 
activation services is done internally by the BA – both for ALG I and ALG II.xci 
The formulation of the annual targets for the activation of ALG II claimants is a complicated 
procedure. In essence, the goals are formulated by the higher levels, and passed down and adapted 
at the local level. The ALG II objectives (for 2013 and 2014 at least) are predominantly outcome 
indicators (Table 23). The literature on performance management suggest that the limited flexibility, 
or rather the fairly hierarchical institutional context, is incompatible with outcome performance 
measures (Nunn et al. 2009: 47). However, there are no funds, bonuses or incentive grants related to 
performance. This begs the question whether this incompatibility will creates perverse incentives, or 
that the lack of performance contingent pay rectifies this incompatibility. Other data (mostly process 
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and outcome indicators) is measured and monitored as well (Table 24 & Table 25). But the German 
style of NPM does not include any performance contingent pay for the municipalities – as most 
activation is in fact still done by the BA. Market pressures are utilised in the activation system, but 
only through a quasi-market for service vendors, not to control or influence local levels of 
government. “Actually there is rather a mix of governance modes: rule-oriented modes co-exist with 
NPM models supported by quasi-market mechanisms and network relations between public and 
private organisations” (Konle-Seidl 2008: 23). 
4.5 The German experience 
Summarizing, the German unemployment insurance is centrally funded and its social assistance is 
mostly dependent on federal funds. The activation is done at the local level, mostly by the BA. 
However, the responsibility for activation lies with the consortia or the opting-municipalities as a 
separate entity. These entities do not fund the unemployment related benefits. Overcoming the 
dilemma between efficient localised services and central control over the funds has characterised the 
reforms since Hartz. “The in-congruency between spending and decision powers at the different 
layers of government inhibits a more efficient management of employment policies especially for the 
long-term unemployed. It seems that there is no simple solution of this very German ‘governance 
dilemma’” (Konle-Seidl 2008: 22). A prominent part of the answer has been the use of the Länder 
level. Although involving another layer might complicate things further, the utilisation of the Länder 
level seems to solve some of those governance issues. The German federal government used an 
already existing layer of government to act as an intermediate, supporting and helping local levels 
but also monitoring them. Furthermore, they translate the local reality to the federal level and are 
more capable of formulating stretching but achievable objectives. In essence they serve as a 
bridgehead between the reality on the ground and the federal government. On the other hand, it 
shows that the federal government did not enjoy the legitimacy to directly instruct the 
municipalities. The need for the use of an intermediate level indicates that monitoring local levels 
requires a substantial bureaucracy and the creation of new institutions and responsibilities on the 
intermediate governmental level. 
The German case shows how difficult it is to implement formal policy changes and how much they 
are integrated with operational policy reforms. The attempts to create a unified structure ran into 
several problems: first of all the German constitutional court determined that some aspects of the 
institutional framework were unconstitutional. Secondly, political compromises established not one 
but three types of one-stop-shops. And thirdly, the one-stop-shops for ALG II in most municipalities 
serve two masters. The German difficulties with creating one overarching institutional framework for 
activation could serve as a warning to European policy makers contemplating a E(M)U-wide 
activation requirements. Additionally, the German experience with transferring some responsibilities 
from one level to another showed that there are issues of moral hazard encapsulated within the 
transformation process itself. In other words, one should be aware of moral hazard not just for the 
final system but also during the transition or initial implementation phase. Additionally the German 
case holds lessons for the use of performance measurement without coupling with performance 
contingent pay. The monitoring seems the cover both process and outcome measures and is also 
devoted to several vulnerable groups. However, the interaction between the BA and activation 
through municipal one-stop-shops remains difficult. The BA is, as a self-governing actor, responsible 
for the ALG I benefit and as a contracted partner for the ALG II benefit it is probable that its prime 
concern is the former. As some authors have noted, there is the danger that the ALG I performance 
measurement results in perverse incentives for the results of ALG II performance (Eichhorst et al. 
2008: 46; Konle-Seidl 2008: 21). So even without performance contingent pay, the monitoring of 
performance can still result in perverse incentives.  
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5. Denmark 
5.1 Introduction 
Unlike Germany, the Danish system can be characterised as fully municipalised. What ‘full 
municipalisation’ in this case refers to, is the total package of activation and to social assistance 
policies over which the municipal authorities have responsibility (see Table 27). Moreover, they do 
not only bear the responsibility over activation, through the municipal jobcentres, but also over the 
administration of the social assistance benefits itself. However, full municipalisation does not refer to 
authority over unemployment benefits or the setting of eligibility, duration and level of benefits. 
Even though, politically, the current municipalisation can be traced back to the 2001 new centre-
right change in government, mention must be made of a previous decentralisation in Denmark in 
1994 which is also a defining moment in the decentralisation of Danish labour market governance 
(Del Prado 2013: 45). The 1994 reforms had two sides: a substantive or formal side (welfare-to-work) 
and an operational side (the creation of 14 regional labour market councils) (Hendeliowitz 2003: 69). 
This regionalisation set the stage for the current decentralisation effort. The regionalised system was 
characterised by a large discrepancy between the centrally set objectives and what the regions and 
municipalities actually implemented, Thomas Bredgaard has referred to this as ‘compliance gaps’ 
(2011: 765). This concept implies a lack of will or enthusiasm for achieving those goals. The problem 
was not so much that the system created perverse incentives for local actors, but that the central 
goals were not seen as legitimate or useful targets by lower levels of government (Bredgaard 2011: 
765). This early Danish situation is remarkably similar to the early German experience. In the end, 
such a situation might lead to perverse incentives. Mosley identifies that the importance of local 
commitment to performance management is a precondition to any meaningful implementation of 
performance measures and the quality of data (2001: 91). The new 2001 government set itself the 
task to reign in these hard-to-control regions. Their ultimate goal was to ‘make work pay’ and create 
a work-first approach, but the autonomy of municipal social workers and the continued dichotomy 
between the municipalities and the PES was seen as a major obstacle to these goals (Bredgaard 
2011: 766).  
Municipal reform marked the start of new labour market governance reforms.xcii Four employment 
regions were created (Figure 7), which delegated responsibilities from the PES central office to local 
jobcentres existing alongside municipal administrations (M-Ploy 2011: 14).xciii This two-tiered 
structure entered into force in 2007, but it was transformed again in 2009. In effect, this 2009 
overhaul completely municipalised employment services; the municipalities were now in charge of 
the activation of all unemployed (through one-stop-shops) and in charge of the administration and 
the paying out of social assistance benefits (through a municipal department). It must be noted that, 
even though the municipality is accountable for activation, much of the services are actually provided 
by third parties. Furthermore, Employment Councils – which already existed at the regional and 
national level in a limited form – were created at every level of the government. They consist of 
social partners, the representatives of the municipalities/regions/ministry and Danish Council of 
Organisations of Disabled People. Their responsibility is to support their respective governmental 
levels in the monitoring and development of policies. The central institution is the National Labour 
Authority, which is responsible for developing new tools, implementing legislation and following up 
on results. 
There are two types of unemployment related benefit schemes in Denmark, which is also the origin 
of the former pre-2009 two-tiered system: unemployment insurance and social assistance. 
Unemployment insurance is based on the Ghent system whereby social partners run (31) state 
sanctioned insurance funds. When someone is no longer eligible or never had any claim to the 
insurance the social assistance scheme kicks in, which is historically a municipally run benefit. 
Activation is run by completely municipalised one-stop-shop jobcentres as the national PES was 
abolished (Jantz & Jann 20-13: 233). See Figure 8 for the complete overview of the practical 
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implications of this division of labour between the levels of government, the jobcentres and the 
Employment Councils. 
5.2 Unemployment insurance 
The Danish unemployment insurance is basically organised along the lines of the Ghent model: social 
partners administer unemployment insurance funds (Arbejdsløshedskassen) which must be formally 
sanctioned by the government.xciv Furthermore, the central level (in the form of the ministers for 
Employment and Pensions) oversees the conduct of the insurance funds.xcv The whole system is 
financed by social contributions which is paid for by the members.xcvi The central government 
determines the duration, level and eligibility of the benefit.xcvii So although, technically, the 
Arbejdsløshedskassen are not state-owned, the unemployment insurance system is centrally run. It is 
the central government who determines the main features and leaves no flexibility for the 
disbursement and administration of UI. The disbursement and the administration of unemployment 
insurance is multi-tiered only in the sense that they are the responsibility of those specialised funds. 
The activation, though, is fully municipalised (section 5.5, see Table 29 for full list on the dimensions 
of flexibility in Denmark). 
5.3 Social assistance 
Kontanthjælp is a municipally run social assistance benefit scheme. As with almost every other West-
European country, it is the central government who determines the eligibility and levels of the social 
assistance, though.xcviii It is a flat-rate benefit with indefinite duration, aimed at those jobseekers who 
are without claim to UI. As with the UI there is no flexibility in the target and eligibility dimensions. 
The way in which this benefit is financed is very interesting from the perspective of this paper. In 
principle, the municipalities are fully liable for the costs of the benefits, labour market services, 
monitoring and the administration.xcix However, the central level reimburses the municipalities for 
30% of the benefits costs, 50% of the municipal costs for persons who currently in activation 
programmes or who receive services but 0% of the costs for every person who should and could 
receive such services but who has not started to do so yet (see Table 30).c This ‘reimbursement 
model’ hardwires incentives for municipalities to engage in, and monitor the activation, of their 
claimants (Besharov et al. 2013: 443). This reimbursement model reinforces the central goals for the 
eligibility, target groups and programme dimensions. But as Table 30 shows, this is fully contingent 
on process indicators. Section 5.4 analyses activation, in that section it will become clear how Danish 
labour market governance deals with the inherent danger of parking. Keep in mind that activation for 
both the unemployment insurance and social assistance is done by the same institutions. Therefore, 
the division of labour between the different layers of government will be thoroughly developed in 
the next section.  
5.4 Activation  
Activation is very much interwoven into the Danish labour market governance. The funding 
municipalities receive is directly connected to the efforts of activation – through process indicators. 
The responsibilities of the levels of government are codified in Act on the responsibility and control 
of the active employment measures.ci This act sets the leeway of municipalities concerning 
programmes and the organisation of delivery. Figure 8 maps the former and the current constellation 
of actors. The objective of the central level behind this system is to create the largest possible 
workforce, this is a shift away from the central goal of human capital development pre-2001.cii In 
order to achieve that goal the Minister of Employment sets a small number of priorities annually. 
Those priorities are set in dialogue with the national Employment Council. During these deliberations 
representatives of municipalities are present, providing influence (and thus flexibility) over the 
performance measures – albeit in a very limited form. A critical part of the responsibilities of the 
central level is what some would call ‘ensuring the minimum rights and duties of the unemployed’ 
(M-Ploy 2011: 20-21) but what Bredgaard would call ‘ensuring local compliance’ (2011). Bredgaard’s 
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vision is, thus, that the central government is reigning in the flexibility of municipalities in the 
organisation of delivery and determining target groups. 
The fact of the matter is that the central level sets out minimum standards for the implementation of 
policies and the behaviour of the jobcentres as well as for the behaviour of the unemployed. “For 
example, job centres are typically required to provide jobseekers with a CV/contact interview every 
three months as a minimum, access to an employability enhancement programme after a certain 
period of unemployment, and a job plan” (Froy et al. 2011: 30).ciii Other minimum requirements 
include the setting of floors and ceilings on the duration training programmes, the formal coupling of 
methods with certain profiles of individual unemployed and sometimes it includes launching specific 
trials and projects (Table 31). This is enforced through the aforementioned reimbursement model, 
which creates financial incentives to comply with process measures, but enforcement is also secured 
through constant monitoring (see Table 30).civ Such minimum requirements and the floors and 
ceilings on intensive services can be seen as a tool to fight perverse incentives. Limiting local 
flexibility in the minimum services they have to provide and by setting minimum and maximum 
duration on intensive services the central level limits the possibility for improper use of services. A 
minimum duration of training services raises the costs for municipalities to use services as a tool to 
provide the unemployed with the credentials to re-apply for UI, thereby limiting the opportunity of 
dumping. A maximum duration limits the time in which unemployed with low probability of re-
entering regular employment can be parked in programmes. Minimal requirements for services 
inhibit the option for localities to select their own clientele and thereby they reduce the option of 
creating programmes that do not actually provide any services. The National Labour Market 
Authority is the executive institution of monitoring at the central level. It is accountable to the 
Minister, who is in turn accountable to parliament. 
The regional level is characterised by Bredgaard as “the extended arm of the central government” 
(2011: 767). This is not just a political statement but it identifies a formal power structure which is 
encapsulated within Danish labour market governance. The employment regions fall under the 
regime of the National Labour Market Authority. The regions have their own Employment Council, 
which consists of representatives of the same actors as the national Employment Council. The 
regions are legally and contractually obligated “to ensure good results and effects in employment 
measures in cooperation with the job centres” by monitoring and measuring the performance of the 
municipal jobcentres (M-Ploy 2011: 21-22). The circle of discussing their contractual obligations with 
the Minister, ensuring implementation, dialogue with the municipalities and following-up on that is 
regulated by the calendar in Figure 9. An important tool that enhances (public) transparency and the 
ability of regions to monitor municipalities is the online portal, through which municipalities are 
required to publish their progress.cv The public reporting must contain participation rates (of 
individuals and businesses), services provided, funding and outcomes – thus covering every type of 
performance measure.cvi This system could be characterised as somewhere halfway between internal 
and external monitoring. The Employment Councils do include actors from the municipality itself, 
and the employment regions are governmental actors. But this way of monitoring is detached from 
the municipal government proper.  
The municipality “manages all employment-directed tasks for all groups of citizens: employed 
people, recipients of unemployment benefits, recipients of social cash benefits, recipients of sickness 
benefits, rehabilitees, unemployment benefits for people in flex jobs, etc.” (M-Ploy 2011: 25). They 
enjoy considerable freedom, but municipalities have to abide by the priorities, minimum 
requirements and sometimes with specific agreements of the central and regional level. The actual 
implementation of labour market services is done by the one-stop municipal jobcentres, they are 
responsible for the activation of the unemployed.cvii They can develop their own programmes, but 
limited to the central legislation which acts as a sort of policy menu. Municipalities do enjoy almost 
full flexibility when it comes to outsourcing. But whoever they contract, the municipalities remain 
accountable for activation. So although (private) third parties provide a substantial part of the 
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(intensive) services, this institutional context resembles what Grubb has described as ‘payment for 
results where payments are determined by levels of performance (volume and quality) over the 
course of the contract’ rather than ‘continuous re-contracting’ or ‘purchase of services directly by 
clients’ (Bredgaard 2011: 770; Grubb 2004). There is a strict division of labour: the job centres handle 
everything that concerns the services while they do not have any authority over the disbursements 
of benefits. The municipal administration itself deals with the disbursements of social assistance 
benefits while the Unemployment Insurance Funds do so for the unemployment insurance. This is a 
striking difference with surrounding countries, but serves to clarify the accountability structure as 
there is one single actor who is purely responsible for activation (Jantz & Jann 2013: 238). The 
monitoring is done mainly through the reporting of the Employment Councils. The behaviour and the 
performance of local jobcentres are analysed and monitored by the municipal council and the 
municipal Employment Council. These municipal Employment councils are obligated to publish and 
report their findings to the regions and the regional Employment Councils. In turn, they report to the 
National Labour Market Authority and the national Employment Council, and thus ultimately to the 
Minister of Employment. This system which combines constant performance measurement with 
constant reporting is very characterising for the Danish experience.  
Bredgaard’s thesis that there were hindering compliance gaps and that the government actively 
pursues a strategy to close them seems validated by the latest round of decentralisation: “The 
organizational reform can thus be seen as an attempt of central government to regain control and 
strengthen the accountability structures in labour market policies” (Jantz & Jann 2013: 238). 
Compared to the two-tiered structure before the reforms, municipalities have decreased flexibility in 
programme development and performance measurement setting. The use of (process) performance 
measures and the reporting thereof is perhaps the most defining feature of the Danish brand of 
municipalisation. The setting of the Ministerial goals and the central employment plan is done with 
close dialogue of the central Employment Council. This means that representatives of the 
municipalities have an official channel to influence the decision-making process. The annual planning 
process is defined by law. Municipalities are obliged to convert the employment plan into local 
targets. Furthermore, the municipalities are allowed to set their own targets and the great majority 
has opted to do so (M-Ploy 2011: 49). The Danish system, thus, combines ex-ante setting of goals 
through this annual agenda, with constant real-time monitoring process used for the reimbursement 
model. However, it is the latter that really characterises Danish monitoring practices. 
5.5 The Danish experience 
The Danish experience with multi-tiered labour market governance (decentralisation) has been 
marked by operational policy reforms. Some would argue that this been inspired by the desire to get 
local and regional government levels on board with central goals (Bredgaard 2011; Bredgaard & 
Larsen 2008). Denmark confirms the remarks by Mosley that the commitment of local levels of 
government is crucial to successful performance management (2001: 91). Two features of the Danish 
model jump out: the reimbursement model and the constant and institutionalised monitoring. The 
reimbursement model, both for activation and social assistance benefits, influences local policies in a 
similar manner as the US tax reduction and block grants: local governments are not formally forced 
to exhibit certain behaviour or adhere to central priorities, they are incentivised by central funds. 
However, there is a major difference. The US financial incentives are contingent on a priori planning 
and policymaking. The Danish refunds are contingent on actual ‘real time’ experience with individual 
benefit recipients.cviii The difference between U.S. reliance on ex-ante goal setting and the Danish use 
of real-time monitoring is very clear in this regard. Arguably the Danish system is more effective at 
ensuring compliance with centrally desired behaviour as it creates financial incentives at the lowest 
level possible. Nunn et al. argue that the amount of flexibility is related to the suitability of types of 
indicators (2009: 47). Even though Danish municipalities are free to outsource their activities, their 
flexibility is much more limited than, say, the American states. The attempt of increasing central 
control over local practices, therefore, seems in line with the focus on process indicators. However 
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reliance on process indicators inherently creates moral hazard issues in the form of parking. A crucial 
feature, therefore, are the performance reviews of intermediate outcome indicators that 
municipalities have to pursue and communicate to the employment regions. The employment 
regions in turn, cast a shadow of hierarchy as they can take over or delegate the responsibilities of 
mal-performing jobcentres to other actors. This two-pronged strategy – reimbursement and 
performance review – requires an extensive bureaucratic apparatus and significant monitoring and 
reporting efforts. According to an OECD survey 93 percent of all the Danish jobcentre managers 
indicated that the bureaucracy level was too high (Froy et al. 2011: 42).  
The Danish multi-tiered labour market governance is predominantly aimed at activation in the form 
of welfare-to-work. Activation is much more of an integral part of the benefit system in Denmark 
than in the other cases, as shown by the reimbursement model of the social assistance benefits. The 
large bureaucracy involved in monitoring process and intermediate outcome would pose serious 
challenges for any E(M)U-wide scheme. So conceived, a reimbursement system combined with the 
performance management system which accompanies it, seems politically and practically not 
feasible for a supranational scheme. It is difficult to differentiate the operational policy (the 
reimbursement model) from the formal policy (activation). Nonetheless, the Danish experience 
shows that posing process activation requirements does entail the issues of moral hazard in the form 
of parking and that fighting those incentives requires a sizeable reporting apparatus. Additionally, the 
Danish experience with trying to close compliance gaps serves as a confirmation of the importance of 
local commitment to performance management systems – as much of the operational reform has 
dealt with this issue. 
6. Belgium  
6.1 Introduction 
The Belgian experience is highly relevant with regard to the issues studied in this paper. Already since 
the 1980s, Belgium features a clear-cut distinction between one level of government which is 
responsible for unemployment insurance benefits (the legislation, the funding, the administrative 
management of the system, and the sanctioning of unemployed individuals when they fail to meet 
the obligations that make them eligible, such as searching employment), and another level of 
government which is responsible for the PES and the activation of the unemployed (but not the 
follow-up of their search effort with regard to their eligibility for benefits).  
This division of labour has created considerable political tensions with regard to the governance of 
the unemployment system, culminating in a new departure in 2004, launched by the Employment 
Conference of September 2003. After complex negotiations between the federal government and the 
three regional governments (and, parallel, many rounds of discussion with the social partners), a 
cooperative framework for the activation and follow-up of the unemployed was formally agreed in 
2004 between the different levels of government. This Cooperation Agreement is the central focus of 
this section. In 2013, a new Cooperation Agreement was negotiated as a follow-up to the 2004 
Agreement. The latter will be the last Cooperation Agreement of this specific kind; from 2015 
onwards, Belgium’s institutional architecture changes in the context of a new round of constitutional 
reform, the so-called Sixth State Reform. In part, this institutional evolution is related to the same 
challenges w.r.t. labour market policy as inspired the Cooperation Agreements; it devolves the 
political responsibility for the activation and the follow-up of individuals with unemployment benefits 
and individuals living on means-tested social assistance completely to the regions. Thus, we enter a 
new era, with important consequences for the issues discussed in this section, but we will not 
elaborate on the Sixth State Reform here.  
6.2 Unemployment insurance 
Unemployment insurance is an exclusive federal competence in Belgium: the level, the duration, and 
the eligibility criteria of unemployment benefits are completely and solely determined by federal 
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legislation. Trade unions play an important role in the practical administration of the system, as 
intermediaries between the individual unemployed on the one hand, and the unemployment branch 
of the federal social security system, which is managed by the Rijksdienst voor Arbeidsvoorziening 
(RVA)/Office National de l’Emploi (ONEM), on the other hand.  
Unemployment insurance in Belgium is different from unemployment insurance in many other 
countries in two respects. First, in principle, the duration of unemployment benefits can be 
unlimited. Second, and not unrelated, the Belgian unemployment case load incorporates a number 
of inactive individuals who would in other countries not be entitled to unemployment benefits 
proper, but be entitled to social assistance, (long-term) invalidity benefits, or early retirement within 
the pension system. Consequently, the unemployment case load is comparatively big (see 
Vandenbroucke 2013: Table 4), but the level of benefits is, in general, not high, certainly not for 
individuals who are not financially in charge of a household and who are medium- or long-term 
unemployed. 
The notion of an ‘unlimited duration’ needs qualification though, on two counts. First, the eligibility 
criteria stipulate that the right to benefits implies obligations: searching employment, accepting 
‘adequate job offers’, and being ready to cooperate with PES that offer activation or training. (These 
obligations hold for most individuals; for a long time, elderly unemployed were excluded from these 
obligations, but these obligations are now gradually extended to elderly unemployed.) Individuals 
who are seen to fail one of these obligations, can be sanctioned. Second, for many years, article 80 of 
the unemployment benefit regulation made it possible to exclude unemployed individuals from the 
benefit system, if the duration of their unemployment was considered ‘abnormally long’. In the 
1990s, a relatively high number of unemployed individuals lost benefits via this system. With 
hindsight, this mechanism can be said to have been rather brutal in its consequences (exclusion from 
the right to unemployment benefits, often without prior warning that one should look for work), 
highly selective (it applied only to a sub-category of mainly women), and not very effective in terms 
of activation (since it was not incorporated into an activation strategy). In the context of the 
Cooperation Agreement of 2004, article 80 was replaced with a regulation that is not only broader in 
scope (it covers all the unemployed, though initially it was restricted to the under-50s) and more 
nuanced in its application (with gradual sanctions), but that also works preventatively.cix 
6.3 Social assistance 
Social assistance (the so-called leefloon/revenue d’intégration sociale) plays a residual role in 
Belgium; in terms of budgets and caseload, it is relatively marginal (compared to unemployment). 
From 2002 onwards, new legislation put an emphasis on the need to activate individuals living with a 
leefloon. The legislation, both with regard to the benefits and the principle of activation, is federal, 
but the practical implementation is completely devolved to the municipal level. The budgetary 
responsibility for these social assistance benefits, very roughly formulated, can be seen as starting 
from a 50/50 division between the federal government and local authorities. As a matter of fact, 
there is considerable variation in the local efforts and achievements with regard to the activation of 
individuals with a leefloon in Belgium (Vandenbroucke 2011). The federal administration facilitates 
activation (by specific programmes, including also extra financial support), organizes its statistical 
follow-up, but does not steer it. The Belgian tradition of respect for ‘local autonomy’ plays an 
important role in this respect. In the context of the new constitutional reform, the competence for 
activation of individuals living with a leefloon will be devolved to the regions. Whether or not this will 
lead to a more consequential central steering (by the regions) and less policy discretion at the local 
level is as yet unclear. We do not pursue this here. 
6.4 Activation 
With regard to activation, Belgium has been a laggard. A systematic approach to activation, 
conforming to the 1997 guidelines of the European Employment Strategy, was only implemented 
from 2004 onwards. Before 2004, there was no systematic ‘preventative’ attempt to activate new 
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entrants into unemployment across all Belgian regions; and the ‘curative’ approach (activating the 
stock of long-term unemployed) was also very disparate. The Belgian experience before 2004 can be 
interpreted as an archetypal case of institutional moral hazard: regional authorities were under no 
financial pressure to commit themselves to systematic activation, given the fact that the funding of 
unemployment benefits was completely federal. The division of labour between federal authorities 
(supposed to monitor and eventually sanction the unemployed with regard to their job search 
effort), and regional authorities (supposed to activate the unemployed), reduced the motivation to 
activate at the regional level, and made it practically impossible for the federal level to monitor and 
eventually sanction the unemployed. In theory, the regional PES had to inform the federal social 
security authority (the RVA/ONEM) about unemployed individuals who were apparently not looking 
for work or who did not cooperate with activation programmes (the regions had to ‘transmit’ 
information on non-compliance with the principles of the federal unemployment insurance; in 
practice, the amount of so-called transmissions remained very limited and was very uneven across 
the regions, as we will explain below. As a result of this rather schizophrenic situation, the main 
mechanism applied throughout the 1980s and the 1990s to monitor and sanction the unemployed 
was the infamous article 80 (see above).  
However, apart from this non-benign interpretation of the long stand-still in activation in Belgium 
before 2004, as a pure case of institutional moral hazard, other factors were at play too. If a regional 
PES wanted to position itself in the market of placement (in competition with interim agencies etc.), 
it had to build and entertain a reputation of sending ‘good and motivated’ candidates to companies. 
Hence, offering jobs to unemployed individuals as a way to ‘test’ their readiness to work (notably 
when their motivation would seem limited), was seen as detrimental to the credibility and the 
competitive position of the PES as a labour market actor. This argument, which is in itself rational, 
contributed to a policy paradigm that activation had to be a ‘positive’ endeavour, far removed from 
any sanctioning mechanism. This explains why, at the regional level the willingness to inform the 
RVA/ONEM about unemployed individuals who were apparently not looking for work, was very 
limited. Finally, in order to understand the Belgian policy predicament of the 1990s and the growing 
political tension with regard to interregional differences in unemployment, one must take on board 
the very different employment situation in the Belgian regions. Given a tighter labour market in 
Flanders and more unfulfilled vacancies, counsellors in the Flemish PES faced a different reality than 
counsellors in the Walloon PES. Despite the factors that inhibited forceful activation efforts both in 
Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels, in the Flemish region, arguments in favour of a more systematic 
activation effort gained ground. In Wallonia, the low regional employment rate was interpreted by 
many actors as solely a labour demand problem and not a supply problem, i.e. as indicating that 
activation of the unemployed would be futile in Wallonia. Data on the (limited) number of sanctions 
vis-à-vis unemployed individuals by the federal RVA/ONEM suggested that the Flemish PES was more 
ready to transfer the files of ‘undeserving unemployed’ individuals who declined job offers, to the 
federal RVA/ONEM, with a view to applying sanctions, than the PES in Brussels and Wallonia (see 
Figure 12 below, at the start of the period under review, the percentage of unemployed individuals 
that were confronted with sanctions in the context of the federal unemployment benefit system, was 
much higher in Flanders than in the other regions).  
All this changed radically with the intergovernmental Cooperation agreement of 2004. Politically, the 
basic idea was that regional authorities and PES accepted that they had to contribute actively to the 
budgetary viability and public legitimacy of the federal unemployment benefit system, which 
retained its defining feature of organizing unemployment benefits with, in principle, no limitation in 
duration if the unemployed individual continues to search for jobs. (In a sense, the gradual abolition 
of article 80 even reinforced this fundamental feature of the Belgian system.) Practically, the essence 
was that the instruments of the federal authorities (with regard to the monitoring and possible 
sanctioning of unemployed individuals) and the instruments of the regional authorities would be 
34 
 
much better coordinated with each other, in order to establish a real link between individual rights 
(to benefits) and obligations (to search employment). 
The Cooperation Agreement implied a marked convergence, across the three regions, with regard to 
the way activation was organized. The federal RVA/ONEM would invite each unemployed person to 
an individual face-to-face meeting according to a strict time schedule (a first meeting after 15 
months of unemployment for people below the age of 25, and after 21 months for older individuals). 
The regional PES committed themselves to an activation process that would offer all those 
individuals adequate opportunities (in the form of counselling, training, job offers) before they would 
be invited by the federal RVA/ONEM. If, on the basis of this face-to-face meeting, the search effort of 
the unemployed was judged to be satisfactory by the RVA/ONEM, a new invitation would come after 
another 12/16 months (if the person would still be unemployed). But if the search effort was 
considered unsatisfactory, a new invitation would follow after only 4 months; a second negative 
evaluation would then lead to a gradual build-up of sanctions. This agreement and the mutual 
regional and federal commitments attached to it, created a strong incentive for the regional PES to 
step up their activation effort, but also a rather rigid straightjacket in which they had to organize 
their own processes.    
With regard to sanctions, article 80 was replaced with a regulation that is not only broader in scope 
(it allows to target all the unemployed, including men and heads of households, though initially it was 
restricted to the under-50s) and more nuanced in its application (with gradual sanctions), but that 
also works preventatively. The essence of the new model is close monitoring rather than imposing 
harsh punitive sanctions. As a matter of fact, within the activation framework stricto sensu, the 
number of total and definitive exclusions in 2009-2011 (5906 cases) was 30% lower than under 
article 80 between 2001-2003; apart from total and definitive exclusions, the new system also 
provides for temporary exclusions; over 2009-2011, there were 5640 cases of such temporary 
exclusions. This largely preventative model was not unsuccessful, according to research by Cockx et 
al. (2011a, 2011b), which is not to say that it cannot be improved. The cooperation agreement also 
created a new momentum for the system of so-called ‘transmissions’, whereby regional employment 
services can report unemployed persons to the national employment agency for a variety of 
contraventions of the unemployment regulation: the number of transmissions increased significantly, 
and so did the number of ensuing sanctions. Although transmissions do not fall within the monitoring 
scheme applied by the RVA/ONEM, they are closely related to the activation drive and the 
Cooperation Agreement.  
We focus here on sanctions, not because we believe that sanctioning ‘undeserving’ unemployed 
individuals is the nec plus ultra of an activation policy. However, the interregional imbalance with 
regard to sanctions, as it existed in the beginning of the 2000s, came increasingly to be seen as 
unacceptable. Applying the concepts of this paper, that regional imbalance may be seen as a signal of 
‘institutional moral hazard’ which undermines the legitimacy of the system. Figure 10 shows the total 
number of sanctions, as a percentage of the number of unemployed, linked to the new federal 
monitoring system (i.e. where the trigger is at the federal level). Figure 11 shows the total number of 
sanctions that followed from regional ‘transmissions’ to the federal level (i.e. where the trigger is at 
the regional level). Figure 12 encompasses both categories of sanctions. To be sure, Figure 12 also 
includes sanctions that are not related to the jointly agreed activation scheme: data mining has made 
it possible to drastically improve the fight against benefit fraud, which has also resulted in more 
sanctions. 
Figure 12 clearly displays a ‘catching-up process’ in terms of the overall number of sanctions in 
Wallonia and Brussels. The underlying components reveal persistent differences in the patterns of 
sanctions (with sanctions from ‘transmissions’ remaining relatively more important in Flanders, and 
sanctions directly linked to the new federal monitoring system being more important in the two 
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other regions); however, the Cooperation Agreement not only fuelled activation and training efforts 
in all regions, but also corrected a situation that was politically unsustainable. 
Simultaneously, the Cooperation Agreement implied a straightjacket for the regional PES, which 
made subsequent adjustments of the regional policy frameworks to new realities or new insights 
more difficult. This led to a call to a new approach from 2008 onwards, in which the complete 
competence with regard to activation, but also with regard to the monitoring of unemployed 
individuals would be devolved to the regions. One of the arguments in favour of further devolution 
was that the federal follow-up of unemployed people cannot be based on a sufficiently fine-grained 
assessment of the real situation of the unemployed individuals: ‘clever’ unemployed people are able 
to conceal lack of effort when they are interrogated by the federal authorities (who do not engage in 
the mediation and training process themselves, since that is done at the regional PES level); 
vulnerable individuals, who experience real difficulties in finding a job in the regular labour market 
may also be very vulnerable vis-à-vis an undifferentiated examination procedure at the federal 
level.cx At first sight, devolving the monitoring of unemployed individuals’ search efforts to the 
regions, would seem to exacerbate the risk of institutional moral hazard. However, the argument 
fitted into a broader scheme, in which the impact of success (or failure) of activation on regional 
budgetary revenues would be enhanced (see Vandenbroucke and Meert, 2010, for a proposal to link 
budgetary transfers from the federal to the regional level directly to regional performance in 
employment policy, formulated in the context of this new institutional debate). The Sixth State 
Reform has taken this call for further devolvement of activation policy on board, but no specific 
intergovernmental ‘financial incentive’ mechanism was attached to it. Implicitly, the negotiators of 
the Sixth State Reform seemed satisfied that the overall financial architecture of the new Belgian 
institutions would constitute a sufficient incentive for the regions to pursue an active labour market 
policy, since regional budgets would automatically benefit from an increased taxable income basis 
when employment would increase. The ‘Sixth State Reform’ has been embedded in legislation and 
voted in parliament, but it still needs to be implemented in practice. The jury is still out with regard 
to the impact of this new constellation. 
For completeness, we should add that in 2013, a new Cooperation Agreement was negotiated, in the 
same vein as the 2004 Agreement but with some important modifications. For instance, the scope 
was enlarged (it also extended to unemployed individuals older than 50, and incorporated specific 
procedures for school leavers) and the intervention periods were shortened (i.e. it implied a 
speeding up of the follow-up process viz-à-viz the individual unemployed). The 2013 Agreement will 
be implemented until the Sixth State Reform is fully executed. Obviously, given the Sixth State 
Reform, this will be the last agreement of this type in Belgium. Implementing the Sixth State Reform 
may well require a specific agreement between the federal and the regional authorities on a 
common normative framework for activation policies (to ensure that the principles of the federal 
unemployment insurance are complied with), but the political and institutional basis of such a 
negotiation – if it is launched – will be different. 
Notwithstanding important institutional change within Belgium, there is continuity in the overarching 
European framework. In a sense, the Cooperation Agreements of 2004 and 2013 can be seen as a 
translation of key and long-standing guidelines of the European Employment Strategy into Belgian 
practice, notably the fact that every unemployed individual had to be offered a new start before 
reaching x months of unemployment (depending on the age of the individual) in the form of training, 
retraining, work practice, a job, or other employability measures. (The observation that Belgium was 
a laggard w.r.t. the implementation of these 1997 Guidelines, was an important argument in the 
internal Belgian debate in the beginning of the 2000s.) Gradually, the European Employment Strategy 
has become more stringent in this regard, culminating recently in the Youth Guarantee. This 
reinvigorated European framework may become even more important for the overall governance of 
the Belgian system in the future.         
36 
 
6.5 The Belgian experience 
Table 33 summarizes the division of labour among levels of government in Belgium with regard to 
unemployment benefits, activation and means-tested social assistance. The main lesson learned 
from the Belgian experience, with regard to unemployment insurance, is  the following: a clear-cut 
distinction between one level of government that is responsible for unemployment insurance 
benefits (the legislation, the funding, the administrative management of the system, and the 
sanctioning of unemployed individuals when they fail to meet the obligations that make them 
eligible, such as looking for employment), and another level of government that is responsible for the 
PES and the activation of the unemployed (but not the follow-up of their employment search effort 
with regard to their eligibility for benefits), does create very serious issues of institutional moral 
hazard, if not in reality, then certainly so in the political perception. In order to counter this problem, 
either a constraining cooperative framework is needed, or an intergovernmental financial 
mechanism that would ‘reward’ successful activation. In 2003, Belgium choose the first solution, with 
marked impact. Simultaneously, this requires difficult and detailed intergovernmental negotiations; 
the ensuing straightjacket for the governments responsible for activation also has disadvantages, 
and, most of all, the monitoring of individual search efforts by the federal authority is sub-optimal. 
The awareness of these disadvantages led to the Sixth Belgian State Reform, which brings the 
country in unchartered territory w.r.t. unemployment regulation and activation. Given the Sixth 
Belgian State Reform, the European guidelines on activation become even more important as a 
unifying framework for increasingly devolved Belgian policies. 
7. Results: the lessons learned 
7.2 National lessons learned 
This paper has studied multi-tiered labour market governance models, and specifically the issue of 
moral hazard. Often, the multi-tiered nature of labour market governance is partly the result of the 
attempt by governments to reduce the individual moral hazard of their workforce; activating policies 
can be seen as counteracting individual moral hazard. Such policies are thought to be most 
conveniently implemented at the local level. But multi-layering can come about in different ways: 
path-dependence due to federalism; or a historical division of institutional responsibilities, e.g. the 
role of municipalities in social assistance, which has existed for decades in some European welfare 
states. Whatever the case, this paper has shown that it is the local level which has been 
predominantly involved in activation, while the federal or central governmental level has mostly 
been responsible for funding and setting the levels benefits. Counteracting individual moral hazard 
through ALMPs in such multi-tiered systems has increased the relevance of another type of moral 
hazard: between levels of government. Institutional moral hazard is not confined to the interaction 
between activation and unemployment-based benefit schemes, though, it could also arise due to the 
interaction between different benefit schemes.  
The Belgian case (with regard to UI benefits) shows that institutional moral hazard can become a 
central policy and political issue. Admittedly, the Belgian case is extreme: the complete responsibility 
for legislating on and funding of unemployment benefits is at the federal level, whilst much of 
activation and the organization of PES are regional competences. The Belgian experience shows that 
such a division of labour is unsustainable, if it is not remedied, for instance by a strict cooperative 
framework with regard to the activation process (rather than performance measurement), as was 
organized from 2004 onwards. The Belgian experience also shows the importance (at least in the 
Belgian case) of the overarching European Employment Strategy.  
Apart from the specific Belgian experience with regard to its unemployment insurance system, the 
attempt to combat institutional moral hazard has often resulted in some kind of performance 
measurement model, or at least some form of performance monitoring. All three EU cases have an 
unemployment insurance system in which the central government is the dominant level in financing 
and determining eligibility, levels and duration of the benefits. Social assistance is much more 
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devolved, both in terms of financing and administration. The obvious lesson here is that any 
supranational benefit system with automatic stabilization purposes must be focussed on UI benefits 
because this would limit the need to account for the large divergences in social assistance. In any 
case, social assistance is not the best benefit to fund if one wants to achieve speedy automatic 
stabilization effects. However, the experiences with social assistance could be relevant for 
investigating moral hazard issues because in social assistance there is often more interaction 
between different levels of government.  
The U.S. system of regular unemployment insurance is somewhat of an outlier in this research. The 
legislation of this federal-state cooperation has little to say on the matter of activation; a fortiori, it 
does not include a measurement of the activation performance of states. Because states are 
themselves responsible for the financing of the actual UI benefits, they are inherently incentivised to 
develop their own activation system. In addition, the lack of concern for institutional moral hazard 
might be due to the meagre nature of regular UI in the U.S. The fact that the flow of funds between 
the federal level and the state is earmarked for administration purposes, further reduces the federal 
level’s concern for institutional moral hazard. The next reason why the federal level might not be so 
concerned with the activation policy of the states is that the states have a relatively uniform 
performance concerning unemployment – at least compared to the European member states (Table 
17). When (member) states have a more equal performance, the relevance of activation – or rather 
the need for federal involvement in activation – is not so high. The FUTA itself – the possibility for a 
credit when legislation complies with FUTA requirements – is also a way for the federal level to 
influence state legislation. In sum, the federal influence on state policies is mainly aimed at the 
convergence of eligibility and administration procedures. This system probably does little in terms of 
automatic stabilization but it could be viewed as a positive example of fostering convergence. 
The federal regulation of emergency and extended UI benefits displays more concern with individual 
moral hazard because the federal level is fiscally involved in the actual benefits – either for 50 or 
100%. Additionally the duration of benefits is greatly extended, which also widens the window of 
opportunity for individual moral hazard to arise. Therefore, the federal level demands certain 
requirements of individual claimants. Institutional moral hazard is, again, not so much of an issue for 
the federal level. If state governments would try to take advantage of either emergency of extended 
benefits it would mean that they would have to actively scale back their already existing ALMP 
efforts during crises, which is highly unlikely. However, the possibility of applying such extended or 
emergency benefits in a E(M)U context seems limited: in some countries the benefits would kick in 
very late and such a system would create the incentive to scale down benefit durations and thereby 
undermining social models while leaning on the EU to support them during times of crises. However, 
the proposal of Dullien works around the divergences within the EU, by proposing the option of 
extending the E(M)U funded benefit (Dullien 2014: 84-86). In other words, it would not extend the 
national UI per se, but it would extend the E(M)U contribution to the national UI. Although this might 
solve the applicability issue (this type of extension would apply to all cases equally), it heightens the 
issue of moral hazard. As the U.S. has shown, increasing the duration also increases the concern of 
the federal level for moral hazard. The proposed E(M)U scheme already entails a base-period of one 
year, extending that would likely raise concerns over it funding long-term unemployment. 
The parsimonious nature of the U.S. federal-state cooperation contrasts with the complicated 
governance of activation policies in the U.S. States have enormous potential to form their own 
governance structures within the federal guidelines, which entails not just significant local autonomy 
but also a lot of variation. Attempts to measure and manage the local performance have led to a very 
complex system indeed. It seems difficult to construct a system in which the activation activities of 
local governments are both effectively monitored and still given enough leeway to implement tailor 
made policies. Furthermore, decentralised ALMP responsibilities seem to go hand in hand with 
strong political struggles over where to place the authority to design, implement and monitor 
policies. Experiences with activation monitoring and performance measurements in the other three 
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cases confirm this point. The TANF programme copes with similar performance management 
problems, although the governance model is much more clearly defined compared to the WIA 
governance structure. 
Concerning the difficulties to create a decentralised governance structure for activation policies, the 
German experience is a case in point. Operational reforms of German activation policies have led to 
multiple interventions by the constitutional court, lots of political debate and the erection of three 
types of one-stop-shops. But as a result of the interventions by the Karlsruhe court, the Länder-level 
has been increased in prominence, which yields an interesting design feature. It resembles the role of 
the Economic boards in Denmark and the WIBs in the U.S. The Länder constitute a kind of bridgehead 
between the federal and municipal level. They organize independent reporting, are perhaps better 
suited to monitor the local level, engage in performance measurement negotiations but also support 
the local level in their efforts, thereby creating possibilities to incentivise convergence and spread 
policy diffusion. The Economic boards (U.S. state and local WIBs and the Danish Economic Boards), 
especially in Denmark, could be also seen as a source of convergence. They are advisory boards that 
include different partners from different levels, and just as the Länder they report independently, 
monitor and support the local level. In doing so, they could serve both as a check on local 
governments and as a source for policy diffusion. Such experiences could be relevant to a E(M)U-
wide benefit. Creating mid-level institutions helps bridging the gap between local diversity and 
central goals, both in controlling and supporting lower levels of government. However, it also shows 
that in these three cases the federal or central level either lacked the legitimacy or the capacity to 
monitor local governments effectively themselves. In other words, this finding reinforces the concern 
that monitoring local levels could require a substantial bureaucracy or at least additional institutions 
to reinforce the legitimacy of central objectives and power and to enhance the capacity to monitor. 
The similarity between the Danish and the German experience in this regard is particularly striking. 
Denmark had issues with the legitimacy of central goals and Germany had issues with the legitimacy 
of the authority itself. Both created new responsibilities and institutions at the intermediate level to 
address those issues. 
The Danish activation model looks more parsimonious in terms of governance structure than the 
other cases. It has less actors involved and less different types of one-stop-shops than Germany. Its 
governance structure is more clear-cut than the American WIA model. Danish municipalities also 
enjoy the leeway to outsource or collaborate with private or social partners in the one-stop-shops if 
they so desire. Some one-stop-shops have even been completely outsourced to private parties. But 
the Danish model seems to be very heavily burdened with (excessive) reporting and monitoring. Even 
though the governance model seems relatively simple, the effort to utilise it is significant. The 
potential for application of such a system in a E(M)U context seems low. 
The only feature all four activation systems have in common is that they are complex, often both in 
governance structure and in the types of moral hazard that arise. What we have learned is that one 
should take account of the institutional context before deciding on how to implement performance 
measurement to fight moral hazard. When both autonomy and diversity among the constituent local 
governments are high - as it would inevitably be the case in any E(M)U-wide scheme  – it would be 
best to monitor outcome measures. However, the two types of outcome measures, final and 
intermediate outcome measures, have their own problematic features. Final outcomes measures are 
influenced by the economic context, which could make them hard to interpret. Especially during 
periods of global or regional crises, final outcome measures do not accurately measure the effort of 
activation. When the implied targets are unrealistic or hard to achieve, and the stakes for measuring 
up are high, incentives for misleading reporting will increase. Intermediate outcome measures are 
more related to the efforts of activating institutions, but on their own they are susceptible to 
creaming. Next to penetration measures, process indicators are a way to offset the shortfalls of 
outcome measures. Measuring the amount and type of intervention has a number of limitations. 
First of all, with highly flexible and autonomous constituent local authorities it is difficult to 
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accommodate the range of possible types of interventions without creating incentives for parking. As 
some of the cases have shown – especially Denmark – it is possible to monitor a broad range of 
indicators. The danger there is that this will lead to a very substantial bureaucracy, especially when 
using constant ‘real-time’ monitoring. The alternative option is to monitor the inputs of activation 
models. The U.S. model has shown that it is also possible to formulate some minimal legislative input 
requirements to achieve a measure of convergence and compliance. However, this is in no way an 
insurance that countries would actually actively pursue activation. The legislative requirements in the 
U.S. system are more aimed at sharing information and convergence of administration systems. 
7.2 The relevance for a E(M)U-wide scheme 
The E(M)U-wide scheme as proposed by Dulliencxi seems attractive from a moral hazard standpoint. 
It draws heavily on the American experience, in which policies to fight moral hazard are almost non-
existent within the regular UI scheme. However, even though there are (almost) no activation 
requirements in the (regular) unemployment insurance in the U.S., the efforts to activate the 
workforce have increased over the years. This has been done through the use of additional individual 
work requirements in recent legislation and the development of the WIA system. This is relevant for 
an E(M)U-wide scheme as it shows that even in the U.S., where through extended and emergency 
benefits the maximum duration is around 70 weeks, activation and moral hazard have become a 
greater concern. Hence, although twelve months of unemployment is sometimes referred to as 
‘short-term unemployment’, the U.S. case suggests that twelve months is already a substantial time 
span, in relation to which concerns about activation can emerge. It is possible to delegate this 
concern mainly to the individual member states, as happens in the U.S. However, as Table 17 has 
shown, the difference between the unemployment rates in the American states is much smaller as 
the disparity among European member states.  
Additionally, the disparity across Eurozone member states concerning the duration of unemployment 
is substantial, even over a longer period (Figure 3). It is true that trends in unemployment rates can 
shift over time. Only a decade ago Germany was qualified as ‘the sick man of Europe’ and now it is 
among the top performers. However, as Figure 3 shows, even over medium-long duration there are 
‘structural’ differences.cxii When the constituent member states of a E(M)U-wide scheme continue to 
show such divergence over longer periods of time, activation becomes increasingly relevant as 
political tensions might arise over the ‘performance’ of other countries – especially those who are at 
that time net receivers. Without proper adjustment mechanisms, such a situation can also lead to 
permanent transfers.  
Our research illustrates the close-knit relationship between unemployment benefits and activation. 
This creates peculiar difficulties for a E(M)U-wide scheme that is, in principle, designed not to get 
involved in ALMPs. The argument is both practical and more theoretical. Practically, this paper has 
shown that benefit disbursement is often hardwired to activation on a national level in a complex 
way. Performance contingent pay, bonuses or non-pecuniary incentives link local policy performance 
to central funds. Activation programmes link individual behaviour to benefit disbursement. The 
political difficulties of managing existing links between benefit disbursement and activation at the EU 
level should not be underestimated. In some countries activation programmes extent eligibility, or 
participants continue to receive benefits during programmes. When there is little consensus on the 
effectiveness of such programmes, the EU might be seen to fund the benefits of unemployed 
workers participating in (or being parked in) highly contested programmes. Also, when participants in 
activation programmes such as subsidised job creation do not continue to receive benefits, an 
E(M)U-wide scheme would provide disincentives for national governments to utilise such 
programmes as that would transfer job seekers from a partially EU-funded passive scheme to a 
nationally funded activation programme. The theoretical argument is based on the vulnerability of 
any European notion of solidarity. If a E(M)U-wide scheme requires redistribution, pan-European 
solidarity requires shared goals and values and also a common sense of purpose. Activation can 
foster solidarity among workers as it reduces concerns for individual moral hazard. If a European 
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system does not create convergence of activation policies, significant differences in activation 
regimes will persist. Some countries invest heavily in enabling activation, some countries rely on 
punitive activation while yet other countries might not utilise activation on a large scale. This 
disparity does not contribute to development of shared values, common goals and a sense of 
common purpose. In other words, an E(M)U-wide scheme that does not display concern for moral 
hazard might be very vulnerable with regard to the degree of pan-European solidarity is requires in 
order to be sustainable. This being said, our arguments should not be interpreted as a rejection of 
specific proposals, but rather as a first exploration of possible pitfalls. 
8. Policy Conclusions & Debate 
This paper is an exploratory research and by no means definitive. It provides no clear-cut answers on 
whether or not a E(M)U-wide scheme is desirable, rather it develops an understanding of the role of 
moral hazard in multi-tiered unemployment benefit schemes. It has shown that it is a complicated 
endeavour to monitor lower levels of government and to provide them with the right incentives to 
enhance their compliance with central activation objectives. Central and federal governments in the 
four cases have struggled to develop a system in which lower levels of government actively and 
effectively activate the unemployed in accordance with central of federal policy goals. Many of the 
difficulties in doing so stem from the complicated nature of performance management and 
monitoring systems. 
Even though it has been a challenging endeavour, central and federal governments have tried to 
enhance compliance at the lower level with central goals because of concern with individual moral 
hazard. The division of labour between higher and lower levels of government generates specific 
issues of institutional moral hazard. Performance management systems attempt to direct local 
behaviour, but they can themselves create new moral hazard challenges (e.g. parking, creaming).  If a 
E(M)U-wide scheme would get involved in activation it would entail adding another layer on top of 
nationally multi-tiered systems. It seems difficult to formulate performance measures that are 
compatible with the variety of different institutional contexts in the member states. In essence, this 
paper suggests a trade-off between, on the one hand, a parsimonious E(M)U-wide scheme that does 
not get involved in activation but that might be at odds with the legitimacy of and solidarity within 
the E(M)U as a whole, and, on the other hand, a system which does display concern with activation 
but which might result in a complicated bureaucratic effort to monitor performance. National 
experiences show that it is hard to separate activation and benefit disbursement both for 
fundamental and practical reasons. This conundrum is not easily solved; it requires substantial 
further research and policy debate. 
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10. Appendices 
 
Appendix A – General 
 
Figure 1. Interaction of national and European insurance schemes in the Dullien proposal 
Source: Dullien 2014: 66 
 
*The light grey block represents the EU funded part, the dark grey the national part of the benefit. 
*Dullien also mentions the option of extending the European funded part in times or extra-ordinary hardship as inspired by the U.S. 
system (see section 3.2; Dullien 2014: 84-86) 
 
Table 1. Formal and operational policy reforms in employment policy. 
Sources: Bredgaard & Larsen 2008: 3. See also Van Berkel & Borghi 2008, Van Berkel 2010. 
 Formal Policy Operational Policy 
Definition The content (substance) of legislation, 
programmes, schemes and 
instruments for delivering benefits 
and providing services 
The governing of the implementation 
structure for administration of 
benefits and provision of services 
Indicators Changes in entitlements, rights and 
responsibilities, target groups, 
instruments, programmes and 
schemes 
Changes in inter-agency cooperation, 
decentralisation, purchaser-provider 
split, new public management 
techniques and instruments, 
introduction of new or reorganisation 
of old organisations 
Dominant research tradition Labour market and social policy 
research 
Governance and new public 
management research, 
implementation studies 
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Figure 2. The relations between the classifications of types of employment policy reform 
  Sources  Van Berkel 2010, Bredgaard & 
Larsen 2008 
Mosley 2011 
 
*The combination of these classification is done by the authors of this paper, none of the original sources state or explicitly adhere to 
such a combination. 
 
Table 2. The types of multi-tiered labour market governance in European and North-America 
Source: Mosley 2011: 9. 
Political decentralisation Managerial decentralisation of national PES 
Federal Regional Municipal 
Canada Belgium For all the unemployed Austria Romania 
The United States Spain Denmark Finland Greece 
Switserland Italy Poland Germany Hungary 
  Norway The Netherlands Latvia 
   France Slovenia 
  Only for long-term 
unemployment (and/or 
social assistance) 
Sweden Bulgaria 
  Finland Estonia Portugal 
  Germany The Czech Republic Ireland 
  The Netherlands The United Kingdom Slovakia 
 
Table 3. The possible dimensions of flexibility in labour market governance 
Sources: Mosley 2011, Froy et al. 2011, Giguère & Froy 2009. 
Mosley Froy et al. Giguère & Froy 
Budget Budgets & financing Financing 
Programme Programme design Programme design 
Target groups Client eligibility Target groups 
Organisation of delivery -  
Personnel Staffing & outsourcing  
Outsourcing Outsourcing 
Collaboration & partnerships Collaboration 
Performance targets & goals Performance measures & targets Performance management 
Employment policy 
reforms 
Operational reforms 
Managerial 
decentralisation 
(NPM & MBO) 
Political decentralisation 
(Federalism, 
Regionalisation or 
municipalisation) 
Formal Reforms 
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Table 4. Forms of flexibility in managerial and political decentralisation 
Source: based on a compilation of Giguère & Froy 2009, Froy et al. 2011 and Mosley 2011. 
 Managerial Decentralisation Political Decentralisation 
Budgets - earmarked and ring-fenced funds (no flexibility) 
- shifting funds between budget lines  
- funds to choose from centrally provided policy 
menu 
- portion of funds for experimentation 
- Shifting funds between budget lines 
- funds are freely available but only for policies 
from centrally ‘determined ‘policy menu’  
- portion of funds for experimentation 
- a budgetary envelope allocated which can be 
spent as seen fit 
Programmes - central designed programmes (no flexibility) 
- local agencies consulted when designing new 
programmes 
 - local agencies can choose a policy mix off a 
centrally set menu 
- local actors consulted when designing new 
programmes 
 - local actors can choose a policy mix off a 
centrally set menu 
 - design own programmes and/or strategies 
Target groups & 
eligibility 
- centrally set target groups (no flexibility) 
- some leeway in stretching eligibility criteria for 
extra funds 
- some leeway in stretching eligibility criteria for 
special programmes 
- national set target groups (no flexibility) 
- some leeway in stretching eligibility criteria for 
extra funds 
- some leeway in stretching eligibility criteria for 
special programmes 
- Setting own target groups  
Organisation of 
delivery 
- standardisation of work processes (little 
flexibility) 
- national IT system 
- local IT system 
- national IT system 
Personnel & 
Staffing 
- Personnel in the service of national PES or 
ministry (no flexibility) 
- Personnel in the service of national PES or 
ministry, but local discretion 
- Personnel in the service of local PES office (as 
distinct legal entity)  
- Personnel in the service of local authorities 
- Combination of central and local personnel 
(only in partial municipalised systems) 
Outsourcing, 
collaboration & 
partnerships 
- outsourcing decides on the central level (no 
flexibility) 
- local influence on which parties could receive 
contracts from central level 
- the amount of outsourcing is decided centrally 
but who to contract and which services is 
decided locally 
- local offices decide on what to outsource and 
to whom 
- the amount of outsourcing is decided centrally 
but who to contract and which services is 
decided locally 
- local authorities decide on what to outsource 
and to whom 
Performance 
measures 
- central setting of input targets (limited 
flexibility) 
- central setting of process targets 
- local negotiations before setting targets 
- qualitative versus quantitative targets 
- financial benefits or sanctions 
- mutual learning & benchmarking 
- national management plan 
- local negotiations before setting targets 
- national management plan 
- self-setting of additional targets 
- mutual learning & benchmarking 
 
 
Table 5. Types of performance measures for Public Employment Agencies 
Sources: Mosley 2001, Grubb 2004, Nunn et al. 2009 
Type Description 
Input Budget 
Personnel 
Output/process Vacancy registration 
Interventions 
Penetration measures 
Process quality 
Intermediate outcome measures General off-flow 
Specific off-flow 
Penetration measures 
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Benefit duration (re-employment rates) 
Vacancy outcomes 
Final outcome measures Employment rates 
Specific employment rates 
Quality measures (duration of employment, average earned income) 
 
Table 6. Types of moral hazard between levels of government 
 Explanation Most common occurrence 
Dumping Intentionally wrongly assess eligibility or working 
capacity as to move claimants to another benefit 
Transferring caseloads from benefits funded by 
one level to benefits funded by another 
Parking Including beneficiaries in activation measures, but 
not actually rendering services 
Satisfying output or process indicators in name 
only by referring unemployed to programmes 
with little or no substance 
Creaming Cherry picking of easy-to-place claimants, 
disregarding harder to place claimants. 
Satisfying intermediate outcome measures 
through non-random selection for activation 
programmes based on high employability 
Short versus 
long term 
When local actors pay for labour market services 
but not the benefit, there is no incentive to actually 
start activating; 
Focussing on out-flows with little sustainable 
prospects 
Neglecting activation duties altogether; 
referring benefit claimants to services or job 
opportunities that are suboptimal but relieve 
the institution of further activation 
 
Figure 3. Average incidence of unemployment from '0 to 12 months' in Eurozone countries & average unemployment rate 
2000-2012 
Source: Labour Force Survey 2000-2012 (http://stats.oecd.org). 
 
*Incidence of unemployment by duration is measured as the proportion of the total population of unemployed who have been 
unemployed for a certain period of time, in this case 0-12 months. Meaning that, for example in Poland 60% of the unemployed are 
unemployed for a time period between 0-12 months and 40% for a time period of more than that. 
 
The European trend of decentralisation: motivation to create multi-tiered labour market 
governance systems by increasing local autonomy 
The goal of this research is uncovering lessons from real world experiences with multi-tiered labour 
market governance systems. Most of these practices we investigate, 3 out of the 4 cases, are 
European cases where these has definitely been a trend of decentralisation (OECD 2003, Wieshaupt 
2010, Mosley 2011). This trend is the converse of any idea of adding supranational layers, but are 
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these trends also contradictory? To answer this question this section looks at the motivations behind 
decentralisation. 
It is often (implicitly) assumed that decentralisation enhances effectiveness or increases adaptability. 
In other words, there is an increasing appreciation for the benefits of a multi-tiered labour market 
governance system. But the opposite could be argued just as easily: decentralisation creates a 
multitude of agencies that are hard to monitor and which operate within very different contexts, 
conversely we have learned that managerial decentralisation might actually reign in the powers and 
flexibility of local offices and might set them on a course of completing centrally set goals rather than 
adapting to their environment. So it is prima facie not a clear cut case, multi-tiered systems have 
their own challenges. The questions as to why a country would decentralise or implement a multi-
tiered unemployment or social assistance system is, therefore, quite relevant. Especially since there 
is a clear trend within the EU but also within the OECD to decentralise much of the labour market 
governance (Giguère & Froy 2009). As we have seen (chapter 2) there is a multitude of forms a multi-
tiered system can take, so we have to assume that the motivations behind such a trend might be 
diverse as well. This section will look into some of the possible motivations, this paper keeps an open 
mind concerning functional or political motivations behind decentralisation efforts. Obviously policy 
changes are officially almost always motivated by effectiveness, efficiency, transparency or 
budgetary gains. Such commonplace motivations are based on assumptions regarding the 
functioning of changed policies. This section is a brief attempt to expose the actual reasoning behind 
such commonplace goals. In other words: why would decentralisation enhance the effectiveness of 
PES’s or why would a decentralised system operate more cost-effectively. Articles by Hugh Mosley 
(2011) and Xavier Greffe (2003) are most helpful in this regard. 
Mosley identified six types of policy motivations behind decentralisation efforts (2011: 10). Mosley’s 
list seems to reflect most of the stated policy goals present in academic or policy literature. Mosley’s 
list includes mostly functional motivations while more political reasons or perhaps just very 
pragmatic reasons do not receive as much attention.4 First on Mosley’s list is better information: it is 
often reasoned that local policy makers are more in tune with the needs and circumstances of their 
constituents than national policy makers are. This logic is very prevalent in decentralisation efforts 
(Greffe 2003: 32). Secondly: tailor-made policies, this motivation builds on the first and moves exploit 
the better information assumption. As local policymakers are more in tune with the needs and 
circumstances they not only have better information but are in a better position to tailor-make policy 
solutions for their client-base (Giguère 2003: 13). The third motivation is innovation: as 
decentralisation promotes better information and more tailor-made policies, regional units are more 
likely to experiment, be competitive and learn from each other. The fourth motivation Mosley cites is 
overcoming policy silos. Policy areas such as education, training, social services and even housing and 
heating are relevant for activation but they are often stowed away in other agencies or institutions 
and ore regulated by separate laws – silos. Centralised hierarchical institutions might be ill equipped 
to overcome such divisions, but at the local level it could well be easier to join efforts. An OECD 
report is devoted solely to this argument as it is central to activation (Giguère & Froy 2010). The fifth 
motivation concerns the effects of decentralisation on local agencies themselves: local 
accountability: decentralisation would place local policymakers and agencies more at the centre of 
the attention and they would be forced to be more involved, which would enhance their 
accountability. The sixth and last motivation, according to Mosley, is to accommodate regional 
differences/cleavages. This motivation is the most openly political and non-functional on Mosley’s 
list. According to this logic decentralisation is motivated by more autonomy as an end in itself. Except 
for the last motivation, Mosley’s list of motivations is fairly functional. He is, however, quite critical of 
such assumptions and clearly states the motivations above as not necessarily true. 
                                                          
4
 Although he does refer to some other, more political, reasons for decentralisation in his text when it comes to 
political decentralisation, Mosley neglects pragmatic reasons such as budgetary pressure or the struggle over 
the role of stakeholders (such as Social Partners) 
50 
 
In that sense is the list that Greffe provides, a little more practical (2003: 34-39). According to this 
author the first reason for decentralisation might well be budgetary pressure. But managerial 
decentralisation could create moral hazard for local authorities and furthermore it creates 
coordination problems. This process could therefore lead to higher costs. In order to overcome such 
problems, states accept a more pragmatic approach with more flexibility for local authorities (Greffe 
2003: 34). There are reasons why decentralisation might be a budgetary relieve: decentralisation 
could entail a transfer of fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of government, or it could be – under 
the assumption that lower levels of government are more effective in this policy area – that local 
authorities operate more cost-effectively or both.5 Greffe’s second reason is very akin to Mosley’s 
accommodating for local cleavages but a little more practical: regions might differ in geographical or 
other senses so a local approach might be best fitted to deal with specific problems. The third 
motivation by Greffe is the fact that unemployment is such a multifaceted problem. This logic is fairly 
similar to overcoming policy silos, but less explicit in terms of how government agencies operate but 
rather that the problem of unemployment issues might not be solely rooted in the labour market. 
The fourth motivation is the fact that labour market relations are changing: job tenures grow shorter 
and people change jobs more easily. In other words, the labour market grows more volatile. Instead 
of placing an unemployed individual in the same exact sector in the same job as he/she had before, 
the current labour market demands a more flexible approach more in tune with human capital 
developments. This requires more and better information of the unemployed and thus is very akin to 
the logic of Mosley’s first motivation: better information. The fifth motivation, according to Greffe, is 
embedded in activation policies. The link between activation and decentralisation is reasonably 
strong, especially in academic literature. The logic behind this motivation has been explained earlier 
in this paper (see OECD 2003: 12-17, Knuth & Larsen 2010) and therefore we will jump ahead to the 
sixth motivation: a longer time lag between unemployment and activity. This motivation relates 
mainly to a growing group of systematically or structurally long-term unemployed. Avoiding massive 
direct job creation schemes but still maintaining or increasing human capital during long spells of 
unemployment requires a meticulous approach. Again, the assumption is that lower levels of 
government are more adequately implement and monitor such policies. The seventh reason is 
exactly the same as Mosley’s third reason: innovation. The eighth reason might be a little outdated: 
increasing social dialogue. As the current trend in Denmark and Germany shows that the role of 
social partners might actually be contested rather than enhanced, this might perhaps best be 
amended to ‘changing the role of social partners’. The last reason is more comprehensive: the need 
to adopt a strategic approach. This reason would subsume all other motivations under it. “The 
decentralisation of job promotion mechanisms is a means of putting initiatives back into a context 
where economic development is strongly linked to employment and social inclusion” (Greffe 2003: 
39). This is a strange motivation for decentralisation per se, as it does not explicitly relates to how 
decentralisation would alter existing unemployment or social assistance schemes. Table 14 
categorises and pairs the possible motivations named by Mosley (2011) and Greffe (2003).6  
Table 7. Motivations behind the decentralisation of unemployment and social assistance schemes. 
Source: Mosley 2011, Greffe 2003 
 Mosley 2011 Greffe 2003 
Political/pragmatic 
motivations 
- Budgetary pressure (NPM) 
Accommodating regional cleavages  Particularities of regions 
- Changing the role of social partners (adapted 
by the author) 
Local accountability Adopting strategic labour market approaches 
Functional motivations Tailor-made policies  Activation & balancing passive and active 
                                                          
5
 As is the case in the Dutch debate about the upcoming healthcare, unemployment and childcare 
decentralisations. 
6
 We acknowledge that the division (political/pragmatic versus functional motivations) is questionable because 
the two dimensions are often hard to separate. Not every pair is as closely related as the next. 
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Greater time lag between unemployment and 
activity 
Innovation Innovation 
Overcoming policy silos  Multifaceted nature of employment  
Better information   Shorter job tenures/Volatile labour markets   
 
One important motivation or driving force behind decentralization is not included by either author 
and that is policy diffusion. PES’s and other labour market institutions have become, just like the 
labour markets themselves, more intertwined. Networks and workgroups have formed over the 
course of the last decades, thereby creating epistemic communities which reinforce practices and 
policy diffusion – especially NPM and MBO practices (Wieshaupt 2010). On the European level there 
is a ‘European Heads of Public Employment Service’s’ (HoPES) which covers all 27 EU countries, plus 
Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland and is chaired by the European Commission. This 
includes a PES to PES dialogue, a peer review programme and a strategic dialogue programme called 
PARES. On the global level there is an organisation called the World Association of PES’s (WAPES) 
which was founded by the ILO and six countries, but now includes not only members from Europe 
and North-America but also from Africa, the Americas, Asia and Pacific and the Middle East and the 
Arabic countries. Furthermore, European member states are involved in a process which reinforces 
mutual learning and benchmarking: the European Employment Strategy (EES). This process has been 
described as a critical element for both political and technical policy learning in this policy area 
(Wieshaupt 2010: 478). Even though it is hard to measure the influence of such epistemic 
communities there is no doubt that policy diffusion has played a role in the decentralisation trend 
within European, but also PES’s worldwide. 
At first glance would adding a supranational layer on labour market governance seem to be in 
contradiction to decentralisation. Especially innovation, tailor-made policies, involving more policy 
areas (overcoming policy silos) and accommodating regional differences could overly complicate 
supranational governance. On the other hand, better information, accommodating a more volatile 
labour market, local accountability and balancing active and passive measures are in line with some 
of the goals of a supranational layer. Nonetheless, the U.S. case shows that there are options to 
combine federal funding with local autonomy. The American states are allowed to set their own 
regular unemployment insurance durations and levels which could be extended through federal 
programmes. The problem with that analogy, though, is that the American states have very meagre 
and short regular UC. Extending benefits would have very different effects for Denmark in 
comparison to Belgium, for example. Belgian unemployment benefits could, if renewed, be sustained 
for a very long period. The Danish model of ‘flexicurity’ is explicitly predicated on short, but relatively 
high, benefits. Therefore, the extension of benefits would in Belgium, reach less beneficiaries than in 
Denmark. Furthermore, as the Danish replacement rates are so much higher, it would not only lead 
to more beneficiaries on EB but also higher costs due to the levels of the benefits. 
The EES and the OMC have demonstrated that the EU has the capability to oversee and comment on 
very different employment regimes, the U.S. state plans and agreements for the WIA and the TANF 
show that it is possible to incorporate contingent funds and requirements within such a mode of 
governance. The insights and lessons of these process could be combined in a new mode of 
governance. However, this relates predominantly to activation. The discussion above on motivations 
shows that the decentralisation trend is very complicated, even within the US context the WIA has 
resulted in an overly complicated governance system. Furthermore, governing activation regimes 
from the supranational level would do little in terms of enhancing counter-cyclical policies and 
automatic stabilization. In this sense the motivations behind the trend of decentralisation and a 
European benefit scheme do look somewhat contradictory.  
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Appendix B – The United States 
 
Table 8. Federal-state cooperation concerning unemployment insurance under the SSA and FUTA today 
Source: US Department of Labour: 1. 
Federal State 
Ensure conformity and substantial compliance of state 
law, regulations, rules, and operations with federal law. 
Determine operation methods and directly administer the 
program. 
Determine administrative fund requirements and provide 
money to states for proper and efficient administration. 
Take claims from individuals, determine eligibility, and 
insure timely payment of benefits to workers. 
Set broad overall policy for administration of the program, 
monitor state performance, and provide technical 
assistance as necessary. 
Determine employer liability, and assess and collect 
contributions. 
Hold and invest all money in the unemployment trust fund 
until drawn down by states for the payment of 
compensation. 
 
Table 9. The division of labour amongst American levels of government concerning labour market governance per 
unemployment related benefit 
 The dominant 
government level 
involved in financing 
the benefit 
The dominant 
government level 
involved in setting the 
level & duration of 
benefits 
The dominant 
government level 
involved in designing, 
implementing and 
monitoring activation 
The dominant 
government level 
involved in financing 
activation budgets 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
The states (benefits) 
& the federal level 
(administration) 
The states The states (PES)
cxiii
 
under federal 
guidelines 
 
The federal level (PES) 
 
Federal-State 
Extended Benefits 
The federal level 
(50%) and the states 
(50%) 
The states 
 
See UC above, with 
stricter requirements 
from the federal level 
See UC above 
Emergency 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
The federal level The federal level See UC above, with 
stricter requirements 
from the federal level 
See UC above 
Food Stamp 
Programme 
The federal level   The federal level 
 
Local (Any political 
subdivision in any 
state which complies 
with 7 USC 2029) 
The federal level 
 
Temporary 
Assistance to Needy 
Families 
The federal level & 
the state 
 
The federal (duration) 
level & the states 
(levels) 
 
The states, 
According to the state 
plan 
 
The federal level  
The Workforce 
Investment Act 
- - The states & localities 
As agreed with the 
federal level 
The federal level 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The flow of funds between revenue generating levels of government, the federal-state unemployment 
compensation program and federal unemployment trust funds 
Source: US DOL: 16 
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Table 10. Federal requirements for states’ claims for federal funds concerning the costs of the administration of the states’ 
UC programmes 
Source: 42 USC (7) §503 
Requirement Substance Penalty 
Administration provisions The use of funds, methods of administration, reporting No certification, 
Suspension of payments 
Cooperation with federal 
agencies 
The states must make their records available to federal 
labour market agencies such as the Railroad Retirement 
Board
7
 
No certification 
Disclosure of unemployment 
compensation information 
The states must disclose unemployment records to other 
benefit agencies (most notably the Food Stamp programme) 
Suspension of payments 
Disclosure of wage 
information 
The states must disclose wage information to the agencies 
in charge of child support 
Suspension of payments 
Income and eligibility 
verification system 
The income and eligibility verification system of states must 
comply with 42 USC (7) § 1320b–7 
 
Recovery of unemployment 
benefit payments 
The method of how states should recover benefits  
Disclosure to Secretary of 
DHHS of wage and 
unemployment 
compensation claims 
information 
Quarterly reporting of wage and claim information to the 
DHHS 
Suspension of payments 
Provide access to State 
employment records 
States must make their employment records available to the 
DHUD 
Suspension of payments 
Engage in worker profiling Profile claimants, refer them to labour market services and 
collect follow-up information 
Suspension of payments 
Transfer of experience rating 
upon transfer of business 
Transfer experience rating records when employers move 
employees among businesses owned by the same holding 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Several occupations such as railroad workers and postal workers are federal occupations, the state does not 
administer their benefits. But in order to work congruently with the federal benefits, they must provide such 
agencies with their records. 
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Table 11. Conditions for additional tax credit and approval of state laws (FUTA) 
Source: 26 USC (23), § 3303 and § 3304, USDOL 2013 
Compensation is paid through public employment offices or other approved agencies 
All of the funds collected under the state program are deposited in the federal UTF (see table ???) 
All of the money withdrawn from the state trust fund account is used to pay compensation, to refund amounts 
erroneously paid into the fund, or for other specified activities 
Compensation is not denied to anyone who refuses to accept work because the job is vacant as the direct result of a 
labour dispute, or because the wages, hours, or conditions of work are substandard, or if, as a condition of employment, 
the individual would have to join a company union or resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labour 
organization 
Compensation is paid to employees of state and local governments and Indian tribes 
Compensation is paid to employees of FUTA tax exempt non-profit organizations, including schools and colleges, who 
employ 4 or more workers in each of 20 weeks in the calendar year 
Payment of compensation to certain employees of educational institutions operated by state and local governments, 
non-profit organizations, and Indian tribes is limited during periods between and within academic terms 
State and local governments, non-profit organizations, and Indian tribes are permitted to elect to pay regular employer 
contributions or finance benefit costs by the reimbursement method 
Compensation is not payable in two successive benefit years to an individual who has not worked after the beginning of 
the first benefit year 
Compensation is not denied to anyone solely because the individual is taking part in an approved training program 
Compensation is not denied or reduced because an individual's claim for benefits was filed in another state or Canada 
and the state participates in arrangements for combining wages earned in more than one state for eligibility and benefit 
purposes 
Compensation is not denied by reason of cancellation of wage credits or total benefit rights for any cause other than 
discharge for work-connected misconduct, fraud, or receipt of disqualifying income 
Extended compensation is payable under the provisions of the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation 
Act of 1970 
Compensation is not denied solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy 
Compensation is not payable to a professional athlete, between seasons, who has a reasonable assurance of resuming 
employment when the new season begins 
Compensation is not payable to an alien unless the alien was in a specified state – such as legally authorized to work – at 
the time services were performed 
The benefit amount of an individual is reduced, under certain conditions, by that portion of a pension or other 
retirement income (including Social Security and Railroad Retirement income) which is funded by a base period 
employer 
Wage information in the agency files is made available, upon request and on a reimbursable basis, to the state agency 
administering Temporary Assistance to Needy Families; and wage and UC information to the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services for the purposes of the National Directory of New Hires 
Any interest required to be paid on advances is paid in a timely manner and is not paid, directly or indirectly (by an 
equivalent tax reduction in such state), from amounts in such state's trust fund account 
Federal individual income tax is deducted and withheld if a claimant so requests 
Reduced tax rates for employers are permitted only on the basis of their experience with respect to unemployment 
 
Table 12. Dimensions of local flexibility in U.S. labour market governance per benefit 
Source: 26 USC (23), § 3303 and § 3304, 42 USC (7) §503, 20 CFR 615, 42 USC Part A, 20 CFR 660-667 
 Unemployment insurance under FUTA & federal 
requirements 
Extended benefits (where different from regular 
UI) 
Budgets - Federal funds can only be spent on 
administration, which must be run according to 
federal requirements 
- All funds retrieved from the state funds 
(financed by states) must be used for paying 
compensation or specified activities 
- States are only reimbursed for benefit 
payments 
Programmes - Levels are set by the states 
- Duration is set by the states 
- Mandatory and optional triggers will/can set of 
this programme 
- Levels are determined by the federal 
government to not diverge from regular state set 
levels 
- Duration is determined by the federal level to 
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extent 50% additional weeks on top of regular 
duration (max. 13 weeks) 
Target groups 
& eligibility 
- The FUTA determines a base floor for which 
employees are covered (state & federal, Indian 
tribe leaders, non-profit and educational 
institution employees), the states can expand on 
this 
- The FUTA determines that some groups or 
behaviour must lead to exclusion 
- Eligibility is federally determined but largely 
based on state eligibility of regular UI 
Organisation of 
delivery 
- Federal requirements for sanctioning & 
retrieving benefits 
Mandatory disclosure of information to federal 
institutions (unemployment records, wage and 
claim information)  
- Mandatory worker profiling 
- Experience rating 
- Extra profiling: ‘classification and determination 
of job prospects’ 
- Mandatory monitoring whether claimants are 
actively seeking for work 
Personnel & 
Staffing 
- A percentage of federal funds is reserved for 
the administration, no other specifications are 
given 
 
Outsourcing, 
collaboration & 
partnerships 
- Mandatory collaboration with federal 
institutions 
- Mandatory referral of jobseekers to the state 
workforce agency 
Performance 
measures 
- Mandatory quality control  
 TANF WIA 
Budgets - Federally determined budget 
- Federally determined MOE 
- Federally determined fields for spending grant 
money (employment placement programme, 
benefit transfer systems, development accounts) 
- Federal limitations on spending grant money 
- States may not spend more than 15% of the 
grant money on administration  
- States can shift limited amounts of grant money 
to other policy areas  
- Grant money can only be spend on children or 
parents below poverty line 
- States may transfer grant funds from one fiscal 
year to another 
- The Memorandum of Understand (See 
organisation of delivery) must state the division 
of operating costs  
- States must reserve funds for mandatory state-
wide workforce investment activities  
- States may hold on to grant money for a 
maximum of two years after receiving it  
- Federally determined allocation formulas, 
which provides limited discretion for states to 
allocate their funds to localities 
- Local boards may shift up to 20% of funds 
between programme budgets (states must 
approve) 
- States must have obligated at least 80% of their 
budget for that fiscal year to be eligible for 
reallotment the next fiscal year  
- Federal minimum requirements for state’s 
reallocation towards localities 
- Strict fiscal and administrative rules for WIA 
grant money  
- Federal costs limits on state and local 
administrations  
Programmes - It must be a programme that ‘provides aid to 
needy families and provides labour market 
services to parents’  
- Work activities for parents are predetermined 
- Grant money can only be spend on the 
following programmes: employment placement 
programme, benefit transfer systems, 
development accounts 
- States can loan money from the federal level  
- The possibilities for individual work activities 
are predetermined  
- Federally determined ‘core’ services which 
must be made available in one-stop-shops  
- Federally determined ‘intensive’ services  
- Federally determined ‘training’ services  
- Federally determined ‘supportive’ services  
- Federally determined ‘youth’ services  
- One-stop-shops may perform additional 
services as agreed upon in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (See organisation of delivery) 
 
 
Target groups 
& eligibility 
- Federally determined eligibility rules for 
persons on which grant money will be spend 
 
- Minimum requirements for eligibility for 
persons on ‘core’, ‘intensive’ and ‘training’ 
services federally determined  
- Minimum requirements for eligibility for 
‘supportive services’  
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- Federally determined eligibility for ‘youth’ 
services 
- Broad target group priorities specified by the 
federal government  
Organisation of 
delivery 
- Penalties federally determined  
- Mandatory engagement in the making of 
individual responsibility plans  
- The state designates Workforce Investment 
area(s)  
- Mandatory service delivery through one-stop-
shops 
- One-stop-shop operators are appointed by the 
state  
- The local WIB, its partners and the chief elected 
official must engage in an Memorandum of 
Understanding concerning their responsibilities 
and efforts  
- Training services must be provided through 
Individual Training Accounts or On-the-Job 
training or customized training  
- Local WIBs must be supported by youth 
councils 
Personnel & 
Staffing 
  
Outsourcing, 
collaboration & 
partnerships 
- States may  administer and provide services 
through charitable, religious, or private 
organizations 
- Mandatory one-stop-shop partners  
- Optional one-stop-shop partners  
- Responsibilities of partners are federally 
determined  
- Federally determined partners for ‘training 
services’  
- Specific minimum requirements for 
cooperation with private parties in organising 
On-the-Job or customized training  
Performance 
measures 
- Federally set performance measures  
- Mandatory reporting of claimant info, use of 
funds, parents in work activities, on families. 
Quarterly and a detailed report annually, both to 
the secretary  
- Federal standards for data  
- Predetermined performance measures 
- States may develop additional performance 
measures  
- States are involved in setting the targets of 
those predetermined performance measures  
- States negotiate local targets with the local WIB 
of the same measures as states report 
- States may develop additional performance 
measures for localities  
- Must use standardised data for reporting and 
must describe their accountability system in 
advance (in the State Plan)  
- Reporting requirements (sub recipient, financial 
and progress information  
- States must monitor their subsidiaries on 
financial costs and compliance with state and 
federal regulations  
 
Table 13. Federal Extended Unemployment Compensation scheme triggers 
Source: Code of Federal Regulations, title 20 (5) section 615.12 
 Mandatory trigger Optional trigger #1 Optional trigger #2 
Insured unemployment 
rate 
5% 6% 6,5% 
Structural unemployment 
rate 
120% for 13 weeks - 110% for 13 weeks 
Reference Period Same period in past 2 years - Same period in either of 
the two previous years  
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Table 14. States’ Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirements 
Source: 42 USC § 609 (7), 45 CFR § 264.72, Brown 2012. 
Amount of spending Conditions and requirements 
75% If a state meets its minimum work participation rate requirements, then it generally need 
expend only 75 percent of the amount it spent in the fiscal year 1994.  
80% To receive its federal TANF funds, a state must generally spend state funds in an amount 
equal to at least 80 percent of the amount it spent on welfare and related programs in the 
fiscal year 1994. 
100% To receive contingency funds, a state must expend 100 percent of that fiscal year relative to 
the 1994 amount. 
 
Table 15. MOE spending requirements 
Source: 45 CFR § 263.2, 263.4, Brown 2012. 
MOE spending 
counts if paid to: 
Families who include a child living with his or her custodial parent or other adult caretaker relative 
(or a pregnant woman) 
Families who meet the financial criteria, such as income and resources limits, established by a 
state for the particular service or assistance as described in its TANF plan. Each state is required to 
prepare and provide a biennial TANF plan describing its programs to HHS. 
MOE spending 
counts if paid for: 
Cash assistance 
Child care assistance 
Educational activities to increase self-sufficiency, job training and work (except for activities or 
services that a state makes generally available to its residents without cost and without regard to 
their income) 
Certain administrative costs  
Other activities considered in keeping with a TANF purpose 
 
Table 16. Requirements for American state plans for TANF SFAG block grants 
Source: 42 USC (7) § 602 
 
 
 
 
1. Outline of the family programme 
The subdivision of tasks of state agencies 
Set work requirements for parents and caretakers 
Ensure work activity compliance  
Restrict the use of personal information to ensure privacy 
Establish goals to prevent out of wedlock-pregnancies 
Establish education/courses on statutory rape 
Establish good access to cash benefits 
Establish ways for beneficiaries to extract their benefits with the least amount of 
costs 
2. Operate a child support enforcement programme 
3. Operate a foster care and adoption assistance programme 
4. Certify the administration of the programme and consult with involved local agencies 
5. Certification that the State will provide Indians with equitable access to assistance 
6. Certification of standards and procedures to ensure against program fraud and abuse 
7. Optional certification of standards and procedures to ensure that the State will screen for and identify domestic 
violence 
 
Table 17. Standard deviations of annual average unemployment rates of (member) states 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/lau/) & Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
US 1,04 1,07 1,03 1 1,27 1,94 2,03 1,95 1,73 1,57 
EMU 3,44 2,9 2,4 2,13 2,12 4,09 4,95 4,98 6,05 6,47 
EU 3,9 3,38 2,71 2,22 2,05 3,57 4,38 4,35 5,23 5,62 
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Table 18. Most prominent federal eligibility and conduct requirements for TANF programmes 
Source: 42 USC (7) § 604 and 608 
1. Income must be under 200% of the official poverty line 
2. Families must have a minor child 
 
3. Code of conduct for parents 
Cooperating in establishing paternity 
Families must assign support rights to the state 
Teenage parents must attend school/training 
Teenage parents must live in adult-supervised households 
4. Federal grant cannot be used for any payment to claimants which have received over 60 months of TANF (exceptions 
possible) 
5. Denial of payments for 10 years for misrepresenting residence in 2 or more states 
6. Denial of payments for children who are absent from their household 
7. States may engage in individual responsibility plans with claimants 
 
Table 19. Mandatory performance measures for the WIA 
Source: 20 CFR 666.110 
Target group Measure Type of measure 
For adults, 
dislocated 
workers, youth 
19-21 
Entry rates into unsubsidised employment Intermediate outcome 
Retention in unsubsidized employment six months after entry into the 
employment 
Final outcome 
Earnings received in unsubsidized employment six months after entry 
into the employment 
Final outcome (quality 
measure) 
Attainment of a recognized credential related to achievement of 
educational skills (such as a secondary school diploma or its recognized 
equivalent), or occupational skills, by participants who enter 
unsubsidized employment 
Process 
For youth 14-18 Attainment of basic skills goals, and, as appropriate, work readiness or 
occupational skills goals, up to a maximum of three goals per year 
Process/intermediate 
outcome 
Attainment of secondary school diplomas and their recognized 
equivalents 
Process/intermediate 
outcome 
Placement and retention in postsecondary education, advanced 
training, military service, employment, or qualified apprenticeships 
Process 
For all A single customer satisfaction measure for employers and a single 
customer satisfaction indicator for participants 
Process (quality) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The most common governance model of one-stop-shops in the U.S. 
Source: Eberts 2009: 126, O’Leary & Eberts 2008: 24-25, Barnow & King 2005: 16. 
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The lines represent mandatory and formally legislated links, the arrows represent the optional linkages. This concerns governance and 
not necessarily funding. 
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Appendix C – Germany 
Table 20. The division of labour amongst German levels of government concerning labour market governance per 
unemployment related benefit 
 The dominant 
government level 
involved in financing 
the benefit 
The dominant 
government level 
involved in setting the 
level & duration of 
benefits 
The dominant 
government level 
involved in designing, 
implementing and 
monitoring activation 
The dominant 
government level 
involved in financing 
activation budgets 
Unemployment 
insurance (ALG I) 
The federal level 
(through the BA) 
The federal level The federal level 
(through the BA) 
The federal level 
 
Basic security 
benefits for 
jobseekers (ALG II) 
The federal level & 
the municipalities 
The federal level
cxiv
 The federal level, the 
Länder & the 
municipalities 
The federal level 
Partial 
unemployment 
(Teilarbeitslosigkeit) 
The federal level 
(through the BA) 
The federal level See ALG I See ALG I 
Short-time work 
(Kurzarbeit) 
The federal level 
(through the BA) 
The federal level See ALG I See ALG I 
Seasonal short-time 
work (Saison-
Kurzarbeit) 
The federal level 
(through the BA) 
The federal level See ALG I See ALG I 
 
Table 21. Contents of German Hartz reform packages 2003-2005 
Source: Konle-Seidl 2008: 7 & Eichhorst et al. 2008: 9. 
Hartz I 
2003 
Redesign and introduction of new ALMP measures, closer targeting 
Hartz II 
2003 
Reform of mini-jobs and new start-up program (Me-Inc.); deregulation of 
temp-agency work /TWA (including midi- and mini-jobs) 
Hartz III 
2004 
Reorganisation of PES (BA) according NPM principles 
Hartz IV 
2005 
a) benefit schemes to the new “basic income support for able-bodied jobseekers” 
b) Creation of a second tier service provision for welfare clients (i.e. long-term 
unemployed) 
 
Table 22. Old (until 2004) and new (after 2005) benefit schemes in Germany 
Source: Konle-Seidl 2008: 8. 
Old System New System 
Arbeitslosengeld (unemployment benefit): 
unemployment insurance benefit; funded 
through contributions, earnings-related, limited 
duration 
Arbeitslosengeld I (ALG I): funded through contributions, 
earnings-related, limited duration 
 
Arbeitslosenhilfe (unemployment assistance):earnings-
related unemployment assistance; tax-funded, earnings-
related, meanstested, infinite duration 
Grundsicherung (Basic income scheme for 
needy jobseekers) Consisting of  
a) Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG II): tax-funded, 
means-tested, flat rate, after expiry of ALG I 
(and temporary supplement) for people 
capable of working; infinite duration 
b) Sozialgeld (social allowance) for kids below 
the working age of 15 living in a household of 
an ALG II recipient 
Sozialhilfe (social assistance): tax-funded, 
means-tested, flat rate, infinite duration 
Sozialhilfe neu (Social assistance): meanstested, 
tax-funded for those working age people 
permanently not capable of working and for 
needy persons above 65 years 
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Figure 6. Accountability structure of the German labour market institutions 
Source: Jantz & Jann 2013: 236. 
Before Hartz reforms After Hartz reforms 
 
 
 
Table 23. ALG II objectives for 2013 & 2014 
Source: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2012 & 2013) 
Goal Core indicator Additional indicators 
Reducing the  
need for assistance 
Change in the sum of services Changes in heating & housing services 
Changes in the number eligible service beneficiaries 
with working capacity 
Average inflow of the number eligible service 
beneficiaries with working capacity 
Average outflow of the number eligible service 
beneficiaries with working capacity 
Improving the integration 
into employment 
The ratio of integration The ratio of entry into marginal employment 
The ratio of entry into subsidized employment 
The duration of integration 
The integration ratio of single-parents 
Avoiding long-term use of 
services 
Changes in the total number of 
long-term beneficiaries 
The integration ratio of long-term unemployed 
The activation rate of long-term unemployed 
The inflow of long-term unemployed 
The outflow of long-term unemployed 
 
Table 24. Mandatory data to be collected in municipal jobcentres which has to reported: inclusion report 
Source: §54 SGB II, §11 SGB III 
The proportion of expenditure per individual service type 
Average expenditure per unemployed taking into account of the background of the individual (long-term unemployed, 
disabled persons, the elderly and low-skilled) 
The participation of special needs groups as a share of total unemployed 
The participation of women in ALMP relative to their size as a group to the whole of the unemployed 
Placement ratio into non-subsidized employment 
The number of workers who no longer are unemployed after six months of completing participation in ALMP measures 
The number of workers who no longer employed in regular employment after six months of completing participation in 
ALMP measures 
The development of a framework for inclusion in the regional labour market 
Changes over time in ALMP policies 
The labour market situation of immigrants 
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Table 25. Mandatory data to be collected in municipal jobcentres which has to be reported: effectiveness 
Source: §55 SGB II, §282 SGB III 
The extent in which participation in ALMPs has improved employability of the participants 
Comparing the costs of benefits in relation to their effect 
Net economic effects of the use of ALMPs 
The effect of ALMP on employment histories of participants 
The above per labour market region 
 
Table 26. Dimensions of local flexibility in German labour market governance per benefit 
 Unemployment Insurance (ALG I) Social assistance (ALG II) 
Budgets - Federally determined (social contributions) - Federally determined (tax-funded) 
- Earmarked federal funds  
Programmes - The federal level determines level and duration - The federal level determines level and duration 
Target groups 
& eligibility 
- Eligibility is determined by the federal level  - Eligibility is determined by the federal level 
Organisation of 
delivery 
- Federally determined - Federally determined 
Personnel & 
Staffing 
 - At least 90% of the one-stop-shops must be BA 
personnel 
Outsourcing, 
collaboration & 
partnerships 
 - Mandatory collaboration with BA in one-stop-
shop (except for Optionskommunen) 
Performance 
measures 
- The BA reports on centrally set process and 
outcome targets (§11 & 282 of SGB III) 
- Municipal jobcentres must collect data on their 
efforts and their outcomes 
- Centrally defined indicators 
 Activation ALG II 
Budgets - Determined by the federal & the Länder level. The federal level determined the division of costs, the 
Länder level calculate the precise contribution of the municipalities 
Programmes - The BA delivers the services, which are centrally defined 
- Municipal services are limited to miscellaneous social services and centrally defined 
Target groups 
& eligibility 
- Eligibility is centrally determined  
- Eligibility is assessed by the BA, but this can be contested by the municipality 
Organisation of 
delivery 
- Through a municipal one-stop-shop 
- Mandatory use of individual six months integration agreements 
- The BA instigates and maintains contact with the unemployed individuals 
- The conduct of BA concerning activation is centrally legislated 
- Trägerversammlung sets out guidelines and regulations 
Personnel & 
Staffing 
- At least 90% of the one-stop-shops must be BA personnel 
- Trägerversammlung determines the conduct of personnel 
Outsourcing, 
collaboration & 
partnerships 
- Mandatory collaboration with BA in one-stop-shop (except for Optionskommunen) 
- Training vouchers 
- Local certification of appropriate (third party) training & service providers  
- Beneficiaries may seek out private vendors  
Performance 
measures 
- Municipal jobcentres must collect data on their efforts and their outcomes  
- Centrally defined indicators for municipal reporting 
- Mandatory comparison of that data 
- Specific annual targets are set by Kooperationsausschus (Länder & federal government) 
- Municipal objectives are negotiated in the Trägerversammlung between the municipalities and the 
BA (in the Optionskommunen they are negotiated by the municipalities and the Länder). 
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Appendix D – Denmark 
Table 27. The division of labour amongst Danish levels of government concerning labour market governance per 
unemployment related benefit 
 The dominant 
government level 
involved in financing 
the benefit 
The dominant 
government level 
involved in setting the 
level & duration of 
benefits 
The dominant 
government level 
involved in designing, 
implementing and 
monitoring activation 
The dominant 
government level 
involved in financing 
activation budgets 
Unemployment 
insurance 
The central level 
(Unemployment 
insurance funds) 
The central level Implementing & 
designing: municipal 
and regional level 
Monitoring: central, 
the regional and the 
municipal level 
The central and the 
municipal level 
(division based on 
behaviour and results 
of the municipal level) 
Social assistance 
(kontanthjælp) 
The central and 
municipal level 
(division based on 
behaviour and results 
of the municipal 
level) 
The central level Implementing & 
designing: municipal 
and regional level 
Monitoring: central, 
the regional and the 
municipal level 
The central and the 
municipal level 
(division based on 
behaviour and results 
of the municipal level) 
 
Figure 7. The new employment regions of Denmark 
 
 
Table 28. The mandatory contact and job plan procedure municipalities must engage in with insured unemployed or able-
bodied social assistance claimants 
Source: chapters 2-7 of the Act on the Responsibility and Control of the Active Employment Measures 
The state Has created the 4 employment regions 
Created regional offices and appoints regional director 
Appoints other staff, recommended by the regional director 
Is the highest administrative authority for employment regions, the Employment Council conducts the 
day-to-day management 
Pose rules and regulations for the municipal Employment Plans 
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Pose national requirements for tenders and contracts for third parties involved in Act on Active 
Employment, Act on Active Social Policy and the Act on Sickness Benefits Act, the right to leave and sick 
pay for maternity 
Employment 
regions 
Monitors and analyses regional labour markets 
Advises the jobcentres on the regional labour market developments 
Provides documentation of employment services results and performance results of jobcentres 
Provides assistance to municipal councils and ensures that council decisions are legitimate 
Is involved with agreements made and information provided to third parties 
Will enter into agreements with poor performing jobcentres and can: 
1. appoint other actors to perform the jobcentres responsibilities 
2. mandate other actors to be involved in employment services for persons under the Integration Act 
3. ensure effectiveness and results by getting involved the decision of points 1 and 2 
4. make the municipal council comply with, and finance the costs of, point 1. 
It could finance consulting services that could help the performance of jobcentres 
Municipalities The municipal council has the responsibility to decide how the municipality should plan and perform 
employment services in the jobcentres 
It must form an annual Employment Plan which must be passed by the municipal council and covers: 
1. the execution by the municipalities  
2.a dissemination of local businesses, opportunities for cooperation and how business might be 
involved in providing services 
Ensure that administration of benefits and employment services shall be separated 
The finance department of the municipality is responsible for the direct management of the municipal 
duties under the Act on Active Employment, chapter 10 of the Act on Active Social Policy and 
miscellaneous benefits (integration, maternity etc.) 
It could create a standing committee to take over the responsibilities of the finance department 
(above) 
Prepare an annual performance review that shows the results and effects of the employment in the 
jobcentre 
Communicate the Employment Plan and performance review to the employment regions 
Develop targets for other actors involved in the Act on Active Employment 
Publish expense reports for dealings with third parties Act on Active Employment 
Jobcentres Execute the employment services 
Must be involved in the formulation of the Employment Plan 
National 
Employment 
Council 
Advise the Minister of Employment in matters of employment policy 
Make recommendations for 
1. national employment policy proposals, including the organization and publication of analyses 
2. experiments, projects and policy programmes 
3. the contract with the regional employment, including the Minister's announcement of targets for 
employment activities 
4. the follow up on Employment Plans 
5. acts, laws and regulation on national employment policies 
Regional 
Employment 
Council 
Monitor and analyse developments in the regional labour market and help to ensure the results and 
effects of Employment Plans 
Engage in annual contracts with the Minister for Employment setting targets for Employment Plans and 
goals and performance requirements for the regional Employment Council itself 
Involve relevant partners with the formulation of the annual contracts 
Coordinate training and vocational training 
Take over the jobcentres responsibilities if they do not meet the agreed upon requirements 
Launch special regional labour market initiatives with state funds 
Launch special regional initiatives to compensate for major business foreclosures with state funds 
Local 
Employment 
Council 
Advise municipal authorities and coordinate and develop municipal labour market services for 
jobseekers 
Monitor and analyse the jobcentre performance and advise the municipal council on improvements 
Advise and get involved in the municipal annual Employment Plan 
Make recommendations to the regional Employment Council 
Develop business orientated initiatives with state grants 
 
 
65 
 
Table 29. Dimensions of local flexibility in Danish labour market governance per benefit 
 Unemployment Insurance Social assistance 
Budgets - Fully determined by the central level - Central level determines that in principle the 
municipalities are liable for 100% of the costs  
- Centrally determined reimbursement model  
- Floors & ceilings on service costs  
Programmes - The (calculation of the) levels are set by the 
central government 
- The duration is determined by the central 
government 
- The (calculation of the) levels are set by the 
central government  
- The duration is determined by the central 
government  
Target groups 
& eligibility 
- Eligibility rules are set by the central 
government  
- Eligibility rules are set by the central 
government 
Organisation of 
delivery 
- Through state sanctioned Insurance Funds - Municipalities must enact a local employment 
council  
Personnel & 
Staffing 
 - Floors & ceilings on administration costs 
Outsourcing, 
collaboration & 
partnerships 
- Only state sanctioned funds may operate 
Unemployment Insurance 
- Municipalities must administer and disburse 
benefits 
Performance 
measures 
 - Municipalities are subject to annual 
performance audits based on their employment 
plans 
- Municipalities must provide statistical, policy 
and priority information 
 Activation 
Budgets - Centrally determined reimbursement model 
- Floors & ceilings on services costs 
Programmes - Central level determines types of services and the conduct of jobcentres  
- Central level set rights and duties of the insured unemployed  
- Central level set rights and duties of social assistance beneficiaries  
Target groups 
& eligibility 
- Target groups and eligibility are predetermined at the central level  
Organisation of 
delivery 
- Municipalities must enact a jobcentre 
- Standardised process for contact with individual jobseekers  
- Jobcentres must engage in individual job plans  
Personnel & 
Staffing 
 
Outsourcing, 
collaboration & 
partnerships 
- All the responsibilities of jobcentres could be outsourced  
- The central level lays down common nationwide requirements for tenders and contracts with other 
actors 
Performance 
measures 
- Central level sets minimum requirements 
- Reimbursement contingent on process indicators 
- Goals agreed with employment regions 
- Public reporting 
 
Table 30. State-municipal reimbursement and conditions for Danish Kontanthjælp 
Source: chapter 14 of the Act on Active Social Policy  
30% 
reimbursement 
of: 
The costs under chapter 4 on the Act of Active Social Policy: 
Cash benefits 
The costs under § 51 of chapter 6 of the Act on Active Social Policy: 
Costs for rehabilitation services within the confounds of personal job plan 
The costs under § 74 of chapter 7 of the Act on Active Social Policy: 
Special grants & grants 
50% 
reimbursement 
of: 
The costs under chapter 4 on the Act of Active Social Policy: 
Cash benefits for persons who receive rehabilitation services under Chapter 6 or activation under 
chapter 11 of the Act on Active Employment. 
The costs under chapter 4 on the Act of Active Social Policy: 
Cash benefits for persons who receive rehabilitation services as a result of the Integration Act. 
The costs under chapter 23 118 of the Act on Active Employment 
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Training costs 
Costs of subsidized employment under § 51 (2) and § 52 under the Act on Active Employment 
Housing costs under § 64-64a of chapter 6 of the Act on Active Social Policy (for persons in 
rehabilitation services) 
The costs of extra or emergency social assistance according to chapter 10 and 10a on the Act of 
Active Social Policy 
65% 
reimbursement 
of: 
The costs of persons participating in job offer programmes pursuant to chapter 11 of the Act on 
Active Employment 
0% 
reimbursement 
of: 
The costs of people who are in flex jobs for over 18-24 months according to chapter 13 on the Act 
of Active Employment 
The costs of under chapter 4 on the Act of Active Social Policy: 
Cash benefits for persons who do not comply with their rights and duties according to chapter 17 
of the Act on Active Employment  
The costs under chapter 4 on the Act of Active Social Policy: 
Cash benefits for persons who receive social assistance on based on health reasons but who are 
not considered as sick based on the health monitoring responsibilities of the municipalities § 12b 
of chapter 4 on the Act of Social Policy or aliens receiving cash benefits based on their status who 
do not comply with their rights and duties under § 20 of chapter 4 of the Integration Act 
The costs of flex jobs (chapter 13 on the Act of Active Employment) when the government has not 
fulfilled its duties according to § 70 and 74a of chapter 13 on the Act of Active Employment 
 
Figure 8. Accountability structure of the Danish labour market institutions 
Source: Jantz & Jann 2013: 234. 
Before 2007 
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After 2009 
 
 
Table 31. The mandatory contact and job plan procedure municipalities must engage in with insured unemployed or able-
bodied social assistance claimants in Denmark. 
Source: Chapters 7 and 9 of the Act on Active Employment 
The mandatory 
process for 
contact with 
insured 
unemployed and 
able-bodied social 
assistance 
beneficiaries (§ 2 
(1-3) chapter 1) 
Individual interviews on the job search activities of the unemployed 
Assessment of the distance a person has from the labour market 
Follow up interviews with persons receiving activation under chapters 10-12 
Information on the interviews must be entered into the jobnet portal 
An interview after every three months when persons receive activation under chapters 10-12 
First interview must be before 1 month after applying for the benefit or activation if the person is 
under 30 years of age and before 3 months if the person is over 30 years of age 
Claimants over whom suspicion on their availability has arisen must be contacted and interviewed 
within 2 weeks 
Obligation for persons under 25 without qualifications must complete training 
One must receive a job offer within five days, this process must continue until three months have 
passed 
After three months a person must be offered either guidance, qualification, internships or 
subsidised work (chapters 10-12) 
The mandatory 
content of 
individual job or 
rehabilitation 
plans for insured 
unemployed and 
able-bodied social 
assistance 
beneficiaries (§ 2 
(1-3) chapter 1) 
The plan must contain a strategy to obtain regular employment 
Which type of services/offers will be provided (§ 22 chapter 8) 
For persons on social assistance it must contain a strategy to stabilise their physical, mental and 
social situation 
It contains a description of the desired employment in a field where there is demand for labour 
If the Jobnet portal contains such vacancies the person must be referred to them 
A job plan must be formed before any offer according to chapters 10-12 can be made 
The job plan can only be revised due to significant changes in the persons personal life or the 
labour market, this must be justified. 
 
Table 32. State-municipal reimbursement and conditions for activation policies in Denmark 
Source: chapter 23 of Act on Active Employment 
50% 
reimbursement 
of: 
The costs under § 2 of chapter 1 of the Act on Active Employment: 
Activation costs (for persons who receive activation because they are insured unemployed, receive 
social assistance because solely because they are unemployed, receive social assistance because 
solely because and receive rehabilitation services, receive sickness benefits and persons with limited 
working capacity§ 2 1-5 & 7 of chapter 2) of guidance and qualification services (chapter 10), training 
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materials (§ 76-77 chapter 14), partnership costs with firms (§ 81a chapter 14), flex jobs (§ 73b 
chapter 14), upgrading skills for persons who are hired with wage subsidies (§ 99 chapter 14) 
The costs under § 2 of chapter 1 of the Act on Active Employment: 
Activation costs (for persons who receive activation because they are below the pension age and 
unable to maintain regular employment, permanent reduced working capacity, persons under the 
disability act, persons under 18 in need of education § 2 6-9 & 11 of chapter 2) of guidance and 
qualification services (chapter 10), training materials (§ 76-77 chapter 14), partnership costs with 
firms (§ 81a chapter 14), flex jobs (§ 73b chapter 14), upgrading skills for persons who are hired with 
wage subsidies (§ 99 chapter 14) 
The costs under § 2 of chapter 1 of the Act on Active Employment: 
Wage subsidy costs (chapter 12) 
Mentoring costs (§ 78-81 chapter 14) 
Travelling expenses (§ 82 chapter 15) for persons participating in activation or training offers 
(chapters 10-12) 
65% 
reimbursement 
of: 
The costs under § 2 of chapter 1 of the Act on Active Employment: 
Wage subsidy costs (chapter 12) for persons with limited working capacity (§ 2(4) chapter 1) 
Wage costs (§ 70f chapter 13) of persons in flex jobs (chapter 13) 
Self-employment subsidies (§ 70g chapter 13) 
Employer grants (§ 71 chapter 13) for flex jobs (chapter 13) 
100% 
reimbursement 
of: 
Rotation benefit costs of the job centre when an employed temporarily in education and training 
period hired someone to cover for the employees (§ 98a chapter 18) 
Wage subsidies to employers who hired vocational training students (§ 98c-g chapter 18) 
 
Figure 9. Tasks and roles of the employment regions in the planning process 
Source: M-Ploy 2011: 22. 
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Appendix E – Belgium 
 
Figure 10. Sanctions as a % of the total number of unemployed, directly linked to the federal follow-up 
Source: Cockx et al. (2011a) 
 
 
Figure 11. Sanctions following from ‘transmissions’, as a % of the unemployed 
Source: Cockx et al. (2011a) 
 
 
 
70 
 
Figure 12. Total number of sanctions, as a % of the number of unemployed 
Source: Cockx et al. (2011a) 
 
 
Table 33. The division of labour among levels of government in Belgium concerning unemployment and social assistance and 
activation 
 The dominant 
government 
level involved 
in financing the 
benefit 
The dominant 
government 
level involved 
in setting the 
level & 
duration of 
benefits 
The dominant government level involved 
in designing, implementing and 
monitoring activation 
The dominant 
government 
level involved in 
financing 
activation 
budgets 
Unemployment 
insurance 
The central 
level: the 
federal social 
security system  
The central 
level: 
unemployment 
benefits are 
completely 
regulated by 
federal 
legislation 
PES are fully regionalized, but in 2003 a 
cooperation agreement defined the rules 
of the game… 
 
2003-today 
 
design: regional level, but constrained by 
federal legislation with regard to principles 
of availability for the labour market, and 
constrained by a  cooperation agreement 
with the federal level with regard to the 
organisation of the process 
implementation: regional level, but 
constrained by a cooperation agreement 
with the federal level with regard to the 
administrative organisation of the process 
monitoring: compliance with  cooperation 
agreement is monitored, but no 
monitoring of regional ‘performance’, but a 
systematic monitoring on the level of the 
individual unemployed is organized at the 
federal level 
From 2015 onwards (6
th
 State Reform)  
Design, implementation and (individual) 
monitoring are fully regionalized. 
2003-today 
The regional  
level is 
responsible for 
PES budgets, but 
a federal lump 
sum subsidy 
supports the 
regional budgets 
for activation 
services 
 
Activation 
instruments at 
the level of 
individual 
unemployed and 
individual 
employers are 
funded by 
federal level 
 
From 2015 
onwards 
Activation 
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Sanctioning of individual unemployed is 
also completely regionalized (but on the 
basis of federal unemployment regulation 
and federal normative framework)  
budgets are full 
regional 
responsibility 
 
Social assistance 
(leefloon/ 
revenue 
d’intégration 
sociale) 
The central and 
municipal level: 
the federal 
state budget 
and municipal 
budgets 
The central 
level: leefloon is 
completely 
regulated by 
federal 
legislation  
2003-today 
Implementing & designing: municipal level, 
but on the basis of federal legislation (only 
general principles of activation are 
specified in federal legislation) 
Monitoring: central level, but 
inconsequential 
From 2015 onwards 
Legislation on leefloon remains federal, but 
activation policy, as a competence, is 
regionalized. 
 
2003-today 
The central level 
organizes some 
extra funding for 
‘leefloners’ who 
are activated.  
From 2015 
onwards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
Endnotes 
                                                          
i
 It is our contention that there could be a more crystallised debate on what exactly is the purpose of the 
specific proposals: macro-economic stabilization, harmonization, developing social functions of the EU or a 
combination of those three. In some instances, policy proposals partly rely on implicit motivations without 
developing these explicitly. The three goals are interrelated but are not always congruent, some policy 
proposals might be seen as more preferable due to implicit motivations, and this could complicate the analysis 
of the effects and desirability of proposals. 
ii
 local governments might have better information about the local economic and employment context, they 
could be more able to form local alliances, and there might be strong regional divergence or a political 
intolerance for central authority (Mosley 2011: 11-13). 
iii
 Take, for example, activation policies. The transition from passive to active policies is certainly formal policy 
reform; it deals with the content of unemployment policies such as conditionality and eligibility. But as has 
been argued here and by others (Bredgaard & Larsen 2008, Van Berkel & Borghi 2008), activation could require 
decentralisation, which is a form of operational policy reform. So one type of reform might necessitate 
another. The reverse might also be possible: a call for more regional autonomy might include the transfer of 
responsibilities of unemployment benefit administration, which might be integrated with other policy fields 
that were already decentralised such as social assistance. The result of this operational policy reform would 
very likely influence the content of policy. 
iv
 These forms that Mosley identifies are very reminiscent of what Anne Kjaer named: deconcentration (where 
the centre holds its authority but delegates implementation) and devolution (where authority itself is 
decentralised) (2004: 149-169). ‘Devolution’ is the most common synonym for political decentralisation, while 
there is a multitude of possible synonyms for ‘managerial decentralisation’ – including: new public 
management reforms, performance measurement efforts etc. 
v
 Mosley does not categorise all federal states, such as Belgium and Germany, as federal multi-tiered labour 
markets. Although we support his categorisation when it comes to labour market policies, not classifying 
Germany and Belgium as federal is in contradiction to the overall political and institutional structure of those 
countries. What is meant by ‘regional’ is the type of decentralisation rather than the political-institutional 
context. 
vi
 Take for example two countries where local agencies can choose activation programmes from a central 
‘menu’, in one country there might be a very limited arrange of options and a centrally set ratio of which sorts 
of policies could be chosen in what measure while in the other there is a broad range and total freedom of 
choice. In practice, therefore, there might be a large difference between the two countries in the measure of 
flexibility even though this might not be so obvious on first sight. 
vii
 See also Mosley 2009, but as this concerns an earlier article of the same author Mosley 2011 will serve as the 
main reference as to incorporate the latest insights. 
viii
 Of course, this is not the only factor in institutionalising unemployment related insurances, normative and 
ideological consideration come into play 
ix
 It must be said that there is an almost endless variety in the constellation of benefits and institutions, the 
forms of moral hazard discussed here are ideal-types and are not necessarily mutually exclusive, the list is 
therefore not exhaustive. 
x
 This type of decentralisation is very pervasive, it is present in almost every Western country (Mosley 2011: 7). 
xi
 Which should not be confused with managerial decentralisation, MBO is a management approach which 
could be applied to political decentralised or multi-tiered systems as well. Obviously, the more autonomy local 
governments receive the less objectives they will have to adhere to, but MBO and political devolution are not 
mutually exclusive. 
xii
 Initially this number was lower, but this was expanded in 2011 to represent around 25% of the total number 
of municipalities. 
xiii
 Although again, we follow Mosley in his classification of Belgium as ‘regional political decentralisation’ but 
we recognise that, from a political perspective, Belgium is a fully-fledged federal state. 
xiv
 Of course, the fact that it does not partake in any European mutual learning processes influences the 
institutional setting, but the U.S. has a very different approach to labour market policies all together. 
xv
 In this case the Employment Security Administration Account. 
xvi
 See USDOL 2013: 4-6 for an extensive list or see 42 USC (7) § 503 for the applicable paragraph from the 
United States Code’s chapter on social security. 
xvii
 See 26 USC (23) § 3303  as well as 26 USC (23) § 3304 for the applicable FUTA paragraphs. 
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xviii
 See 42 USC (7), § 1321-1324 for all provisions governing this possibility. 
xix
 An interesting state requirement is that the states engage in: “the system under which employers are 
assigned tax rates in accordance with their individual experience with unemployment (and subject to the needs 
of the state program) is referred to as ‘experience rating’” (USDOL 2013: 9). But even though there are federal 
requirements for the implementation of experience rating there is a lot of bandwidth for states to set tax rates. 
xx
 The only federal limitation on eligibility is that it must be paid to persons who are ‘able and available’ which is 
defined in a very broad sense (20 CFR 604.3). The levels of benefit vary between a weekly maximum of $555 in 
Connecticut and $240 in Alabama 
xxi
 The requirements which come closest to performance indicators are reporting requirements, through which 
the federal level ensures that institutions share their data and information about the claimants. 
xxii
 This is a new requirement inserted by the The Middle Class Tax Relief & Job Creation Act of 2012, see below 
xxiii
 For the full text on the division of costs see 20 CFR 615.14 
xxiv
 It expired january 1st 2014 
xxv
 This is excluding the TAA, which is mostly governed by state law since 2002. 
xxvi
 This section of the ARRA is referred to Assistance for Unemployed Workers and Struggling Families Act, to 
install the requirements for these contracts the ARRA amended the aforementioned 26 USC (23) § 3304 
xxvii
 Section 2141 (b) of this act that for EUC08 ‘actively seeking work’ entailed that individuals were: registered 
for employment services, has engaged in an active search for employment, has maintained a record of such 
work search and when requested, has provided such work search record to the State agency, states must 
perform a certain number of random audits. For extended benefits 20 CFR 615.8 (g) states that ‘the state shall 
provide that an individual who claims Extended Benefits shall be required to make a systematic and sustained 
effort’ which has been defined in 20 CFR 615.2 (o)(8) as: a high level of job search activity, a plan of search for 
work, actions by the individual must be comparable to those actions by which jobs are being found by people in 
the community and labour market, a search should not be limited to classes of work or rates of pay to which 
the individual is accustomed or which represent the individual's higher skills, a search by every claimant 
(without exception for individuals or classes of individuals other than those in approved training), a search can 
only be suspended by severe weather conditions or calamities and there must be tangible evidence of an active 
search for work. 
xxviii
 Which is largest of all social assistance programmes in terms of numbers of claimants. 
xxix
 See 7 USC (51), § 2014 for eligibility criteria and 7 USC (51), § 2015 for disqualification grounds, the latter 
includes work requirements (§ 2015: paragraph d-1 i-vi). The state’s responsibility is limited to determining 
eligibility according to these standards. It can however pose its own conditions but they cannot be stricter than 
the conditions of similar programmes (similar programmes are defined as programmes operating under 42 USC 
§ 601 et. Seq. Paragraph 4-D of § 2015 determines that states must have available some programmes, these 
include training programmes but also provide the opportunity to develop own state programmes, including a 
workfare programme compliant with 7 USC (51), § 2019. 7 USC (51), § 2017 determines the calculation of the 
benefit value. The overall leeway states enjoy is interpreting the federal rules. 
xxx
 See 7 USC (51) § 2025 
xxxi
 See 7 USC § 7517 
xxxii
 Also in 7 USC § 7517 
xxxiii
 It is mostly up to the discretion of the Secretary 
xxxiv
 It is, however, a surprising feature that the legal relationship between the welfare agency and the benefit 
recipient is not federally codified. In other words, there is (since 1996) no federal welfare entitlement (Quade 
et al. 2008: 394). The federal requirements that are in place for states being able to apply for a block grant are 
just that: requirements for funds. It is hard to overestimate the importance of central codification (of the legal 
relationship between the state and the individual claimant) in terms of flexibility for the state level. In the 
German, Belgian or Danish cases, decentralisation is always done within the parameters of central legislation. 
However, all American states do currently operate a TANF programme. 
xxxv
 See 42 USC § 609 a 7 i, also see Brown (2012) for an excellent discussion on this subject 
xxxvi
 42 USC 607(d) specifies 12 work activities: (1) unsubsidised employment; (2) subsidised private sector 
employment; (3) subsidised public sector employment; (4) work experience (including work associated with the 
refurbishing of publicly assisted housing) if sufficient private sector employment is not available; (5) on-the-job 
training; (6) job search and job readiness assistance; (7) community service programmes; (8) vocational 
educational training (not to exceed 12 months with respect to any individual); (9) job skills training directly 
related to employment; (10) education directly related to employment, in the case of a recipient who has not 
received a high school diploma or a certificate of high school equivalence; (11) satisfactory attendance at 
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secondary school or in a course of study leading to a certificate of general equivalence, in the case of a 
recipient who has not completed secondary school or received such a certificate; and (12) the provision of child 
care services to an individual who is participating in a community service programme 
xxxvii
 Work requirements are legislated by 42 USC § 607, the state plans by 42 USC § 602. 
xxxviii
 And is now integrated into the WIA jobcentres 
xxxix
 Of course, the definition unemployed and the coverage of unemployment insurance varies a great deal 
between (and in the EU case, within) the U.S. and the EU. The comparability might not be so high, but these 
different definitions and scopes are used for national policy input.  
xl
 The one-stop-shops are governed by the Wagner-Peyser act but as amended by the WIA. The four PES 
responsibilities devolved to the states are: firstly, facilitate the match between job seekers and employers. 
Secondly, provide labour market information to job seekers and employers. Thirdly, to make appropriate 
referrals to related employment and training programs and finally to meet the work test requirements of state 
unemployment compensation systems (see also O’Leary & Eberts 2008: 3). 
xli
 See 20 CFR 661.250 for the requirements of Workforce Investment Area designation. 
xlii
 Pursuant to 29 USC 2821 the State WIB includes the governor, two members of each state legislature and 
governor appointed business, labour and expert representatives, furthermore some chief elected officials and 
the one-stop-shop operator. 
xliii
 See 20 CFR 661.300 for the legal standing and 20 CFR 661.305 for the responsibilities of the local WIBs. 
xliv
 See 20 CFR 662.400 for the complete list of possible operators and 20 CFR 662.420 for the guidelines under 
which the WIB may fulfil this role. 
xlv
 See 20 CFR 662.200 for the mandatory partners and 20 CFR 662.230 for their responsibilities. 
xlvi
 Even though the local WIB might not necessarily have any staff, they must include one member representing 
every mandatory partner, a member representing the operating agency, business and trade association 
representatives (see 20 CFR 661.315) 
xlvii
 See 20 CFR 667, the requirements for funding are codified in WIA section 112, Wagner-Peyser Act section 8, 
and 20 CFR 661.220, 661.240 and 652.211-652.214. 
xlviii
 See  20 CFR 666.110 
xlix
 See 20 CFR 667.300 and 20 CFR 666.110 
l
 See 20 CFR 661.240 
li
 See 20 CFR 667.400 for the responsibilities of the Secretary, 20 CFR 667.410 for the responsibilities of the 
states. 
lii
 “The total performance bonus funding made available in WIA is comparable to that of the TANF high 
performance bonus system, which limits bonuses to no more than 5 percent of a state’s TANF block 
grant. Wiseman (2004) reported that the $200 million in annual performance bonuses amounts to less 
than 1 percent of TANF expenditures” (Heinrich 2007: 287). 
liii
 The use of funds is limited to “any one or more innovative programs under titles I or II of WIA or the Carl D. 
Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act” (see 20 CFR 666.210). 
liv
 States are eligible for incentive bonuses when they achieve at least 80 percent of the negotiated (expected) 
performance levels on each of the performance measures and a cumulative program area score of at least 100 
percent for each of the major performance measure groups. 
lv
 Concerning the quality of data, the USDOL has experimented with independent verification of the data 
submitted but these results of these attempts have been kept confidential, further exacerbating the initial 
doubts. 
lvi
 More management by directives than MBO 
lvii
 As defined by Eurostat, according to the Eurostat metadata. 
lviii
 This practical form of moral hazard shows that the ideal-types of moral hazard do not always cover the 
broad spectrum of reality. Creating work programmes with limited actual service provision resembles parking, 
but by doing so the municipalities transferred unemployed to the federal budget, which is a form of dumping. 
lix
 See § 341-349 of SGB III for regulations on the amounts of contributions, how they are collected and when 
they are paid. § 363-365 SGB III determines that the funding of the BA comes from the federal level, any deficit 
the BA may experience is also covered by the federal level (Ebbinghaus 2007:35-36). 
lx
 See § 280-283 and 367-370 of the SGB III in particular 
lxi
 For legislation on the duration see § 147-148 SGB III, for the level see § 89, 129, 149-154 and § 118-121 for 
eligibility and for exemptions and limitations see § 155-160. 
lxii
 See §11 & 282 SGB III 
lxiii
 See § 7 and 19-20 SGB II for the levels (based on Art.1 of the constitution), § 10 SGB II for eligibility 
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lxiv
 See § 20, 21 SGB II, conform 22, 22a, 22b and 22c  SGB II the Länder set the rates which municipalities 
contribute. 
lxv
 Miscellaneous social services include: the care of minors or children with disabilities or interpersonal care, 
debt problems, psychological care and addiction counselling (SGB II §16a) 
lxvi
 See SGB II § 22a-c 
lxvii
 According to MISSOC comparative database for Germany (2004-05-01) [checked: 15-05-2013]. 
lxviii
 See § 20-23 SGB II 
lxix
 See §15 SGB II 
lxx
 Originally called Arbeitsgemeinschaften (ARGEn) but as of 2011 they are called Gemeinsame Einrichtungen or 
‘Job Centers’.  
lxxi
 See § 16 & 44b SGBII 
lxxii
 As said, in 2007 there were 69 Optionskommunen and this was expanded to 105 in 2011, for the relevant 
paragraphs see §6(3) and 6a SGBII 
lxxiii
 See § 6-6d SGB II 
lxxiv
 See § 367 SGB III and 368 SGB III 
lxxv
 Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 20/12/2007 
lxxvi
 See § 48-48b SGB II 
lxxvii
 See § 48 SGBII 
lxxviii
 § 3 and 29 SGB III 
lxxix
 § 1 SGB III 
lxxx
 These agreements set quantifiable goals within three permanent categories: reducing the number of 
persons depending on basic income support; preventing long-term dependence on basic income support 
benefits; and improving re-integration measures (Wegrich 2013: 11-12). 
lxxxi
 See here, here and here for the Rahmenziele 
lxxxii
 Social partners used to occupy a central position in the operational policy making, but their role has been 
cut short as a result of the Hartz reforms (Jantz & Jann 2013: 235).    
lxxxiii
 See §11 & 282 SGBIII 
lxxxiv
 “Since the reform [Hartz], selection into training measures and job creation schemes have deliberately 
used cream skimming in order to choose those clients who will benefit most” (Konle-Seidl 2008: 24). 
lxxxv
 In practice this means the BA (either as a local office or through a consortium with the municipalities) or the 
Optionskommunen. § 14 and 16 SGB II determines that ALG II beneficiaries are entitled to the same 
instruments as ALG I beneficiaries, § 16(2) SGB II provide additional services for those with specific 
disadvantages (psychological counselling, child services etc.), § 29 provides the option of a ‘starting allowance’. 
lxxxvi
 See § 44c & 44d SGBII 
lxxxvii
 See § 44b(3) SGBII 
lxxxviii
 See §47 SGB II 
lxxxix
 See §48 SGB II 
xc
 See § 47(1) & (2) SGB II, in the case of disagreement, the kooperationausschuss determines (§ 44
e
 SGB II) 
xci
 See § 49 SGB II, but the federal court of auditors checks benefit payments and the use of funds (§ 46 SGB II) 
xcii
 271 municipalities were merged to 98 municipalities. It is often stated that Denmark has reorganised its 
municipalities in order to deal with the decentralisation (Mosley 2011: 22), but the some argue that the 
reorganisation (upscaling and merging) of the Danish municipalities provided a window of opportunity to 
rekindle former municipalisation dreams (Bredgaard 2011: 766-768). 
xciii
 Jobcentres were to be organised as independent municipal agencies only responsible for job (re)integration, 
while benefit administration should remain a responsibility of either the local governments (uninsured 
unemployed) or unemployment insurance funds (insured unemployed). See the Act on the responsibility and 
control of the active employment measures chapter 2 paragraphs 5-12 
xciv
 See chapter 7 of Act on Unemployment Insurance for the formal requirements for state sanctioning of 
unemployment insurance funds. 
xcv
 See chapters 14-15 the of Act on Unemployment Insurance 
xcvi
 See § 76-78 of chapter 12 of Act on Unemployment Insurance 
xcvii
 See chapter 9 of Act on Unemployment Insurance for the levels and chapter 10 of the same act for the 
eligibility (§ 55) and duration. 
xcviii
 See Act on Active Social Policy chapters 2 and 3 eligibility, chapter 4 (specifically § 25-26) for the levels. 
xcix
 See §99 of the Act on Active Social Policy 
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c
 According to §100 of the Act on Active Social Policy. The services which are reimbursed fall under chapter 6 
and 11 of the Act on Active Social Policy. 
ci
 The Act on Active Social Policy covers the activation of social assistance and the Act on Active Employment 
that of the unemployment insurance and social assistance beneficiaries who receive social assistance solely 
because they are unemployed and those who are not in rehabilitation programmes (§ 2 of the latter Act). 
Chapter 5 of the Act on Active Employment regulates who can register at the jobcentres. 
cii
 The implicit argument is that deterrence is a more effective and efficient way of fighting individual moral 
hazard than enhancing the motivation of the unemployed (Bredgaard & Larsen 2008: 5). 
ciii
 See chapter 7 of the Act on Active Employment for the minimum requirements. Chapter 3 of the Act on 
Active Social Policy and title IV of the Act on Active Employment determine the types of services and the 
conduct of the jobcentres. Chapter 16 of the Act on Active Employment determines the rights and duties of the 
insured unemployed, chapter 17 the rights and duties of social assistance beneficiaries. 
civ
 See chapter 23 of the Act on Active Employment. 
cv
 www.Jobindsats.dk, see chapter 11 (§59) Act on the responsibility and control of the active employment 
measures. The National Labour Market Authority administers this statistical database, the regions and 
municipalities must report their efforts through common or certified IT systems. 
cvi
 See chapter 12 Act on the responsibility and control of the active employment measures 
cvii
 These jobcentres may be run by other actors than the municipality (§ 4 b Act on Active Employment), which 
is in fact encouraged. 
cviii
 This does not mean that Danish local governments do not engage in the formulation of strategic annual 
employment plans, they do. 
cix
 On a critical note, one might say that the activation policies deployed by the regional PES, still do not reach 
out (or, at least not sufficiently) to the ‘stock’ of long-term unemployed. Hence, in reality, replacing art. 80 by 
the new mechanisms of sanctions and control may not have changed the situation of the long-term 
unemployed with regard to activation that much.  
cx
 A key to understanding the Cooperation Agreements is the following ‘division of labour’: the regional 
authorities were ready to share ‘facts’ with the federal authorities, but not to transmit an overall evaluation of 
the search effort of the unemployed individual (on which they have much more and more detailed ‘first-hand’ 
information than the federal authority). 
cxi
 Dullien has proposed a system in which the supranational level would provide 50% of the last earned wage 
as a unemployment insurance, national governments can top this up to whichever level they prefer. The 
supranational contribution would only run up to twelve months per unemployed, after which the national 
governments take over again. See Dullien 2014 for the latest version of his proposal. 
cxii
 Keep in mind that the figures in Figure 3 represent LFS statistics and to not necessarily reflect those who 
would be covered under an E(M)U-wide scheme. It does not fit within the objective or scope of this paper to go 
into a detailed costs and divergence analysis of the E(M)U-wide scheme. 
cxiii
 This section only pertains to the PES enacted under the Wagner-Peyser Act, the WIA will be described 
separately. The WIA has amended the Wagner-Peyser Act, but has explicitly retained the separate funding 
stream for PES services (Balducchi &Pasternak 2004: 49). 
cxiv
 The maximum duration is six months, after which the benefit has to be renewed at the one-stop-shop, 
giving the municipality or the local office some influence over the duration (§ 15 SGB II, see also Konle-Seidl 
2008:27). 
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